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ABSTRACT:  
This Study argues that the development of indigenous forces as part of Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) presents risks to the British Army where they do not adhere 
to international law. Indigenous forces may not use the skills that they are taught 
responsibly, because traditions of civil-military control do not exist within receiving 
states. This could implicate their British trainers in any legal violations that 
indigenous forces commit.  
The linkage between SSR and Professionalisation theory is limited in literature. 
This produces limited understanding of this risk of SSR, which may undermine 
efforts to develop indigenous forces in the future. Utilising an examination of 
existing literature, UK military doctrine and open ended interviews with a range 
of practitioners and former serving military personnel to examine this dilemma, 
this study makes several recommendations. 
Indigenous force development has emerged as an effective method of securing 
states, reducing the need for large scale ground interventions. SSR advocates 
the development of local security systems by processes of local ownership. 
However, the British doctrine produced to prepare soldiers for this task is lacking 
in its understanding of indigenous force development, utilising case studies and 
terminology that do not aid the concept.  
This study examines gaps in the doctrine’s understanding of development in 
conflict and the range of scenarios likely to be encountered. Subsequently, the 
study identifies a policy-practice gap, where actions at the implementation level 
differ to what is directed at the policy level. UK forces have developed tactical 
paradigms that are contrary to public policy and doctrine, but are effective at the 
tactical level; both at developing indigenous forces and safeguarding British 
forces. The adoption of a UK Due Diligence Policy on training indigenous forces, 
methods advocated by other areas of the UK military, such as coaching and 
mediation and utilising the experience of NGOs to mitigate the dangers identified 
is also examined. 
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Introduction 
This study examines the risks of professionalising indigenous forces during 
Security Sector Reform. Indigenous force development has emerged as a 
fundamental tool in Western military intervention in the last decade, providing 
both local legitimacy and the ability for Western states to assert security and 
political influence abroad. However, current experience and civil-military relations 
literature suggest that indigenous forces, when developed by Western forces may 
abuse the skills they are taught, thus causing moral, operational and strategic 
repercussions. This risk is amplified by the effectiveness of civil-military oversight 
exposing such events within the UK, which some observers mistakenly confuse 
with Lawfare. 
It will be argued that the mitigation of the risk of indigenous forces abusing the 
skills that they are taught is essential if the UK is to maintain its aspiration of 
developing indigenous forces abroad. By examining UK doctrine on indigenous 
capacity building, by utilising key informant interviews and pertinent literatures on 
British Army SSR experiences this study identifies the emergence of decoupling, 
where what is advocated within UK policy and doctrine differs from what occurs 
during tactical implementation. The study identifies situations where indigenous 
force trainers are faced with ensuring principles of civil-military control in contact-
where mentors and indigenous forces operate within combat situations on the 
frontline, without having undergone the necessary selection or development 
themselves to do this effectively. By examining organisations outside the British 
military and NGO practices related to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
development, as well as practices utilised elsewhere in the UK MOD but unlinked 
to indigenous force development, this study asserts that the British Army can 
improve the preparation of its troops to develop indigenous forces. 
This study reviews areas of literature that concern indigenous force development. 
It finds that there is a policy-practice gap between SSR policy and its 
implementation in practice. Specifically, approaches to indigenous force 
development and the encouragement of them to behave appropriately, have 
been neglected. The study examines civil-military control as conceived 
respectively by Huntington and Janowitz and Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
literature embraced by Western governments such as the UK and USA. 
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SSR focuses on practical doctrine written by governments, NGOs and security 
observers; advocating the development of indigenous security structures in order 
to improve security in host nations and for the ultimate goal of achieving 
international security. However, Jackson (2011) bemoans the lack of depth to 
modern SSR literature. It is therefore necessary to examine more dated civil-
military relations theorists, namely Kamrava (2000), allege that military capability 
development without enhanced civilian oversight is dangerous. Secondly, that 
there must be a balance in development of military force; to protect people from 
an assertive military, this is rarely mentioned in SSR literature. This concern over 
the balance of development of military power and civil oversight has been termed 
as ‘Feaver’s Problematique’ (1996); that the military must be kept strong enough 
to protect the population. On the other hand it must be kept weak enough to 
protect the population from the military. Despite these concerns and SSR’s 
underdeveloped theory, it has earned primacy amongst security actors today. 
Taking heed of such paradigms, this study examines how the British Army have 
responded to the risks of SSR. 
Chapter One examines the recent history of intervention that has led the UK to 
this point. Aydin (2012) argues that intervention has become increasingly 
complex. The end of the Cold War produced a need to intervene in an increasing 
array of complex conflicts in the mid-1990s, intervention that was tailored by the 
legacy of the past decades of the Cold War. This intervention manifested itself in 
a development led foreign policy, utilising foreign aid to effect change in unstable 
states. The ineffectiveness of solely development initiatives reaffirmed the 
necessity of security provision within unstable states. Combined with the events 
of 9/11, the UK and NATO developed a renewed desire to exercise influence and 
development abroad by pursuing SSR (and nation–building). Despite the 
advantages of this strategy, giving the prospect of security and aid to troubled 
states, it was not without its detractions. 
Chapter Two explores the impact of indigenous force development without the 
necessary civil-military control safeguards that exist within the UK, and the risk 
that such forces will abuse the skills that they are taught. This risk is strongly 
aligned with the political, socioeconomic and resource driven causes of conflict 
identified by Ohlson (2008) and Hoeffler (2012). Furthermore, the states that most 
require indigenous force development often host aggravating factors to the risk 
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of misbehaviour, the use of drugs and the recruitment of children within their 
ranks. 
The risk of indigenous forces abusing their skills if taught by British military 
personnel has moral, strategic and operational ramifications. The modern 
proliferation of technology and social media amplifies the impact of abuses of 
military behaviour both domestically and in the host state. The behaviour of 
indigenous forces can go as far as to undermine the stability of their own state 
and improve chances of success of an insurgency within the unstable state. 
Beyond the operational importance of encouraging proper behaviour are the legal 
ramifications. There is a risk that should indigenous forces abuse the skills that 
they have been taught by UK forces, that the UK troops will be held accountable 
for such violations in UK courts. Some observers, such as Croft & Tugenhat 
(2013) and Marcantel (2013) define this as the pervasive effect of Lawfare. 
However, it is not; such legal oversight is a fundamental aspect of civil-military 
oversight. It should not be confused with Lawfare, which is the use by insurgents 
of a liberal state’s legal mechanisms to have an operational effect. By forcing 
Western forces to consume time and effort to modify their procedures to remain 
legally compliant, the Western ability to fight the insurgent is weakened. 
Accepting that there is a risk of legal oversight denouncing the activities of some 
that the UK may train, there must be effective attempts to mitigate this risk 
however possible, whilst still producing indigenous force capability. 
Chapter Three argues that UK MOD doctrine and the preparation of UK troops to 
develop indigenous forces are inadequate to mitigate the risk of indigenous forces 
abusing the skills they are taught. With the examination of UK doctrine on the 
development of indigenous forces, and the use of interviews with former serving 
soldiers, practitioners and observers in the field of SSR, this study takes issue 
with the terminology, breadth and selection of case studies that comprise British 
SSR doctrine. Poor doctrine affects negatively the preparation it affords UK 
soldiers. The study identifies a large deficit in the understanding of developing 
indigenous forces in conflict, specifically in situations daily in the throes or 
immediate aftermath of battle, which has been termed in contact. 
Further to the deficits in paradigms of SSR there appear to be instances of 
decoupling at play within the British Army’s approach. Namely that the 
understanding of developing indigenous forces in line with civil-military norms is 
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understood in one way at the tactical level, but not mirrored at higher levels in 
policy or doctrine. The decoupling takes the form of tactical commanders 
developing indigenous forces by turning a blind eye to certain violations of 
Western civil norms within the context of the society that they are in, in exchange 
for the long-term benefit of continuing the capability development of the 
indigenous force. The study has termed this pragmatic patience. Furthermore, 
these actors understand the impact of personality, character clash and personal 
safety in a way that is not iterated in doctrine or policy. 
The study recommends the need to utilise more external experience and 
knowledge already at play within the UK MOD in order to aid the development of 
an indigenous force’s adherence to IHL. Firstly, the UK Government should adopt 
a policy in line with the UN Due Diligence Policy, in order to eliminate the 
instances of decoupling and unsanctioned pragmatic patience currently at play. 
By further utilising concepts and experience of NGOs and other actors, such as 
IHL integration in training, advocated by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), bottom up approaches and culturally applicable approaches, the 
UK MOD could improve its development of indigenous forces. Techniques such 
as Coaching and Mediation, already at play within certain areas of the Army could 
further help mitigate the risk of indigenous forces abusing the skills they are 
taught, specifically aiding those troops that find themselves advising indigenous 
forces in contact. 
The study utilised key informant interviews with practitioners and experts on the 
tactical level, from military, academic, professional and NGO spheres. Albrecht 
and Jackson (2015) utilise such an approach in their RUSI White paper on 
Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997-2013. Some of the focus of the 
study has been informed by the author’s personal experience of two tours in 
Afghanistan and consequent observations that many at the tactical level were 
utilising concepts and methods that were not taught in pre deployment training. 
The danger with this, of course, is that one may enter the study with preconceived 
ideas. However, the study has evolved over the course of the research. The 
realisation that existing SSR literature was heavily weighted toward advocated 
government sources, as opposed to a complimentary scholarly bloc influenced 
the decision to utilise existing civil-military relations theory in this study’s analysis 
of the UK’s approach to indigenous forces capability development. 
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The political and legal sensitivity of the subject is one where the study has at 
times been constrained. Initially this project started as a small MOD Fellowship 
study on the development of indigenous forces, broadening into the MA by 
Research thesis that it now is. As a serving Army Officer the author has balanced 
the sensitivity of the subject at hand against privileged insights into the process 
of training indigenous forces. Subsequently it was agreed to mitigate these 
interests by only interviewing retired members of the Armed Forces. This allowed 
these interviewees to speak with the candour that their experience warranted, 
whilst also protecting the UK MOD from the comments of serving soldiers that 
they otherwise might sanction. Added to this, it was agreed with my tutor, during 
the research ethics application process, that all participants would retain total 
anonymity, even those who gave consent to be freely quoted.  
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Literature Review: SSR, professionalisation and developing indigenous 
forces? 
This literature review will assert that by examining works on Professionalisation 
and Security Sector Reform (SSR), it is apparent that developing a military force 
in an unstable state, is dangerous when civil-military control does not exist. The 
UK military in conducting such development may become vulnerable to ever 
greater legal scrutiny and risk. Furthermore, SSR literature and doctrinal 
guidance exist but are undeveloped in relation to the concept of guarding against 
this risk. They are largely practical and thus, devoid in the conceptual 
background in civil-military relations theory. The latter theory posits the risk of 
indigenous force development, but lacks the practical implementation to earn 
primacy amongst these two schools of thought.  
SSR is the process by which effective political, legal and security institutions 
within a state are developed in order to improve its security and thus, stability. It 
emerged, Sahin and Feaver (2013) claim, as a merger of security and 
development agendas during the post-Cold War era. Professionalisation is ‘how 
occupations become recognized as ‘professions’’ (Neal & Morgan, 2000:9). 
Within military sociology literature, Professionalisation enables the 
establishment of effective civilian control of the military within the state. By 
focusing on the seminal works of Samuel Huntington in Soldier and the State, 
and Morris Janowitz in The Professional Soldier, this review will show that there 
is an insufficient grasp of the dangers of developing indigenous forces to provide 
increased security within states without the effective existence, or at least 
concurrent development, of civil-military control. Furthermore, there is minimal 
linkage between the two concepts in modern academic literature, despite the two 
processes being closely related. SSR practice has taken priority over the existing 
works on military sociology; the two should be considered in tandem.  
Security Sector Reform 
The development of the security mechanisms of less developed states has 
earned vogue status in recent years amongst scholars of International Relations. 
Jackson (2011) argues that the role of SSR has become a more significant 
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aspect of intervention to Western forces than it ever has been before1, although 
he argues that corresponding academic focus on the topic is lacking. 
Subsequent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have, however, emphasized 
the importance of long-term security and SSR in unstable states. The relevant 
aspects open for reform are emphasized by Chalmers as comprising the ‘military, 
police, judicial services and civilian management of these’ (2000). Whereas the 
UN (2015) highlights SSR objectives more as aimed at institutional 
interdependence, enhancing ‘effective and accountable security for the State 
and its peoples, transforming institutions to make them more professional and 
more accountable.’. The process of SSR is often in response to a variable set of 
circumstances, whether a state is in the grips of an insurgency, suffering from 
weak institutional power, or in the aftermath of civil war.2 
Why conduct SSR? 
There are competing motives for pursuing SSR. It is conducted to provide 
security within a state’s borders. Albrecht and Jackson (2009) emphasize that 
the rehabilitation, or creation of security institutions, is a precondition for 
development. Members of the international community see the rehabilitation of 
dysfunctional societies as desirable for the people of those states, but also as 
Jackson (2011) argues, the international community has self interest in more 
stable foreign states which might otherwise be a haven for terrorist training, or 
encourage large scale migration to Western states. There is not a fixed format 
for SSR, the assistance given to another state to develop indigenous forces can 
consist of selected aid or the full spectrum of support such as intelligence, air 
power and military resources. However, most approaches emphasize the need 
for ownership of the process by host authorities with a focus on safeguarding 
human rights and the rule of law. SSR incorporates all forms of security 
development, including police and legal functions, not just those pertaining 
strictly to the armed forces. It is a long term and comprehensive approach. 
                                                                
1 It could be argued that the previous development of colonial armies was SSR. However, it was performed 
in a different context, with colonial troops subservience to the UK government, instead of the development 
of autonomous governance that we see today. 
2 See also: The United Nations SSR Perspective: Sustainable Peace Through Justice and Security, The UN, 
2013 
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SSR challenges 
Jackson (2011: 1813) argues that SSR produces a dilemma for contemporary 
policy makers because they must create liberal states out of non-liberal ones. 
Supporting this observation, Kamrava (2000) claims that militaries may be armed 
and developed without the effective control of a legitimate state. Indeed, 
Hendrickson (2009) agrees that SSR is at a cross roads between the balanced 
principles of professionalism, which Huntington advocates, and the desires of 
states to implement security mechanisms for their own security needs. SSR is 
not meant to merely develop the armed forces of a state to provide mere physical 
security with SSR; there must be the simultaneous development of the state’s 
ability to control the application of violence in line with the principles of civil-
military control proposed by Huntington and Janowitz. 
Local ownership of SSR 
Increasing commentary on the interplay between international legal norms and 
the process of SSR has recently emerged. The UN and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) claim that local ownership 
should be a basic principle of SSR. Nathan (2007), for example, is a forceful 
proponent of this principle. However, other scholars have argued its difficulty. 
Oosterveld and Galand (2012) claim that local ownership has often had to be 
sidelined in SSR, because of the interplay between local and international norms. 
More specifically, Gordon (2014) claims that donor organizations and states are 
held to account for their actions to a greater extent than recipient countries by 
legal considerations. However, Donais (2009) stated that it is mainly a point of 
practicality that SSR contributors have more experience of conducting the 
process, whilst host nations have, by their very nature, not had experience in 
SSR. It is difficult to fully conform to the local ownership principle of SSR and 
simultaneously abide by all operational and legal standards expected of Western 
forces. 
There is concern over the legitimacy of parties receiving support during SSR, 
which raises questions about their ability to own their own SSR. Donais (2008) 
claims that the identity of indigenous forces receiving aid could be of concern to 
the donor parties. ‘State’ parties are often the recognized force by their nature as 
a government or most powerful faction, but often do not conform to Western 
models of democratic accountability. Giustozzi (2007) supports this concern with 
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observations of the Taliban infiltration of SSR processes in Afghanistan, whereby 
Western coalition forces ended up training and developing those they were 
purported to oppose, because of the fractious and complicated loyalty systems 
that existed within local politics3. However, Donais (2009) is more focused on the 
importance of local ownership of SSR and the risks that it poses. He returns to 
the issue of ownership by asking a question framed by Norwegian researcher, 
Hansen; ‘If local authorities decide they would like to have a bicycle with square 
wheels, should the internationals allow them to have such a bicycle’ (in Donais, 
2009: 121). Indigenous governments must learn from their own mistakes. 
However, should this be at the expense of severe harm to the donor nation’s 
reputation? Thus, Oosterwald argues, Western states must be wary of the 
dangers of SSR in underdeveloped states.  
Where SSR has gone wrong  
Processes of SSR have fallen victim to abuse of power by indigenous forces.4 
Giustozzi (2007) reported that Afghan Police went on the rampage at a market in 
Kandahar Province in 2006, when they were not paid their wages, this was the 
result of corruption within the locally managed police system. Similarly, Robert M. 
Perito (2011) detailed in a United Institute of Peace report, the actions of Iraqi 
Commando Brigades in 2007, who during the day conducted military actions 
alongside their United States mentors, but at night would go back and burn down 
the homes of those who they had come into contact in the day, who they deemed 
to be insurgents.5 Similarly, the UN has been plagued by accusations surrounding 
the conduct of its non-Western troops, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. Such 
events highlight the disconnect between non-Western forces and the standards 
expected of Western forces, thus reinforcing Kamrava’s civil-military control 
concerns of military forces without traditions of civil-military control. Conversely, 
Afghanistan does present a number of examples of indigenous forces adapting 
successfully to British expectations of behaviour later in the Afghan conflict. 
                                                                
3 We will not explore this concept further, as deciding the legitimacy of the government of the host state is 
a long and tangled subject. However, the potential Security Sector Reform Donors may develop forces with 
an alternative agenda should be acknowledged. 
4 See also: M. Mwengula, (2011) The Security Sector Reform and the Promotion of Human Rights and the 
International Humanitarian Law in Africa and A. Onoma, (2014) Transition Regimes and Security Sector 
Reforms in Sierra Leone and Liberia. 
5Commentary on violations of international law by troops during SSR, see: The ICRC and development of 
IHL and Human Rights during SSR; Saferworld; USIP 
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Interview 6 highlighted the compliance to international law of Afghan forces, 
despite a legacy of misbehaviour in preceding years. 
The policy practice gap 
Such dangers suggest that states should develop a better understanding of SSR 
implementation before embarking on it. Sahin and Feaver (2013) argue that the 
scope of SSR policy is perhaps overly ambitious and that it lacks conceptual 
depth. Whilst the SSR concept does provide a set of over-arching principles and 
objectives, these policies are less developed at the enactment level. Scheye 
(2010) identifies this as ‘an SSR policy-practice gap’, where international SSR 
policy objectives differ from the methods by which they are implemented. This 
study will therefore examine whether a ‘policy practice gap’ exists, between 
British Army understanding of SSR and its implementation.  
Professionalisation 
The mismatch, they argue, between SSR policy objectives, targets and outcomes 
appears to stem from a broader disconnect between ‘a state as a society’ and ‘a 
state as a collection of governance institutions’ (2013: 1060). This alludes to the 
significance of civil-military relations. It is essential to understand the connection 
between the military as an institution and the state and society. 
The two schools of thought developed by Huntington and Janowitz each provide 
important perspective on civil-military relations. Cohen believes that they 
produce ‘two brilliant works that disagree, but encompass the most penetrating 
assessment of the military profession in a turbulent age’ (1997: 220). However, 
Feaver (1996) believes that they are unevolved theories that fail to properly 
explain civilian control of the military today. He claims that the academic focus 
on the theories has been too narrow, that ‘empirical literature is vast and 
informative, but [that] it has advanced primarily along theoretical lines of analysis 
laid out by Huntington and Janowitz’ (Feaver, 1996: 150). However, it is not the 
fault of Janowitz or Huntington that the schools of thought have failed to evolve 
beyond theory into more practical studies. The merits in both schools lay initially 
in the framework created by Huntington, but secondly by the identification of the 
importance of society to the process. This study, will, therefore take note of this 
framework to explore the more practical application of such theories to SSR. 
What is professionalisation? 
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Professionalisation is relevant to this study, because of the framework it offers 
this study’s examination of indigenous force development. Huntington (1957) 
devised two essential tenets for professionalism; a thorough command of the 
exercise of military force, and the importance of civil control over military action, 
in order to provide society with a safeguard against the military interference in 
civilian matters. He believed that professionalism induced officers to approach 
the conduct of military operations as full time professionals trained and schooled 
in their field, under provisions of ‘expertise, responsibility and corporateness’ 
(Huntington, 1957: 8). Lanswill deemed military officers as responsible for ‘the 
management of violence’ in conflict, believing they should be encouraged to 
attain expertise in their field of endeavour achieved by ‘considerable training and 
experience’ (in Huntington, 1957: 13). Professionalism sets modern soldiers 
apart from the amateurs of the 18th and early 19th centuries, where ‘military 
officership in Europe was primarily determined by lineage rather than the 
professional military education associated with academies and war colleges’ 
(Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000: 2). Huntington believed that entrenching an 
officer’s self-worth in upholding his country’s democratic system in line with 
professional standards, discouraged violation of a nation’s laws and deviation 
from, the acceptance of civil-military control, also guarding against what he refers 
to as ‘Praetorianism’6. 
Huntington (1957) asserted that civil-military control is the result of training and 
tradition within a military, whereas Janowitz (1960) argues that different states of 
civil-military relations are due to the stages of development of a nation’s society. 
Civil-military control is determined by the level of development of a society and 
not by domestic military processes. He advocates for the necessity of societal 
development in order to establish a liberally educated officer corps which will 
adhere to society’s democratic standards. The divergence between Huntington 
and Janowitz on how effective civil-military control is developed is relevant to this 
study. Huntington’s theories would see professionalizing the military as the 
source facilitating effective civil-military control during SSR. However, Feaver 
(1996) argues that Huntington’s work should be seen as a point of departure, 
                                                                
6 Nordlinger and Pearlmutter examine praetorianism, and see it as one of the fundamentals of civil control 
defeated. See: Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments, and Amos 
Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army”. 
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rather than a stopping place. On the other hand, Janowitz claims that the level 
of societal development predicts the behaviour of indigenous forces. He 
identifies societal development in vague terms, but typically makes the distinction 
between established European and North American states in contrast to other 
less developed Asian and African states with undeveloped societal structures. 
Challenge in how they are developed 
Challenging the manner in which effective civil-military relations are developed, 
Janowitz claims integration and a set of civil-military checks and balances offer 
safety, rather than division. Perlmutter (1969) builds on Janowitz’s work by 
warning against too distinct a military identity; Nordlinger (1977) further enforces 
Janowitz’s view that the military intermixes with the more powerful of civil western 
society, thus, reducing the effect of division between military and civilian 
spheres7. The implication is that it is the background from which a military 
originates that influences its behaviour. Kårtveit and Jumbert (2014) claim that 
Huntington resisted the argument that economic, political and military 
development are naturally connected to one another and to Professionalisation. 
However, for Janowitz (1975), civil-military control is enforced by class structures, 
aspirations within the military and the level of education of officers. He proposes 
that the feudal legacy that exists in western nations produces a strong loyalty 
between the military’s officers and the established political system; this has 
relevance to the development of indigenous forces. This school of thought 
suggests that it is not the military training itself that will encourage forces to 
behave, but the background and society from which they originate and belong.  
This is a very black or white interpretation of what drives indigenous force 
behaviour. The earlier examples of SSR failures and of the later success in 
Afghanistan suggest a combination of both societal development and military 
training have an effect. 
Types of civil control 
                                                                
7Analysis of Huntington’s work continues today. Nielsen (2012) claims that Huntington’s separation is too 
stark. His theory fails to acknowledge the intertwined nature of politics and warfare. Simpson (2012) 
similarly makes this criticism, although his identification of political involvement lays sharply at the 
tactical, not national level that Nielsen focuses on.  
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Although Huntington argued for civil control of the military, not all forms of civil 
control are preferable he claimed. Objective control should be the aspiration of 
the modern military professional seeking to maximize military power whilst 
respecting effective civil control. Subjective control is similar to the overbearing 
military presence of Praetorianism in that it undermines the balance of civil-
military control. It invokes darker connotations, whereby political control is 
exercised by specific groups within society who have a role in the direction of 
military action; ‘Government Institutions, such as the Crown; Social Classes, the 
aristocracy or Liberal Bourgeoisies; and by Constitutional form, this may be a 
non-democratic or totalitarian government’ (1957: 83). Subsequently, the 
balance of control over military action may be disjointed in such systems. 
Whereas Objective control sees a ‘maximizing of military professionalism’ 
(Huntington, 1957:83), military officers adhere to the laws and values of society 
and hold that military participation in politics is ‘the antithesis of objective civilian 
control’ (1957: 83). Subsequently, SSR missions must be wary of states where 
political systems exercising subjective control exist.  
Types of nation 
The contrast between Janowitz and Huntington’s theories highlight the 
complexity in this debate and the various degrees of professionalism. Whilst 
Huntington’s theory is important for maintaining control over the military’s 
‘management of violence’ and holds true today in more developed nations8. 
Janowitz (1975) introduces the distinction between new and old nations,9 which 
are applicable to this study. He claims that developed older and underdeveloped 
new nations have very different military professions. Where Professionalisation 
has taken place in new nations, there exists a different level of control of military 
forces than in the West. This is a very significant consideration when developing 
the indigenous forces of new nations.  
SSR aims to achieve the Professionalisation of indigenous military forces in new 
nations. Industrialized old Western states originate from traditional society and 
have long standing and steady social structures focused on stability. Janowitz’s 
                                                                
8 Janowitz makes the distinction between developed ‘Old’ nations, consisting of the established Western 
democracies of Europe and North America, and ‘New’ nations, economically and politically undeveloped 
states often from Africa and Asia. 
9 See also: ‘peasant societies’ where the economy is far more agrarian based, power is held by urban elites 
and political change is slow. 
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(1964) introduction into civil-military theory of African and Asian countries 
develops the civil-military relations debate. Swept into the path of modernization, 
having achieved independence since the Second World War, there exists a 
national aspiration to modernize within new nations socially, economically and 
politically. Such states initially differ from old nations by allowing ‘military 
involvement in politics in order to embark on a goal of rapid modernization.’ 
(Janowitz, 1964: 137), this involvement is not permanent. Albright (1980) 
highlights that shifts in civil-military relations is a function of the effectiveness of 
civilian control, so initial military involvement in the civilian sphere should 
diminish as the nation develops its society and functions of civil-military control. 
Military presence in politics 
The lack of military presence in politics in old nations, Praetorianism as 
Perlmutter would describe it, marks a distinction between them and new nations 
however. This is a differentiation, which concerns Western forces attempting to 
develop indigenous forces in new nations. Although a characteristic of a 
postmodern military is ‘increasing interpenetrability of the civilian and military 
spheres, both structurally and culturally’ (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000:), 
the presence of military leaders, often fuelled by individual or group ambition can 
vastly undermine the cause of civil oversight of the military, which has proven so 
effective at ensuring military accountability in the West. Moskos (1988) claims 
that very occasionally, there is justification for military presence in politics- the 
breakdown of civil democratic institutions being one. Some states also argue for 
the accelerated pace of economic and social development under military 
leadership. However, adherence to modern societal norms is likely to suffer 
without the presence of strong civil oversight, especially given what Kitson (1971) 
identifies as the military’s Organisational disposition to violence. This risks the 
emergence of Praetorianism, which Nordlinger (1977) identifies as the antithesis 
of civilian control arguing that it arises when there is conflict between soldiers 
and civilian governors that undermines their civil supremacy. Those aiding the 
Professionalisation of forces should be aware of its impact. 
The British Army’s approach to developing indigenous forces should be tailored 
to take better account characteristics of new societies, as these affect the 
behaviour of their militaries. Janowitz (1975) believes limited technology, the 
division of labour and limited collection of aims and goals, such as educational 
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and social advancement allows lesser developed societies to absorb more social 
dissensus than modernized societies. This reduces the political opposition a 
government faces and subsequently violation of Western norms of 
Professionalisation are accepted more freely. This is because public reaction to 
failure to adhere to Western norms of civil-military control is dependent on the 
cultural context. International law for example, conforms to the western 
interpretation of ‘universal rights’ and may not match the view of developing 
nations.10 In the UK, where public outrage has influence, violations of 
humanitarian norms committed by military forces may generate more public 
impact than they would in a new society. A nuance, therefore, exists that violation 
of Western codes by indigenous military forces trained by Western forces may 
have little effect on the public conscience of an indigenous force, but could still 
have an effect on the civil-military compact in the UK. This dichotomy will be 
discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
The state of the society in a new nation could present obstacles that will affect 
the development of indigenous forces by Western nations seeking to improve 
international security. By developing unity, expertise and corporateness under 
the guise of professionalism, the army can become an aid to society under 
objective civilian control. Yet, by wholly accepting Huntington’s model and by 
making a more socially ambitious officer class better at the ‘management of 
violence’, Kamrava (2000) believes a danger comes with improved military 
equipment, weapons, training, and a professional approach to combat. These 
similarly enhance military identity and political aspirations.  
 
 
The military problematique 
Professionalisation without civil-military control creates danger. Feaver (1996) 
describes this concept as the military problematique. On one hand, the military 
must be kept strong enough to protect the population. On the other, it must be 
kept weak enough to protect the population from the military. However, 
development of new nations occurs without the liberal education or clear civil-
                                                                
10 Universal Rights, synonymous with Human Rights. The term ‘Universal’, because they are applicable to 
all citizens worldwide. See: J. Donnelly, 2013, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. 
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military divide that Janowitz believes ensures the political system. With the risk 
of increased Praetorianism, indigenous force development could lead to military 
disregard for civil direction or enable the military to disregard their responsibilities 
under a state’s legal framework. Kårtveit and Jumbert claim that, ‘The study of 
civil-military relations is closely intertwined with processes of transition from one 
system of governance to another, whether through military coups, or through non-
violent political reforms, and with democratization more generally.’ (2014: 1) This 
observation is particularly apt for this study’s discussion of indigenous forces.  
For Oosterwald (2012) there are a raft of legal concerns for a developing nation. 
Jackson agrees, ‘the technical methodology of state building leads to 
construction of entities that may look like states but in reality lack legitimacy or 
capability’ (Jackson, 2011: 1806). Therefore, what are the implications of these 
shortcomings for the UK when engaging in SSR, specifically in relation to the 
training of indigenous forces by the British Army? By joining Kamrava’s dilemma 
and reports of indigenous force misbehaviour during SSR, this study will examine 
the interplay of these factors. In doing this it will ask specifically the question of 
whether or not there are risks for the United Kingdom in developing indigenous 
forces of unstable states without pre-existing civil-military relationship 
frameworks.  
There must be more academic interrogation of SSR efforts. Jackson (2011) 
argues that academic SSR research has been lacking11. Much of the literature 
available is from government and NGO sources, with analysts more focused on 
the practicalities of SSR than the theory underpinning it. Where Jackson is 
correct is his aspersion that SSR is not a fixed concept. Each situation calling for 
SSR is different, subsequently the approach to it must also be. The UN has 
balanced its approach to SSR across legal, police and military frameworks, in 
line with concepts of civil-military control. However, Hendrikson (2009) argues 
that some states employ SSR for their own security means and that they want to 
create internally secure states that will not undermine their own security. Albrecht 
(2015) similarly highlights the conflicting priorities of numerous state and NGO 
actors during SSR. Subsequently, delivering a solution that provides security 
                                                                
11 Research on civil-military relations has also fallen behind. Kårtveit and Jumbert (2014) argue that the 
Arab Spring has highlighted the need to refresh perspectives on civil-military relations, which have been 
neglected of late, especially in the Middle East since 1980. 
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with effective civil-military control is difficult. Consequently, this divergence has 
been identified as a key area of study for this dissertation, in relation to 
Kamrava’s (2000) observation that there is danger in professionalizing 
indigenous forces in SSR without the simultaneous existence or development of 
effective civil-military control; this creates risk for the UK government in a number 
of ways that should be examined. 
Conclusion 
The contrast between Huntington’s and Janowitz’s comprehension of civil-
military relations theory highlights the importance of a broader approach to 
indigenous force development than mere MCB, conducted by the British Army. 
The UK, as an old nation, has the traditions of civil-military control and legal 
behaviour influenced by its culture and history, which many undeveloped new 
nations do not possess. 
Whilst the goal of Professionalisation developing effective management of 
violence and ensuring the implementation of effective civil control remains 
important, British forces must be cautious that the Professionalisation of a 
military force brings risks without the influencing nature of a responsible society. 
This will be referred to as Kamrava’s dilemma. Whilst this study sees the works 
of Huntington, Janowitz, Nordlinger and Perlmutter as highly influential in the 
development of civil control of the military, such works have been neglected in 
recent years, and have not evolved to mirror the practical application of SSR 
efforts today.  
Security Sector Reform has emerged as the practical implementation of 
Professionalisation theory. Whilst civil-military relations scholars receive criticism 
for being narrowly focused on theory and not practice, SSR has earned criticism 
for lacking academic rigour and its ad hoc approach. Subsequently, a policy 
practice gap is alleged to have emerged, where the process of SSR differs 
between literature and enactment. Furthermore, Giustozzi and Perito highlight 
cases where indigenous forces trained by Western states have abused their 
military power.  
SSR has the potential to progress the forces of new nations to be very effective 
at the management of violence. However, as Jackson highlights, without the 
same societal restraint that ensures militaries use their skills responsibly that is 
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present in old nations this could be dangerous and allow the indigenous forces 
of new nations to abuse their new military skills. Whilst there is understanding in 
British government literature of these concepts, the understanding must deepen 
to mitigate the risk of misapplied violence. 
This dichotomy has presented three major questions that will form the focus of 
this study. Firstly, is there a risk associated with training militaries to be effective 
managers of violence, when there does not exist the required liberal tradition to 
underpin the very values of professionalism? Secondly, how do the dangers of 
developing indigenous forces without a tradition of civil-military relations 
manifest? Thirdly, has a policy practice gap emerged between the British Army 
policy on SSR and the mitigation of the dangers that British forces experience 
when developing indigenous forces without a tradition of civil-military control? 
Whilst the desire to progress may be great amongst indigenous forces, it 
presents very real risks. These risks will be examined in this thesis, as will the 
ways in which they may be mitigated. Evidence of this mitigation may prove 
evident in British Army Doctrine and practice. 
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Chapter 1 - What is the significance of indigenous force development to 
the British Army’s approach to modern intervention? 
Indigenous force development will increasingly dominate the British Army’s 
approach to modern intervention as part of SSR. The UK Government aims to 
minimize the spread of instability abroad by processes of Security Sector Reform 
that develop government forces to provide their own domestic security. This 
Chapter will explore the development of modern intervention before the 
emergence of SSR. Understanding this development creates a clearer 
comprehension of the risks and rewards of the UK’s desire to develop of 
indigenous forces today. This Chapter will provide an overview of the role of 
indigenous forces in Western intervention from the closing years of the Cold War 
to today, the impact of the 9/11 attacks on this, and the issues surrounding SSR 
and developing indigenous forces. The Chapter will focus on the advantages and 
the disadvantages of utilizing them.  
Intervention has changed rapidly over the past three decades and continues to 
evolve. It has a more comprehensive nature today comprising more actors, 
governmental assets and methods than before; this has simultaneously 
developed the usefulness of indigenous force development. Although focus has 
traditionally centered on hard military intervention, scholarly interpretations of 
intervention are disparate. On a basic level, intervention is ‘the use of force by 
one country to interfere in the internal affairs of another’ (Schraeder, 1992: 2). 
However, Aydin (2012) argues that it has begun to assume a number of forms 
and can be divided into economic, military and diplomatic acts for the purpose of 
influencing the affairs of another state. Schraeder acknowledges that intervention 
has developed to comprise economic options such as sanctions, and any form of 
interference in the domestic policies of a country. A wide range of affairs 
traditionally demanded intervention by an external actor, including: ‘civil wars, 
overt or covert operations aimed at destabilizing foreign governments and 
initiation of hostile actions against other nations’ (Aydin, 2012: 20).12 Over recent 
years, however, there has been an upturn in the prevalence of internal conflicts 
and instability requiring intervention. 
                                                                
12Further nuances exist within the situations that lead a state to intervene, and the level of approbation from 
the state to that intervention and urgency of the incident may decide what form the intervention takes. 
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Humanitarian crises in the Balkans and the attack on the World Trade Centre 
reemphasised the relevance of physical military tools in intervention. Despite the 
rise of economic and diplomatic intervention in the 1990s, the necessity of 
legitimate security forces able to provide stability endures. The aftermaths of 
intervention in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan has affirmed this. In response 
to the deployment of large interventionist forces within COIN campaigns in both 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Jackson (2011) argues that the role of developing 
indigenous forces has become a more significant aspect of intervention to 
Western forces than ever before13. Further instability in foreign states has 
motivated the UK’s need to develop the security structures of foreign states.  
In response to this, the UK MOD has developed doctrine and policy that 
envisages the deployment of British forces to develop indigenous forces 
overseas at its heart. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3/40 – Security and 
Stabilisation: The Military Contribution, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/11- 
Partnering Indigenous Forces, is the most relevant British doctrine on the subject. 
Stabilisation describes the UK MOD’s aim to counter religious fanaticism, 
instability in North Africa and recurring conflict traps. Through traditional and 
modern methods of intervention, that include the development of indigenous 
forces to provide security effect. 
At the forefront of these policies is the aspiration to engage with unstable North 
African states. Political leaders, including Prime Minister David Cameron have 
advocated the need to engage with unstable states, by developing their 
indigenous forces, before they descend into political turmoil and develop into 
ungoverned space that threatens UK interests. Indigenous forces provide a 
number of advantages by being low cost, more politically acceptable and 
operationally prudent in intervention. However, they come with risks. The UK 
Government, despite a will to engage with indigenous forces, perceive a risk that 
they may abuse the skills that they are taught. 
The place of SSR in recent intervention 
The evolution of intervention over the past three decades has given prominence 
to the development of indigenous forces today. It has produced four key themes 
                                                                
13 Some may argue that the previous development of colonial armies was. However, such development was 
performed in a different context, with colonial troops subservient to the UK government, instead of the 
development of autonomous governance that we see today. 
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that are central to Western interventionist principles: early engagement with 
unstable states, physical security, local ownership of security development and 
the need for development to be comprehensive in nature. Western interventionist 
strategies varied through the 1980s and 1990s, heavily influenced by external 
threats, events, and domestic political trends. The significance of indigenous 
force development today is the culmination of the success and failure of 
strategies to counter these situations. In the midst of the Cold War, Scott (1996) 
argues that a number of the West developed strategies to deal with Communism 
with varying success. Truman, Eisenhower and Carter each emphasized policies 
of containment, avoiding intervention. However, the election of Reagan saw a 
shift to a less isolationist stance.14 Lagon (1992) claims that Western 
governments cultivated a combination of containment, by refusing the 
deployment of combat troops to derail Communist influence, whilst also 
supporting proxy indigenous forces to undermine Communist influence. This, 
Scott (1996) argues, was a proactive policy aimed at restoring influence in the 
aftermath of Vietnam. National Security Decision Directive 75 (January 1983) 
further underlines Reagan’s willingness to detach from mere containment, ‘US 
policy will seek to …weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links 
between [Soviet Third World allies] and the Soviet Union’ (in Scott, 1996: 1). This 
policy was subsequently hailed as successful, encouraging the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. However, with the reduction of the Berlin Wall, the end of this period 
marked a focal shift to a less military interventionist doctrine.  
Importance of security in intervention 
The 1990s represent a period of confused foreign policy for the UK that varied 
between an unwillingness to use force and a realization of the importance of 
military effect in intervention. Initially there was an assertive approach to Foreign 
Policy, with intervention in the Gulf. However, the 1990s developed a shift away 
from Western state unilateralism. Travis (1998) argues that the 1990s became 
synonymous for the policy of ‘promoting democracy’ emphasized by using AID 
as a force for influencing democratic sustainability and a more internationally 
harmonious approach to foreign policy; termed ‘assertive multilateralism’ by 
Madeleine Albright. There was reduced emphasis on military effect. Sterling-
                                                                
14 Interestingly, each was President in the aftermath of a major conflict involving US troops: e.g. WWII, 
Korea and Vietnam. 
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Folker (1998) believes this surge of Soft Power and Multilateralism was driven by 
the lack of support for unilateral action within Western states. However, the policy 
was not entirely effective.  
The realization of the importance of security functions in intervention and unstable 
states was not a new discovery however. Thompson (1966) emphasized the need 
for political solutions underpinned by security within a threatened state, 
reinforcing Lt. Col. P. Vann’s maxim ‘Without security, nothing else will last’ (in 
Simpson: 2012: 149). The crisis in the Balkans realized the limitations of solely 
Soft Power and Assertive Multilateralism. The UK pushed the US to endorse 
military action during the Kosovo crisis, emphasizing the need for decisive 
physical intervention, for which Sterling-Folker asserts Clinton received extensive 
criticism for his indecision. However, Kampfner (2003) argued that the UK acting 
under the ‘Blair Doctrine’, rallied for intervention on humanitarian grounds, 
nowhere more apparent than in the Balkans and Kosovo, which saw a massive 
expansion of Peace Support Operations and humanitarian intervention from the 
West. This example, whilst emphasizing the West’s will to intervene on 
humanitarian grounds, also highlights the importance of military forces in 
neutralizing instability. 
Comprehensive approach  
Failed Assertive Multilateralism emphasized the need for comprehensive 
approaches to intervention. Although the less invasive doctrine of the 1990s 
utilized economic and political means to pursue a more humanitarian agenda, it 
did so with limited success without the concurrent ability to influence physical 
security. NATO made the observation that, ‘Military means, although essential, 
are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-
Atlantic and international security’ (2014), likewise for solely political and 
economic approaches to instability. Both the UK and US Governments have 
acknowledged the strength of uniting approaches to conflict, ‘where we have 
pursued more holistic approaches….we have helped partners to transform their 
security sectors in ways that have had a direct, positive, and sustainable impact.’ 
(2009:1). The merger of approaches has increasingly been referred to as a 
Comprehensive Approach; an approach demanding civil, political and military 
instruments to manage and resolve crises. Although, some almost two decades 
earlier Schraeder described intervention in the same vein as ‘the calculated use 
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of political, economic and military instruments by one country to influence the 
domestic or foreign policies of another’ (1992: 3), so it could be argued that the 
‘Comprehensive approach’ is merely re advocating the need for tools to be 
unified. 
Local ownership and security 
Despite this, the need for security development remains. Moreover, local 
ownership has emerged as a key theme in intervention and development of 
security institutions. Travis (1998) claims that as intervention missions sought to 
develop judicial institutions in the 1990s, many societies resisted rapid change, 
with AID alone initially producing limited impact without the consensus of the host 
nations. This served to emphasize the importance of local ownership of 
approaches to instability. Nathan claims that experience has shown that ‘reform 
processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the 
part of those undertaking reforms’ (2007: 1), whilst a Western state imposing an 
idea on a weaker state may have more experience and possibly international 
legitimacy, it remains unlikely to garner effective support amongst a group who 
feel it imposed upon them. What will work, Nathan argues, is ‘a process-oriented 
approach that respects and empowers local actors [which] is more likely to yield 
good results in the long-term’ (2007: 3). The emphasis on the importance of local 
ownership of development efforts and in the importance of security to counter 
crises emphasizes the significance of indigenous forces that can take account of 
their own security. Developing indigenous forces allows simultaneous economic 
and political development with local security ownership by the military. This 
remains the experience of both Assertive Multilateralism and the subsequent 
UK/US Doctrine. 
Post 9/11 
Although the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan mark a shift from 1990s foreign 
policy, the emphasis on SSR further highlights the importance of local ownership 
of efforts to tackle instability. The 11th September 2001 attacks triggered a fresh 
focus onto counter-terrorism and failed, failing and unstable states. The NATO’s 
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, which evolved into COIN campaigns against 
radicalized insurgencies, saw the initial success of the invasions mired by 
botched reconstruction and poor security in the aftermath. Jackson argues that 
‘the desire to propagate the war on terror and to shore up “failed states” has led 
 28 
Western ideas of support to veer strongly towards enhancing developing 
countries to maintain their own security’ (2011:1810). Whilst the initial response 
to 9/11 was a reactive invasion of Afghanistan by NATO, Aydin (2012) argues 
that the ‘Bush Doctrine’, with the support of Tony Blair developed as a proactive 
approach, emphasizing the utility of pre-emption in smaller conflicts to prevent 
their escalation, or the development of a threat to Western states. This marks the 
emergence of a desire to utilize comprehensive methods to address instability 
before it becomes a threat. Interventionists now face increased internal insecurity 
within states. ‘A distinguishing feature of the contemporary period is the decline 
of wars between states and the rise of wars within states, sometimes resulting in 
state collapse’ (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000: 3). More specifically, Walter 
(2011) claims that recurring civil wars have become the dominant form of armed 
conflict in the world today.15 Resultantly, the UK Government has sought ways to 
counteract this instability. 
What is The Stabilisation Doctrine? 
One way in which the UK government has embraced the need to engage with 
unstable states is with Security and Stabilisation-The Military Contribution, Joint 
Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40. It is a piece of doctrine that exists as a guide to 
the UK military’s efforts to encourage stability abroad.16 Stabilisation is defined 
as ‘the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or emerging 
from conflict’ (JDP 3 -40: 2010: xi). It is important to this study, because it 
identifies the development of indigenous forces as a crucial aspect of supporting 
these states. JDP 3-40 pays some mention to the need to balance civil oversight 
and security, but maintains that ‘security in stabilisation is non-discretionary.’ 
(JDP 3 -40: 2010: xiii), similar to Lt Col Vann’s maxim.  
The JDP details the MOD’s strategy within Government’s broader approach to 
reducing international conflict. However, the UK’s approach has come under 
attack. Jackson (2011) argues that the military overly focuses on the security 
aspects of state building, whilst forgetting the development of society. In 
interventions, security governance is carried out by ‘military officers from the 
international community whose concerns are primarily technical (i.e. teaching 
                                                                
15 See also J. Fearon and D. Laitin, (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War 
16 See: Building Stability Overseas (2011) for the UK Government’s argument for the need to encourage 
stability abroad. 
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people to shoot straight) rather than political (i.e. teaching them who to shoot at 
and on whose orders)’ (2011:1807). By conducting state building ‘as a ‘technical-
administrative’ exercise focusing on the technicalities of constructing and running 
organizations rather than on the politics of creating states’ (2011: 1803), the UK 
approach to intervention has societal deficits in its understanding of rebuilding a 
state; it focuses heavily on developing the methods of security, yet neglects the 
importance of simultaneous civil-military oversight that was identified in the 
literature review. Marshall (2011) similarly identifies a fractious and disunited 
approach to SSR within the United States system, with different departments 
focusing on a raft of priorities. Similarly, Jackson (2011) argues that whilst the UK 
managed to strive towards a more unified approach to SSR after its success in 
Sierra Leone, this has digressed and economic hardships made it easier for the 
MOD, DFID and the FCO to let the Conflict Poolbe eroded in favour of protecting 
their internal budgets.17 
Greater awareness of instability 
Despite some deficits in the scope of the Stabilisation doctrine, it is definitive that 
engagement with unstable states should form a central part of UK strategy. Since 
conducting the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the UK 
Government has increasingly emphasized the attention warranted by internal 
conflicts caused by unstable states, arguing that in a globalised and 
interconnected world, nations cannot remain isolated. They have rallied for the 
increasing need to engage with unstable states before a state of conflict 
emerges, seeing a rise in the presence of jihadism and extremism abroad as a 
threat undermining British domestic security. This risk, now centred on North and 
Central Africa where a cycle of violence and conflict traps have fermented 
instability and aided insurgency has led to another UK government policy 
document, Building Stability Overseas (BSO), that emphasizes the need to 
engage instability before conflict takes hold. The UK Government fear is the risk 
of instability becoming epidemic; ‘the effect of violence in one region can spread 
to other more stable areas through refugee flows, terrorist activity, and organized 
crime groups, all of which can have an impact on our own security.’ (BSO, 2011: 
                                                                
17 The Conflict pool is a three agency fund aimed at collaborative approaches to conflict prevention 
between. 
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8). It advocates utilizing soft power, diplomatic efforts and military training teams 
to strengthen foreign government and security institutions. 
Danger in North Africa 
There is growing political belief that the risk emanating from areas like the Sahel 
is profound and requires this focus. In the aftermath of the Algerian hostage crisis 
in January 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron and Foreign Secretary 
William Hague both highlighted the threat of instability in North Africa18. The 
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee has highlighted the risk in such areas, 
claiming ‘parts of North and West Africa have become a new frontline in the 
contest with Islamist extremism and terrorism’ (2014: 37). The Prime Minister had 
earlier claimed that, ‘There are parallels between North Africa and 
Pakistan/Afghanistan’ (20 Jan 2013, in The Guardian). Going onto highlight the 
broader threat that such regional instability posed, asserting that jihadism in North 
Africa was ‘a global threat and it will require a global response.’ (2013, in The 
Guardian). The Prime Minister personally expressed concern that the empty 
quarters of the region have become a ‘magnet for jihadists’. Although the 
Committee (2014) asserted that the risk to the UK in smaller insurgencies is less 
pronounced whilst the on-going situation in Syria continues to attract the bulk of 
jihadists. However, it still endorses the need to act, ‘unless there is concerted 
international action to address instability in the Western Sahel-Sahara region, 
and its root causes, the problem will not go away.’ (Foreign Affairs Committee, 
2014: 4).  
Advantages of engaging 
Early engagement in unstable states offers the UK government multiple 
advantages, including financial and domestic security terms. BSO (2011) claims 
that countries like Yemen and Somalia will be used as a launch pad for terrorist 
attacks if the international community allows them to become ungoverned. 
Therefore, the development of their security institutions promotes the domestic 
and international interests of the UK. Marshall (2011) supports this assessment 
from the perspective of the US. He asserts that global security and stability are 
core interests for the United States. Therefore, developing mechanisms through 
                                                                
18 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/20/algerian-hostage-crisis-terrorism and 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26668665 The UK needs a "bigger footprint" in Mali and other Saharan 
countries to fight extremism, a committee of MPs says. Last Accessed: 26 June 2015 
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SSR to ensure such security is in its national interest. Similarly, there is emphasis 
that the consequences of engaging are positive. Pickering and Kisangani (2006) 
claim that intervention generally has two effects on the receiving country, it 
frequently shortens the length and impact of instability and civil war, and from 
experience in the Cold War, it has the effect of democratizing the governments 
of the receiving state. Early engagement to foster stability before conflict is also 
fiscally wise. The UK Government has claimed measures that promote the 
prevention of conflict are ‘relatively cheap compared to dealing with it once it has 
broken out and having to deploy armed forces’ (BSO, 2011: 10).  
Disadvantages of engaging 
However, there are disadvantages to engagement and intervention. The political 
popularity of intervention often influences a Government’s will to engage, as was 
seen in the US in the 1990s. Marshall (2011) argues that a state must navigate 
the national will to intervene to meet its operational needs. Additionally, there is 
the unpopularity of risking one’s own soldiers. Dobos (2010) argues that a state 
must overcome the risk of both domestic and international scorn if it wishes to 
intervene beyond its borders. There is a strict set of conditions that allow the 
intervention of one state in the affairs of another on humanitarian grounds, 
primarily the imminent or ongoing risk of the loss of life. The balance within this 
dichotomy has meant that the training of indigenous forces is an advantageous 
way to counteract instability as part of SSR.  
The training of indigenous forces by UK and US militaries has gained increasing 
significance as a result of the balance in intervention between soft power and that 
of hard power. Furthermore, the escalation of the religious fundamentalist threat 
and conduct of two major COIN campaigns led the UK and its allies to look ahead 
with a greater emphasis on conflict prevention and pre-emption. Jackson argues 
that a stability-focused approach has a two fold aim: ‘SSR interventions seek to 
develop security systems that provide security both to the population of those 
countries but also to the international community’ (2011:1817). The development 
of indigenous forces meets this aim; it provides a more locally driven solution 
whilst minimizing the number of Western troops needed for deployment, along 
with a number of other advantages, such as knowledge of the local culture, 
language, religion and politics. These advantages will now be discussed. 
Advantages of indigenous forces 
 32 
By developing indigenous forces both the host country and the intervening state 
gain significant benefits in long-term security, and a stronger political mandate. 
Utilizing indigenous forces in COIN and pre-emptive stabilisation efforts, allows 
forces to secure their base areas, one of Thompson’s COIN tenets.  
Developing an indigenous force to deliver security offers both tactical and political 
advantage to an intervening state. Simpson highlights a key lesson from the 
Dhofar crisis in 1970 that ‘counter insurgency does not require a large-scale overt 
presence of foreign troops’ (2012: 152). The operational advantages of a local 
force providing security, rather than a foreign force are well documented. Nagl 
(2002) argues that they transcend the cultural and linguistic barriers that Western 
troops may struggle with, likely also being of the same religion; an indigenous 
force can provide security without the cultural division that may affect intervening 
forces and a local populace. He goes so far as to say that ‘on their own, foreign 
forces cannot defeat an insurgency; the best they can hope for is to create the 
conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them’ (p. xiv, Nagl).19 
The tactical advantages unified under the banner of enhanced cultural 
understanding and legitimacy might afford the intervening state more rapid 
success, however the use of indigenous forces also enhances the strategic will 
to engage by reducing the risk to interventionist troops and the cost of intervening. 
This provides a stronger domestic political narrative, allowing Western 
governments to assert influence more broadly, in contrast to the US reticence to 
intervene in the 1990s.20 However, such advantages must be tempered with 
patience; it takes time to develop a strong indigenous force. Furthermore, the 
host nation to the conflict requires a long term solution, whatever advances may 
be achieved by foreign troops during an intervention, if there is no established 
mechanism to fill the void in delivering security once they depart, their efforts will 
likely as not be in vain. Therefore, ‘reconstruction and reform has become a 
central element of international intervention’ (Jackson, 2011: 1810). Creating a 
                                                                
19 For more information on the tactical advantages of indigenous forces in COIN, read Nagl’s revised 
Preface, written after his second operational tour of Iraq. He claims that such forces ‘gain intelligence 
through the public support that naturally adheres to a nation’s own armed forces….they understand the 
tribal loyalties and family relationships that play such an important role in the politics and economies of 
many nations…they have innate understanding of local patterns of behaviour that is simply unattainable by 
foreigners’ (Nagl, 2002: xiv). 
20 The desire to reduce the number of Western troops deployed in consensual deployments has led to a 
greater privatization of warfare and manifested itself in the increasing utilisation of Private Military 
Contractors (PMCs).  
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trained, responsible indigenous force offers this. Furthermore, Chalmers 
(Saferworld, 2000) argues that well trained indigenous forces accountable to 
government, stems host nation political resentment. Without this he claims that 
frustrated citizen’s vigilante actions may trigger conflict. For these unstable host 
states, the advantages of developed indigenous forces are more profound and 
long term than the nuanced differences that they bring to an intervening state. 
Engaging domestically 
As well as long term reward of enhancing regional and international security, it is 
likely that the intervening state should expect less opposition to their endeavours 
domestically. Indigenous forces offering security in their own country present a 
stronger political narrative for the intervening state than using their own troops. 
Minimising the ‘large-scale overt presence of foreign troops’ (Simpson, 2012) 
means that the army of the unstable state absorbs the risk to life. Additionally, 
Simpson highlights a more nuanced political observation from the Indonesian 
confrontation between Britain and Indonesia: ‘giving limited help to an indigenous 
resistance movement …does at least leave the possibility (which we should be 
careful not to destroy) of withdrawing from the confrontation without intolerable 
loss of prestige’ (2012: 163). Furthermore, indigenous force development is a 
cost effective form of intervention. Despite the economic might of the USA, they 
recognize the advantage of indigenous forces; ‘The military’s increasing practice 
of training and equipping indigenous forces to counter terrorism in their home 
countries is a highly decisive, comparatively low-cost approach to fighting global 
terrorism’ (US DOD, Daniels, 2010). General Petraeus (2010) similarly agrees 
that indigenous forces are vastly more cost effective in COIN campaigns than 
deploying interventionist forces abroad. This provides added incentive to their 
use, similar to the advantage to developing unstable states in order to avoid full 
blown interventions in the first instance. 
 
Disadvantages of indigenous forces 
Despite such advantages, the most prominent consideration for the use of 
indigenous forces in SSR is in the title: it entails their reform. Faced with an 
imminent threat, the development of an indigenous force may not be fast enough 
to stem instability. The state of conflict within the state may further complicate this 
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training. In this instance, JDP 3-40 argues that an intervention of foreign troops 
may be absolutely necessary, until such a point as the indigenous force can be 
responsible for the country’s own security. There is acknowledgment in British 
defence doctrine that this will not occur overnight: ‘It will take time to build 
sufficient host nation forces to replace them (interventionists)’ (JDN 6/11, 2010:3-
22). As well as the time it may take, indigenous forces are also heavily influenced 
by the stage of conflict in the state. JDN 6/11 claims indigenous forces would 
ideally be trained before a conflict emerges both because it is easier and because 
it reduces the risk of the conflict emerging, as JDP 3-40 states. However, if a 
state of conflict exists, indigenous forces should ideally be removed from the 
frontline to conduct this, thus, reducing the manpower of the force at that point 
The requirement for more training also alludes to this study’s discussion of 
Professionalisation. Indigenous forces by their nature of requiring reform, will 
unlikely have achieved the levels of professionalism desired in a Western state. 
As a result of this, there may be concerns over the legality and propriety of 
indigenous force behaviour. This is witnessed in the UK government’s current 
considerations in the provision of aid to indigenous forces in North Africa, a 
concern also raised by the civil-military relations scholar Feaver (1996). 
What next? 
A lack of Professionalisation presents the UK Government with a dilemma. On 
one hand the government perceives a need to engage with and develop foreign 
security sectors; conversely they also fear the results of such development. The 
debate over intervention in Nigeria highlights this dichotomy. The recent House 
of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee Report (2014) emphasized the necessity 
of engaging with such states, highlighting the immediate effectiveness of 
intervention in Mali in 2013. However, in efforts to promote security abroad, the 
UK MOD may have to work with partners, both state and non-state actors, whose 
practices may raise alarm on moral grounds and the ability of indigenous forces 
to use the skills they are taught responsibly.  
The cycle of violence- What is the conflict trap? 
Africa has proven particularly susceptible to instability because of the 
manifestation of conflict into a cyclical process throughout the continent. In 2011, 
the UK government claimed that, ‘ninety percent of conflicts initiated in the first 
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decade of the 21st century were in countries that had already had a civil war’ 
(2011: 11); these include CAR, Burundi, Uganda, and Sudan. In fact, it may not 
be the start of new conflicts that is the primary problem. Walter (2011) claims that 
there is a need to permanently end the conflicts that have already started, not 
simply prevent new ones. Collier et al. (2002) have termed this the ‘conflict trap’21, 
where civil war might be broken up by brief outbreaks of peace, but the conflict 
does not actually end. It is not that these regions are particularly susceptible to 
the onset of numerous civil wars, but rather that they are fundamentally unstable 
as a result of prolonged conflict of varying intensity. 
The danger of the conflict trap 
The conflict trap thesis is significant to this study not only because it predicates 
further instability by removing any legacy of stability which the development of 
indigenous forces hopes to counter, but because within such conflicts, behaviour 
at odds with the Liberal Western moral standard, such as torture, extra-judicial 
killing and the deployment of child soldiers are commonplace.22 Regions 
absorbed in conflict traps have become prone to the perpetration of such 
humanitarian abuses by government armed forces and armed groups, such as 
Uganda and the Central African Republic. Additionally, there are differing 
characteristics to these conflicts: the use of child soldiers, a violation of IHL in 
itself, and drug taking amongst troops that fuels them and makes humanitarian 
abuses more likely. These methods will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 
Two. 
NIGERIA- UK Government’s problem with intervention 
Aspirations to develop indigenous forces are, however, undermined by the 
behaviour of respective militaries. The British Government publicly advocated 
engagement with Nigerian security forces. The Foreign Affairs Committee 
believes that in ‘Libya, Mali and Nigeria the threat is currently greatest (to 
stability)’ (2014: 3). Observers might have expected the UK Government to follow 
up on its intervention in Libya in 2012 and intervention in Mali in support of French 
troops in 2013 with greater engagement in Nigeria. However, the committee 
received evidence that underscores the political problem faced in developing 
                                                                
21 Conflict trap: term established by Collier et al. (2002) 
22 In a military context, this is the observance of rules of IHL. 
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stability through SSR in Nigeria: ‘We are aware of very serious concerns relating 
to the ethics and conduct of elements within the Nigerian army, including 
allegations of torture and extra-judicial killing’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2014: 35). Such risks resultantly impact the stream of government 
decision making. The Committee accepts that the UK Government is ‘anxious 
about the possibility of advice and training given in good faith being subsequently 
misused in a field setting, and of the British officer who provided the training 
becoming implicated.’ (2014: 35). This has subsequently led to a delay in 
assistance being provided, which in turn has frustrated the Nigerian Government. 
To establish how such concerns for British forces legal complicity in training 
indigenous forces with suspect record can be overcome, it is crucial to begin to 
understand the issues and risks surrounding disregard for humanitarian and 
human rights law that are stunting solutions to instability. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that indigenous forces have become an essential aspect of modern 
Western intervention strategies. Having previously been limited in their 
implementation to Third World proxy wars and major COIN campaigns, the 
training of indigenous forces has proved a defining aspect of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan COIN campaigns, but also looks set to be a staple construct of the 
UK and USA’s approach to improving international stability through SSR-based 
intervention. 
Security Sector Reform and the development of indigenous forces can provide 
long term and legitimate security in unstable states. Developing indigenous 
forces is both operationally and politically astute for an interventionist. Originating 
from the states concerned, indigenous forces have both a linguistic and cultural 
advantage in the conduct of a local stabilization campaign and providing security 
in their own state. Politically, the development of indigenous forces minimizes the 
risk of a state’s own forces being put in harm’s way, allowing the interventionist 
greater freedom to affect unstable states. Additionally, it is vastly more cost 
effective than waiting for the point where external intervention forces are required. 
There are situations where the training of indigenous forces may not be the most 
prudent form of intervention in an unstable state, where their development will be 
important, but cannot form the first strand in delivering security. However, the 
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development of indigenous forces is a vital tool in the will of Western states to 
develop those states less stable than them through a stabilisation strategy. 
The British government deems it essential to engage with unstable states, which 
are deemed to pose a risk to the UK by fuelling instability and extremism. The 
logic of intervention to prevent the rise of extremism within states is sound. These 
latest efforts are set to incorporate states under threat from jihadism, but also 
those with a legacy of violence, gripped in a conflict trap. However, it is clear that 
whilst the strategy of developing indigenous forces to provide local security is 
sound, it is currently undermined by fear that the indigenous forces that British 
military personnel may develop, may go on to abuse the skills they are taught. 
Understanding this risk is the first step to overcoming it, and will be examined in 
the next Chapter. 
 38 
Chapter Two, Part One- Is there a risk of indigenous forces abusing the 
skills they are taught?   
There is a significant risk of indigenous forces abusing the skills that they are 
taught because of the unstable situations that exist within their states; the 
situations that predict instability, also predicate the likelihood of humanitarian 
abuses by indigenous forces. The lawlessness of many states, such as 
Afghanistan, has shown that we must be aware of the long term risk of indigenous 
forces abusing the skills that are taught as a part of stabilisation efforts. The 
British government are committed to ‘promote rather than undermine human 
rights, and to mitigate any potential risks to human rights’ (Building Stability 
Overseas, 2011: 30). Therefore, the causes surrounding such risks must be 
better understood. The prospect of engagement is weakened by this risk. This 
section argues that there are a number of factors that produce the need for the 
UK to engage with unstable states to encourage security. A number of current 
examples help to highlight why conflict and violence are likely in states such as 
Sierra Leone, the Central African Republic and Nigeria. 
These factors have produced a legacy of conflict traps and instability that has 
allowed a disregard for IHL to fester within many of the unstable states that the 
British Government may seek to engage with. There is a common disregard for 
IHL amongst both state and non-state actors alike, the result of traditional causes 
of violence; institutional, socioeconomic and environmental factors that also 
encourage IHL violations. This Chapter will examine the causes of the high risk 
of indigenous forces abusing their skills, as well as some of the symptoms of this 
risk that may be evident to indigenous force trainers. Amnesty International 
(2000) in highlights the use of drugs and child soldiers by armed groups eroding 
the effectiveness of individual conscience. A further lack of access to resources 
amongst troops; relative deprivation, hunger and frustration, further drives this 
state. These are factors that may all be witnessed and affected at the tactical 
level, so the risk of their occurrence is significant to this study. 
Political and institutional factors 
The risk of violence and conflict is predicated by the political and institutional state 
within the country. This has strong alignment to Huntington and Janowitz’s 
theories on civil-military relations. Where weak state institutions exist, the void 
can be filled by military and powerful actors. A concurrent lack of judicial oversight 
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reduces the effect of lawful behaviour, allowing individuals and groups to exploit 
the lack of accountability that they should be held to. Where different identities 
exist within a state, often along religious or tribal grounds, further frictions also 
occur. Finally, the ambition and influence of neighbouring states offer threats to 
the proper conduct of soldiers within the state, which will be explored now, and 
later in this Chapter. Both Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic offer 
contemporary examples of these political and institutional weaknesses. 
Central African Republic 
The Central African Republic has shifted drastically in the past two years from a 
relatively peaceful state to one facing civil war and significant humanitarian 
abuses. Driven initially by socioeconomic and corrupt institutions, what started as 
a political movement against the corrupt government took on an ominously 
religious character. David Smith in The Guardian (2013) reported on the conflict 
between Muslim Seleka groups and the Anti-Balaka.23 Discussing the descent of 
the country into civil war, the Guardian described the conflict as ‘the most 
neglected crisis in the world, a country abandoned to its fate’ (2013). Harding 
(2013) asserts a coup by the Muslim Seleka group triggered the conflict, initially 
a political protest against corruption, and it subsequently escalated. When the 
newly appointed President Djotodia officially disbanded the Seleka, ‘many of the 
rebels refused to disarm and leave the militias as ordered but veered further out 
of control, killing, looting and burning villages.’ (The Guardian, 2013). Christian 
militias, known as Anti-Balakas subsequently regained control of the country, 
from the Selekas who stand accused of terrorizing the country. However, The 
Guardian (2013) claim that an “us and them" mentality of mutual distrust and 
paranoia took root, with some Christians taking up arms and committing atrocities 
of their own, giving the Seleka a pretext for yet more aggression. Whilst this 
conflict was initially triggered by political institutional factors, it soon escalated 
into an identity based conflict along religious grounds. With no established stable 
government, soldiers were not held accountable for their actions. 
Internal conflict and abuse of military power can also be fostered by external 
political influence. The brutality of behaviour in Sierra Leone was encouraged by 
external state actors. In the 1990s, a group led by Col Gadhafi of Libya, 
                                                                
23 Meaning anti-sword or anti-machete. 
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established satellite criminal networks for personal gain that thrived off such 
behaviour. In an interview for the American International Legal Association (2014) 
David Crane, Chief International prosecutor at the Sierra Leone War Crimes Trial, 
claimed that the instigation of 1.2 million human beings killed and maimed in that 
conflict was caused by state actors not just armed groups committing violations 
internally. Where such influences affect a state, indigenous force trainers must 
be mindful that it will affect the general atmosphere of the conflict, where the 
threshold of violence is raised. 
Socioeconomic 
Where there is economic inequality, predicted by ethnic or religious grounds, the 
risk of violence is heightened. The Central African Republic offers an example of 
young men driven to violate norms because of institutional corruption that they 
perceive and due to their own poverty. Andrew Harding, in an article for From Our 
Own Correspondent on BBC Radio 4, is told by a local 'No wonder everyone is 
looting now. The elites here have been doing it for years' (in Andrew Harding, 
2014). Criminal activity is normalized amongst populations that perceive a high 
level of corruption in the establishment and comments of this nature emphasize 
the importance of legitimate political institutions to avoid humanitarian abuses. 
This is beyond the examination of this study, but the emergence of aggression 
exemplifies the institutional and political mechanisms that lead to IHL violations.  
Lack of resources  
Inappropriate behaviour is not always the result of socioeconomic factors. Both 
adults and children may be induced to commit IHL abuses by basic environmental 
and resources factors. A lack of shelter and hunger, and human need, as well as 
greed and corruption may cause indigenous forces to act outside of domestic and 
international legal norms. Examples from both Afghanistan and the Central 
African Republic support this. Interviewing a local militia fighter in the Central 
African Republic again, he claims that whilst they are the only people protecting 
the country, some of the militias are hungry ‘so they go off, and they’re obliged to 
commit abuses’ (in Andrew Harding, 2014). The type of abuses are not specified, 
but they are rooted in the acquisition of food and material wealth, the risk of 
physical violence needed to enforce the acquisition may lead to abuses, not to 
mention the act of theft itself being illegal. These militias are not official 
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government forces, but could form them in the future. This interpretation is 
similarly confirmed by Giustozzi’s (2007) reports on the Afghan security forces.  
Resource theft in Afghan 
The behaviour of some indigenous forces in Afghanistan has been directly 
impacted by resource factors, such as late salary payment. Giustozzi’s (2007: 
145) study of the early stages of the Afghan insurgency (2001-2007), investigates 
the development of the Afghan Police force, and claims that the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI) usually paid police units their meagre salaries (US$16-70) several months 
late, subsequently, encouraging police to impose their own ’taxes’ on the 
population.  
Although this form of corruption might not be as concerning as systematic torture 
under the considerations of IHL it can have more pernicious effects. Giustozzi 
claims that the lack of pay and resources meant ‘police would sometimes vent 
their frustration against civilians. During one case in Kandahar at the beginning 
of 2007, police started shooting at traders in the bazaar accusing them of 
complicity with the Taliban’ (2007: 176), this being an obvious violation of IHL as 
a result of frustrations amongst the security forces. Although this example is no 
justification for the murder of civilians, it highlights the importance of indigenous 
soldiers being paid on time in order to minimize dissension within the ranks and 
the justification to claim resources illegally or forcibly elsewhere. 
Use of child soldiers and drugs 
Whilst the factors that cause conflict may similarly induce inappropriate behaviour 
amongst indigenous forces, there are other symptoms that are more prominent 
in indigenous forces that will exacerbate the risk of abuses. British forces 
developing indigenous forces must be wary of the age of those soldiers they train. 
The 2006 Africa Research Bulletin (Steel, 2008) claims that children, some no 
more than seven or eight years of age, are recruited by government armed forces 
almost as a matter of course in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. When disregarding IHL norms, state and 
non-state actors in unstable states often utilize child soldiers and drugs, this 
makes it easier to condition ‘fearless killing and unthinking obedience; child 
soldiers are sometimes supplied with drugs and alcohol to overcome their fear or 
reluctance to fight.’ (Amnesty, 2000: 24). Violence is encouraged immediately 
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after a child’s recruitment into the force, where ‘drugs are administered to deaden 
the effects of conscience’ (Steel, 2008). This prepares young soldiers to commit 
war crimes at the orders of more senior commanders; those who refuse are 
punished. This is an uncommon paradigm within Western professionalized state 
forces, where society’s standards and international law prevent the deployment 
of children or use of drugs. This is, therefore, a characteristic un-encountered 
within the British Army, likely to complicate the development of indigenous 
forces.24 
Why are they used? 
Casting aside the use of drugs for a moment, child soldiers as a source of readily 
available troops is so troubling, because it can lead to the perpetuation of abuses 
that may not occur if only adult soldiers were used. Amnesty International claims 
that children can be more easily encouraged to commit grievous crimes than 
adults: ‘their underdeveloped ability to assess danger means they are often 
willing to take risks and difficult assignments that adults or older teenagers will 
refuse….depending on their age and background, their value systems and 
consciences are not yet fully developed’ (Steel, 2008). Consequently, the 
presence of children on the battlefield multiplies the risk of IHL violations. 
Furthermore, the use of child soldiers is a violation of IHL in its own right. Amnesty 
(2000) assert that recruitment of the under-15s is a war crime, in both 
international and non-international conflict. The normalization of violence at an 
early age also has long lasting traumatic psychological effects.  
Long lasting effects of drug use/child soldiers 
Those engaged in training indigenous forces must be mindful of the effects that 
the previous status as a child soldier or drug addict may have on those they are 
training. The ‘psychological effects of the conflict on these children are 
immeasurable’ (Amnesty, 2000: 24). Subsequently presenting mental health 
difficulties in large swathes of the population in later years and making 
reintegration into normal society or a legitimate indigenous force difficult. Children 
are left ‘haunted psychologically and facing an immense struggle to rebuild 
shattered lives’ (Amnesty, 2000: 24). The presence, therefore, of former child 
                                                                
24 The British Army operate a strict no drugs policy, enforced by Compulsory Drugs Testing, and have 
strict age quotas, where the soldier must be a minimum of 16 years old, but at least 18 years old to serve in 
a combat operation. 
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soldiers in a legitimate indigenous force creates further concern associated with 
the mental state of the soldiers. 
It is difficult to say which has a greater impact on stability: the immediate impact 
of child soldiers on an already violent conflict, or the long term risks to future 
stability that these experiences have on the state’s next generation. It is not the 
purpose of this study to further examine child soldiering or drug use in conflict, 
but they are issues that exist in many unstable states that are at odds with 
Western standards, which heighten the risk of indigenous forces abusing the 
skills they are taught. Forces engaged in indigenous force development must, 
therefore, be mindful of the presence in the indigenous forces they train of both 
child soldiers and drug taking given the risk each presents to IHL adherence. 
Common disregard of law – state and non-state actors 
So far this dissertation has explored the factors that promote violence and conflict 
and inappropriate behaviour within it. Many of these examples have been 
perpetrated by non-state armed groups. However, inappropriate behaviour is not 
only within the remit of the non-state actor. The risk of violations of IHL is rife in 
unstable states, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors alike. The 
frequency of humanitarian law and human rights violations amongst combatants 
and armed groups such as The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone shows the severity that such 
violence can reach. Although these groups are distinctly non-governmental and 
at odds with British foreign policy, their behaviour represents a normalization of 
violations in an unstable region, which creates risk around the behaviour of more 
legitimate forces.  
The RUF and LRA are not representative of the types of indigenous forces the 
UK Government would hope to develop; they are rogue states and armed 
groups.25 But Steel (2008) claims more legitimate state actors are also prone to 
commit abuse. The story of Ismael Beah a former child soldier in Sierra Leone, 
in A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier highlights the risk of even 
government forces driving individuals to violate international norms; ‘hunger and 
insecurity led him to join the government forces, who compelled him not only to 
                                                                
25 That is a state or nation breaking international law and/or posing a threat to the security of another state. 
The term gained particularly prominence in the Bush Administration’s lead up to the invasion of Iraq. For 
further commentary, See: N. Chomsky, Rogue States, in Z Magazine, April 1998. 
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fight against the rebel opposition but to perpetrate acts of extreme violence 
against innocent civilians along the way’ (Steel, 2008). The Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee (2014) identify concerns around Nigerian security forces that further 
illustrates this risk, but there is similarly an acknowledgement that to develop 
stability, and long term adherence to humanitarian norms may mean ‘working 
with countries and institutions where we have concerns about their respect for 
human rights and democracy’ (Building Stability Overseas, 2011: 30). Such 
examples suggest that a common disregard of law exists amongst both state and 
non-state actors. Therefore, a process of societal development must take place 
before norms sufficiently change.  
Conclusion 
There exists a very real risk of indigenous forces abusing the skills they are taught 
by training missions. Such risk is created by the institutional, socioeconomic and 
resource factors discussed in this section. Conditions that develop in the regions 
are further undermined by the presence of child soldiers and drug use, which 
inculcate the risks of IHL violations through the reduction of individual conscience. 
Where armed groups or government forces see a disparity of wealth distribution, 
they may seek personal enrichment, which endangers civilians. On a basic level 
of need, armed forces that are not fed or paid their basic salary by government 
are likely to feel marginalized, driven to a point of retribution or to take what they 
need to survive, by force if necessary. 
Whilst that does not mean that abuses should be accepted, it does suggest why 
partner indigenous forces from unstable states may have alternative 
interpretations of appropriate behaviour to those from the UK, and why the risk 
that they will abuse the skills that they are taught is so present; Sierra Leone and 
the Central African Republic being examples of this risk. Soldiers in indigenous 
forces may have fought in unofficial militias, in organizations that have violated 
IHL in the past, may utilize underage fighters or have normalized war crimes with 
the use of drugs. These factors create a legacy of violence, and absence of 
Professionalisation that the indigenous force trainer is confronted with. These, in 
turn, make the risk of indigenous forces abusing their skills quite a prominent 
issue.  
The British government is faced with the conflict between the possible risk of 
moral and legal culpability for IHL and human rights abuses versus the 
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degradation of existing stability and security at the hands of expanding 
insurgency and extremism. This study will now examine why it is necessary that 
indigenous forces be encouraged to respect humanitarian norms in order to 
highlight the necessity of increase the support for and success of SSR. 
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Chapter two, part two - Does the risk of inappropriate behaviour by 
indigenous forces concern the UK Government’s aspiration to develop 
them? 
Introduction 
The aspiration to develop indigenous forces to provide security is undermined by 
the threat that they may abuse the skills that they are taught. This was identified 
in the previous Chapter. The need to engage in unstable states and the risk of 
violations being committed by indigenous forces are not mutually exclusive; the 
areas most at risk of hosting IHL violations often require the most development 
of government institutions. However, accusations against forces trained in 
unstable regions by British forces can undermine support for the UK military to 
develop indigenous forces and promote regional security. Acknowledging the 
difference between professionalized and Nigerian security forces to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee (2014), UK Head of the Counter-Terrorism Department, Simon 
Shercliff, claimed that a major factor causing a delay in the development of their 
forces was driven by civil scrutiny likely to include, legal, press, public and political 
means. It is, therefore, important to examine the moral tactical and strategic 
considerations, in and out of conflict that highlight the importance of developing 
indigenous forces, which adhere to international legal norms.  
Moral imperative 
For Western forces, the necessity of behaving in accordance with international 
norms is enshrined in moral standards, attuned to the Professionalisation model 
of Huntington, and the domestic political ramifications that abuses may produce. 
However, these standards amongst professionalized forces are not automatically 
reciprocated in unstable states. The UK Foreign Affairs Committee details the 
UK’s desire to engage in unstable states, which is advocated in BSO and publicly 
by David Cameron. However, the committee highlights the concern that a British 
officer could be implicated in delivering training to unprofessional forces and the 
corresponding lack of appetite for British citizens to accept this risk.  
 
 
Tactical imperative 
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Prominent writers on counter insurgency have argued that the tactical imperative 
of appropriate behaviour in such conflicts is significant; Galula’s (1964) Counter 
Insurgency Warfare and Kitson’s (1972) Low Intensity Warfare, claim that 
appropriate behaviour are tactically necessary; although these texts were both 
written long before the emergence of more contemporary insurgent threats, their 
observations remain applicable today. Giustozzi (2007) claims that even in an 
insurgency fought against religious extremism, inappropriate behaviour by 
indigenous forces has the potential to undermine a counter insurgency effort. 
Earlier literature including discussions on Mao’s guerilla warfare Warfare remain 
relevant; even when faced with a ruthless modern religious extremist insurgent, 
it focuses on the nature in which Mao sought to undermine his opposition by 
winning the support of the people; this is something that indigenous forces must 
similarly do. 
Strategy of engagement 
On a macro scale, the behaviour of trained indigenous forces may have a UK 
domestic impact; even a strategic effect. The behaviour of indigenous forces 
trained by the UK MOD has the potential to impact strategic policy making. 
Simpson (2012) claims that enemies now exploit such vulnerabilities to influence 
domestic politics. Social media and 24-hour news coverage expose humanitarian 
and human rights abuses undermining the UK Government. An understanding of 
these issues will help develop consensus for the most appropriate ways in which 
to encourage IHL adherence amongst indigenous forces. The moral, political and 
tactical factors that influence the debate will be examined in more detail here. 
Legal debate surrounding indigenous force behaviour will be discussed in a 
following section. 
Moral imperative 
The British Government has a moral responsibility to mitigate the risk of 
indigenous forces abusing the skills they are taught. Ultimately ‘your morality 
defines your legitimacy’ (General Lamb in Simpson, 2012: 213). This moral 
motivator enshrined by Professionalisation and the values taught within a modern 
liberal society, normalizes adherence to IHL amongst Western forces, but is not 
automatically reciprocated in other societies. Galula (1964) claims that being a 
professionalised force produces a moral imperative to foster proper behaviour 
elsewhere. Nagl (2002) states that this imperative is enforced by unfavourable 
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perceptions of IHL violations in Western Democracy. Shercliff (2014) summed up 
this moral dilemma facing UK decision makers, who cannot ‘afford to be, for 
example, handing over intelligence on Nigerian terrorists for the Nigerians then 
to go and find the people and hang them up by their toenails’ (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee Report, 2014: 35). This is something British 
democracy will not morally stand for, so careful consideration must be made 
before agreeing to aid indigenous forces. Whilst the moral stance of society is 
one facet governing decisions, the morality of engagement also contributes to the 
cohesiveness of the military deployed on the mission. 
Effect on our military 
Engagement with indigenous forces who askance IHL norms could have an 
inadvertent effect on the training unit’s force cohesion. A soldier may question the 
legitimacy of their role if they feel that their role is immoral. Moskos (1988) has 
argued that national patriotism and the concept of the just cause is one of the key 
motivations for serving in the Western military, producing ideologically driven 
soldiers. Therefore, a soldier’s particular IHL violations or training poorly behaved 
indigenous forces, might severely undermine his will to continue the operation; 
creating a sense of dissension within the force. Kitson (1973) argues that if a 
soldier feels that his nation’s military actions are wrong and unlikely to be 
transformed, he should cease supporting it and face the consequences. With the 
increased liberal education that Janowitz (1960) claims is so crucial in asserting 
proper behaviour in a military force and support for society’s values, association 
with indigenous forces that perform violations of IHL must be considered a threat 
to the moral cohesiveness of British troops. 
Engaging domestically  
The public’s perception of military activities abroad has gained increasing 
relevance in recent years; the moral debate above exemplifies this. General 
Carter (2012) has termed this battle for public support ‘engaging domestically’. 
The development of social media and 24-hour press scrutiny has exposed 
political action to ever-greater examination, concurrently ‘Our adversaries have 
already recognized the strategic importance of influencing public perception’ 
(Simpson, 2012: 12). Increased scrutiny, fostered by domestic institutions 
enforcing legitimacy and by enemies attempting to undermine, makes it possible 
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that support for a stabilisation strategy could be undermined by the exposure of 
inappropriate behaviour by poorly selected ally indigenous forces.  
A recent case in New Zealand highlights how domestic oversight of indigenous 
force development caused the cessation of a training mission by the New Zealand 
Army in West Papua26. Simpson (2012) claims that there is a need to understand 
the link between tactical actions and policy outcomes. This example 
demonstrates how a training mission by a Western force was impacted by the 
improper behaviour of the indigenous force. The West Papuan police were 
perceived to have abused their power by members of the press and investigators, 
which subsequently led to questions being raised over the policy in parliament. 
The tactical conduct of a small group of indigenous police officers involved in a 
NZ$4 Million upstream capacity building project impacted political levels, with 
politicians questioning the wisdom of troop’s involvement in an indigenous force 
development mission. This highlights the very real awareness of the press and 
politicians of the behaviour of our allies and its ability to impact their development.  
The need to develop indigenous forces to provide security for their own countries 
is so critical, that such efforts cannot afford to be derailed by destabilizing 
accusations. The Foreign Affairs Committee described the threat of Boko Haram, 
an AQ-affiliated group in Nigeria, ‘left us in no doubt as to the cult-like violence 
and sadism of the movement’s hardcore’ (2014: 35). The task of facing opponents 
such as these may seem daunting to indigenous forces, but a law abiding force 
that can deliver security can take solace in the long term from the support they 
are likely to receive from the local population. Simpson claims that 
‘fundamentalism has nothing to offer in the long term’ (2012: 227), when faced 
with a choice the population will ultimately choose security for their families, this 
will likely see them reject forces with ‘very young children being indoctrinated into, 
and participating in, the movement’s brutalizing and murderous activities.’ 
(Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014: 35). This makes ensuring support for 
indigenous force training a crucial aspect to a liberal western domestic moral 
argument, hence, the need to avoid embarrassing domestic revelations about 
indigenous force behaviour. 
                                                                
26 https://www.devex.com/en/news/under-fire-new-zealand-aid-and-violence-in-west/82761 Last 
Accessed: 26 June 2015 
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The proliferation of media technology 
The development of technology, transport and society’s access to information 
and news can expose bad behaviour quickly. Freedman (2006) has argued that 
the concept of strategic narrative has come to influence government policy, 
manipulated by the originator who controls and influences the press mechanism 
to deliver a certain massage. The West missed the initial significance of this 
strategic development and is subsequently not fully appreciative of its 
implications. Hammes (2006) claims that this is because the development of 4th 
Generation Warfare (4GW) occurred under Mao’s guidance away from Europe. 
4GW has meant that people’s perception of military conduct has taken on greater 
meaning. Globalization has led to a ‘proliferation of audiences beyond the enemy’ 
(2012: 74). Indigenous force behaviour has a direct relation to this perception. 
The rise in social media has meant that actions are now immediately traceable 
and accountable in electronic public forums, used by both enemies and friendly 
NGOs to expose counterproductive behaviour by Western forces and allies. This 
exposure can influence the further deployment of sessions to unstable states. 
Specific examples of the UK’s opponents influencing domestic policy have hailed 
from insurgents in Afghanistan. Giustozzi (2007) asserted that the Taliban were 
aware of political impacts, monitoring domestic political timetables of intervening 
forces in Afghanistan, they sought to influence the conduct of political decision 
making through public statements and coordinated military actions. The 
proliferation of social media and mobile phone, internet and digital technology 
capable of sharing photos and videos has the potential to accentuate this 
process27. Humanitarian abuses can trip up policy at short notice. If an indigenous 
force training mission is derailed because of unpopularity domestically, then any 
future stability that may have occurred in that country will become irrelevant. 
Concurrently, there is success for those forces which would see indigenous force 
development derailed. It is therefore key to ensure the appropriate behaviour of 
forces to maintain UK support domestically. 
War as interpretive construct - local political effect of tactical actions 
                                                                
27 The Arab Spring has emphasised the role that social media can play in destabilising states, albeit often 
dictatorships. It is the acknowledgement of the ability of this media to rapidly impact public opinion, that 
the importance of this topic is based.  
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Low-level tactical actions can impact strategic decisions and the perception of the 
events at the local level. Simpson (2012) argues that the impact of a tactical 
action is not just judged on the outcome of the battle in physical terms, but that, 
‘Confrontation on the ground was understood in political terms’ (Simpson, 2012: 
175). This means that the behaviour of indigenous forces has an impact on the 
perception of those forces by local populations. For those training indigenous 
forces, and forces acting independently in Nigeria, the Foreign Affairs Committee 
acknowledge that ‘police and army heavy-handedness (or worse) towards 
ordinary people in the north and north-east risks playing into Boko Haram’s 
hands.’ (2014: 35). Whilst an indigenous force may judge their influence over an 
area as effective, even if this includes the abuse of local civilians, the main impact 
of such behaviour will be viewed through interpretation the of the action by local 
civilians and the legitimacy they assert to such forces.  
It is not just the strategists and policy makers who are affected by tactical 
behavior in battle, the tactical conduct and success of a mission is also impacted 
by local operational perceptions. The rise of interpretation of events impacts at 
two levels. Simpson (2012) claims that perception of battle is a vital ingredient of 
modern COIN campaigns. British Army doctrine similarly recognizes this, 
claiming ‘legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by 
externally imposed criteria’ (JDP 3-40, 2010: 6). Developing Clausewitz’s 
assertion that war is an extension of politics by other means, Simpson develops 
the responsibility of modern Generals, stating that ‘strategists must comprehend 
war as an interpretive construct’ (2012: 37), and whilst absolute war produces 
end states, in all others, interpretation is key to strategy. Therefore, in addition to 
the domestic interpretation of violations of IHL by indigenous forces, such 
behaviour also has an impact in their countries of operation. 
If war is an increasingly interpretive event, then the Army’s mitigation of what 
populations access to interpret war is increasingly essential, ‘liberal powers 
cannot opt out of today’s information revolution for the purposes of armed conflict’ 
(Simpson, 2012: 187). This means ensuring behaviour that may be captured on 
social media will not undermine military goals. Whilst for Simpson (2012) the 
British Army remains good at the technical Vernacular aspects of battle,28 they 
                                                                
28 Technical Vernacular: traditional military language of war, concerning hard military functions, tactics 
and strategy. 
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still lack understanding of the language of war. In the past decade, this language 
has increasingly had a social media aspect. Indigenous force behaviour feeds 
directly to the content of this language and subsequently can influence the 
effectiveness of the enemies of stability. 
Establishing the cause 
In an unstable region, inappropriate behaviour by indigenous forces offers the 
insurgent a cause to unite behind, especially in relation to the risks of indigenous 
forces abusing their skills and the causes of conflict discussed in the previous 
Chapter. Galula (1967), a French Army officer with experience of deployments in 
numerous COIN theatres described the establishment of an insurgency; laying 
out the conditions required to commence and succeed in one, but also to repel 
one. He claims that the pre-requisites for insurgency are a cause and the 
weakness of an opponent. Without these an insurgency will flounder. He further 
claims that geography and outside support are significant contributing factors. At 
the time of writing, Galula stated that the majority of recent insurgencies had 
stemmed from ‘1) The rise of nationalism in colonial territories, and 2) Communist 
pressure’ (1967: 96). Since his work’s publication, religion has emerged as a 
prominent driver of contemporary insurgency, as described in the previous 
Chapter. Although, Galula’s publication is weakened by time. The counter 
insurgency analyses he discusses focus on nationalist or Communist 
insurgencies rather than contemporary insurgencies. However, his identification 
of the need for a cause to unite behind for an insurgency is apt. The rectification 
of such improper behaviour of indigenous forces could be that cause. 
Before Conflict – The importance of appropriate indigenous force 
behaviour 
How an indigenous force’s behaviour before a conflict emerges has the potential 
to impact UK government aspirations to develop security, as well to affect the risk 
of conflict emerging in that state. The distinction between the development of 
indigenous forces or the counter-insurgent before and during a conflict is a theme 
throughout this study. Kitson’s (1973) work examines the countering of an 
insurgency before conflict by opposing the political movements that seek to 
establish them. Therefore, interested parties must be mindful of the political 
effects of an indigenous force’s actions, as ill-considered police or military action 
may strengthen an emerging insurgency. 
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Proper behaviour by the indigenous force can go some way to stall the rise of an 
insurgency. Kitson (1973) claims that insurgents start with nothing and that 
government have everything to lose. This early position of strength allows the 
counter insurgent to undermine the insurgent at the start with political solutions, 
‘to deprive the insurgent of a good cause amounts to solving the country’s basic 
problems’ (Galula, 1964: 46), providing the counter insurgent a distinctly political 
solution to the threat of insurgency. In the case of an unstable state or region, 
Kitson argues that governments need to concurrently exercise restraint in the 
political process, ‘violence may lead to surge in opposition’ (1973: 87). Similarly, 
an insurgent should not be considered benign because their cause is in its 
infancy, a competent arrested insurgent ‘will take refuge in the chicanery, exploit 
to the utmost every advantage provided by the existing laws’ (Galula, 1964: 45). 
This exists as a contradiction in the insurgent position, as insurgents seek to 
exploit the freedoms of a system. It is a strength that they, but not the state, can 
possess. However, eroding this advantage may galvanize insurgents further and 
undermine the system that the insurgents are attacking. This mischievousness 
by an insurgent is a similar exploitation of the state systems as Lawfare, which 
warrants further discussion in the next section.  
Where a state of instability exists and a government recognizes it, proper 
behaviour by indigenous forces becomes especially relevant. If a state overly 
represses the insurgent, it may have the effect that ‘opposition will increase, and 
the insurgent will thank his opponent for having played into his hands’ (Galula, 
1964: 45). Rather than reacting disproportionately to insurgent activity and further 
fuelling their cause, Galula argues that the counter insurgent will prosper by 
‘adapting the judicial system to the threat, strengthening the bureaucracy, 
reinforcing the police and the armed forces’ (Galula, 1964: 46). Societal 
development is key, over repression will endanger the government, but, ‘If the 
great mass of the population knows that it will be protected by a strong, just 
government, then it has no reason to cooperate with the guerrillas’ (Nagl, 2002: 
26). The behaviour of a state remains a very fine balancing act, between being 
overly repressive, by providing too much security or by providing too little. This 
remains extant both before and during conflicts. 
Approaches by forces during conflict  
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There is, however, an argument that oppressive behaviour, out of line with IHL 
can be used to ensure stability. Termed “direct” and “indirect” approaches, these 
are respectively aligned to attritional and non-attritional approaches. Direct action 
consists of ‘depriving the insurgent of any physical possibility of building up his 
movement’ (Galula, 1964: 44). This might include restriction of freedom of 
suspected insurgents or the repression of propaganda, whilst the indirect 
approach focuses on the removal of a cause discussed previously in the pre-
conflict stage and reducing the insurgent’s ability to exploit the state’s 
weaknesses. There subsequently exists a conflict between the application of 
these two approaches. The direct approach is plausible in a totalitarian regime, 
whereas a liberal democracy is confined to employ the indirect approach. 
There exists some debate as to the effectiveness of direct and indirect action. 
Nagl (2002) compares two such approaches in an insurgency to those of the 
Norman King William II (Rufus) from 1097 and Gerald of Wale’s from 1194; 
contrasting the two as ‘annihilating versus turning the loyalty of the people’ (Nagl, 
2002: 26). He claims that the more conciliatory approach of Gerald was vastly 
more successful than William’s repression. Conversely, Galula (1964) and Kitson 
(1973) claim that totalitarian rule offers effective mechanisms in oppressing 
insurgency. Galula emphasizes the ease with which totalitarian countries can 
carry out such action. He cites the Chinese Communist model of control from the 
1950’s, observing that ‘As long as there is no privacy, as long as every unusual 
move or event is reported and checked, as long as parents are afraid to talk in 
front of their children, how can contacts be made, ideas spread, recruiting 
accomplished?’ (1964: 19). Even when a government is unpopular or feared, a 
tight grip on power can minimize the possibility of insurgency. Kitson (1973) 
asserts that the Nazis were an effective counter insurgent force through the 
utilization of absolute repression.  
Governing with often barbaric discipline Nazi-occupied areas during the Second 
World War minimized civilian insurrection. Simpson (2012) concurs that the Nazis 
were so successful because they out terrorized the local population through 
disproportionate reprisals. Furthermore, Nagl (2002) cites the success of 
Saddam Hussein’s infamous repression of the Marsh Arab uprising in Southern 
Iraq as a contemporary example of attrition. He caveats the claim, however, that 
on the whole the success rate of attrition in COIN operations is ‘a poor one’ (2002: 
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27). These authors emphasize the effectiveness of methods at odds with modern 
Western norms in suppressing insurgency, but provide a mixed reasoning and 
analysis for why these methods are inappropriate. Whilst there may be some 
benefits in stifling opposition to stability in utilizing oppressive direct methods, 
such behaviour is unavailable to UK forces or those they train, both for the moral 
reasons mentioned earlier, certain tactical implications in modern conflict, and 
because of legal constraints, which will be discussed in the next section. 
Why international law should be followed 
Inappropriate behaviour by indigenous forces remains a threat to their 
development by UK forces, even once a conflict has started. The Stabilisation 
Doctrine (2010) argues that ‘A brittle form of stability can exist using brutality and 
corruption’, ‘such states require a constant demonstration of the power of the 
state in order to keep their populations in thrall.’ (JDP 3-40, 2010: 6). Further 
argument for why indigenous forces should be encouraged to obey IHL can be 
found in the logic of Nagl, Galula and Simpson who reemphasised respect for 
Western moral standards to justify the need to adhere to Thompson’s COIN 
principles.29 Thompson significantly advocated adherence to law as a crucial 
principle to adhere to in COIN campaigns. Nagl cites contemporary British 
doctrine, which argues that ‘it is considered that a ‘gloves off’ approach to any 
insurgency problem has a strictly limited role to play in modern COIN operations’ 
(2002: 26). This view, derived from a piece of British Army Doctrine is a 
representation of the British Army’s Professionalisation and reciprocation of 
society’s moral and legal standards. 
However, indigenous forces are not themselves subject to western moral 
standards, greater incentive may be needed to convince them that IHL and 
human rights adherence is beneficial to their cause. Having claimed that 
attritional methods are so effective in suppressing insurgency, these authors do 
little to criticize the operational effects of such methods. Nagl claims that Saddam 
Hussein was an effective counter insurgent, but does not elaborate on why he 
                                                                
29 1) Clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically 
and economically stable and viable. 2) Government must function in accordance with law. 3) Government 
must have an overall plan. 4) Government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the 
guerrillas. 5) In the guerrilla phase of an emergency, a government must secure its base areas first Source: 
Michael Crawshaw, The Evolution of British COIN, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/43334/jdp340theevolution
ofbritishcoinbymichaelcrawshaw.pdf Last Accessed 26 Jan 2015. 
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feels that the attritional method does not work. However, for Kitson (1973) the 
conflict between the use of attritional methods with barbaric application and more 
legitimate approaches to COIN is solved by its tactical ramifications and not just 
by the legal and moral drawbacks posed. The argument against the direct 
repression of insurgents by government forces gives a transferable argument that 
can be utilized in contemporary theatres that have a weak record of humanitarian 
and human rights observance. This debate will be examined now.  
Importance of intelligence 
Effective intelligence is essential to any counterinsurgent operation. Kitson 
believes that intelligence sharing and analysis should be at the forefront of a 
military’s approach, proper behaviour by indigenous forces will encourage this. 
Jackson cites the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor Survey ‘poor people 
themselves identify security and access to justice as two core concerns’ (2011: 
1805), so those that offer both security and justice should logically earn the 
support of the poor, thus emphasizing Gerald of Wales’ approach to COIN 
operations as more tactically sound in the long run. Yet, trying to win the support 
of the population is not a simple approach, which Nagl acknowledges in his 
updated preface, written in 2005, after he deployed to the Sunni triangle in Iraq. 
He claims that ‘winning and keeping the support of the population is far more 
complex than I had understood’ (Nagl, 2002: xiii), claiming that ‘military 
operations that do not exercise minimum force instead diminish the support of the 
people for the government, which they feel should protect them’ (Nagl, 2002: 30). 
Thus, winning and maintaining the support of the population for your cause 
politically or for the tactical advantages it offers and behaving properly, in line with 
moral and legal norms are methods of doing this. 
Treating the population properly will engender their support, leading to tangible 
benefits. People are ‘more likely to share intelligence with a strong, but moral 
force’ (1973: 99). Kitson’s interpretation of how to approach a COIN operation is 
further strengthened by the manner in which he conducts his analysis. Instead of 
examining the clearest route to gain the support of the local population, Kitson 
utilizes the writings of Mao as mentioned briefly earlier. His emphasis on the 
power of intelligence is in direct response to Mao’s fish-amongst-the-sea analogy 
an insurgency. Mao described an insurgency as akin to a fish swimming through 
water. The political party and armed groups constitute the head and body of the 
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fish; the people are the water. With effective operational intelligence, the fish can 
be identified and separated from the water. A further evolution of this 
methodology may be to ‘kill the fish by polluting the water’, but this is described 
as undesirable. Without intelligence, the fish cannot be identified.  
Mao’s 6 principles 
Mao’s writing as a lead theorist and practitioner of evolutionary warfare 
emphasized the necessity of appropriate conduct of a counterinsurgent. Although 
Mao discussed evolutionary warfare and theories focused on nationalist and 
communist insurgencies, his writings are similarly relevant when facing religious 
extremism today, as they pertained to the motivations and needs of individuals. 
Hammes (2006) claims that this is because he understood political struggle. 
Accepting this understanding reinforces the relevance of older interpretations of 
approaches to COIN and of Mao’s observations. 
Opposition to the modern counterinsurgent may be based on their status as a 
foreign, non- Muslim force. Yet, the counter insurgent cannot readily change his 
religion to appease this issue, if this would in fact have any effect. Therefore the 
examples cited from Afghanistan highlight the importance of appropriate 
behaviour amongst armed forces and how Mao’s (1928) six main ‘points for 
attention’ remain relevant today. Mao claimed that in order to maintain the will of 
the people, his soldiers were bound to observe six principles in their interactions 
with the population and opposition forces.30 Whilst the motivation of the insurgent 
may have changed from then, the appropriate behaviour of an armed force, 
specifically indigenous forces, remains of paramount importance to influence the 
will of the people. 
Many of the issues identified in this section have a longstanding basis in 
counterinsurgent doctrine. Although the conflicts the British Army now face have 
shifted from the Nationalist or communist causes that this doctrine emerged to 
defeat, traditional thinking on counter insurgency techniques remains relevant to 
modern counterinsurgency. This is particularly evident in cases of Afghan 
security force behaviour. Giustozzi (2007) claims that ‘in terms of the direct 
impact of the police on the counter-insurgency effort, there is plenty of evidence 
                                                                
30 Mao’s 6 Rules: replace straw bedding and wooden bed boards after you spend the night in a peasants 
house; return what you borrow; pay for damage; be courteous; be fair in business dealings; treat prisoners 
humanely. 
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to suggest that the indiscipline and corruption of the Afghan security services, 
including police, was a contributing factor to the insurgency’ (Giustozzi, 2007: 
174). Therefore, even in a religious insurgency where religion may be a major 
motivating factor, the need for appropriate behaviour among indigenous forces 
still retains the tactical importance that it did when Mao wrote his 6 points for 
attention in 1928.  
Conclusion:  
UK aspirations to train indigenous forces are endangered by the risk of them 
abusing their position of strength. According to Huntington, this risk is driven by 
the moral ethic that underscores the values in Western, and more specifically, 
British society. This ethic no longer accepts violations of humanitarian law 
committed or aided by UK forces. This aversion to IHL violations is reinforced by 
the moral compulsion to act appropriately, backed up by civil legal oversight. This 
will be discussed in the next Chapter.  
The effect of this moral compulsion runs through the stream of this argument. 
There is, firstly, a risk that the association with such groups may undermine the 
integrity of the military engaged to complete the task, that individual soldiers may 
find the behaviour of those they train so against their personal morality that they 
refuse to carry out their mission. This is a stark consideration for commanders, 
discussed by Kitson and Simpson. It could undermine efforts to develop such 
forces. 
Should the aspiration to develop indigenous forces be seen as legitimate, those 
conducting the training must be aware of the tactical impact that certain behaviour 
has on developing the stability of a state. Tactical IHL adherence is important 
even before an insurgency takes root, so as not to galvanize support for the 
insurgent. Once there is a fully-fledged insurgency, treating the population 
properly should seek to earn their trust, facilitating intelligence efforts. It will also 
help avoid exacerbating resentment towards the government. Simpson argues 
this now more than ever is an aspect of the interpretation of battle and that the 
perception of actions, in this case abuses, has as much effect as traditional 
military physical functions. 
However, some counter insurgency literature highlight the effectiveness that the 
direct approach has had in suppressing instability and dissent in the past. Citing 
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the Nazi’s occupation in the Second World War, Saddam Hussein’s repression 
of the Marsh Arabs and Chinese Communist rule in the 1950s; methods at odds 
with Western IHL standards can be effective for guaranteeing security in the short 
term. However in the long term they are flawed. By allowing indigenous forces to 
act at odds with international norms, British public perception threatens to 
undermine engagement with indigenous forces. Social media and the modern 
press cycle’s ability to unveil issues in the public interest make this a greater 
possibility. Thus, whilst there might be increased local discipline and control in 
the short term, the long-term perspective of British domestic opinion dictates that 
inappropriate behaviour by indigenous forces will threaten the UK Government’s 
aspiration to develop them.  
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Chapter 2 part 3 - Does civil oversight, in the form of legal action, pose a 
threat to the British Government’s aspiration to professionalize indigenous 
forces?  
The threat of legal scrutiny significantly affects the UK government’s aspiration to 
develop indigenous forces. The increasing vogue of lawfare has left the British 
government cautious that any decision to develop indigenous forces in unstable 
states may result in legal scrutiny and complicity for those training the forces if 
they then abuse the skills that they are taught. This chapter will argue that whilst 
legal action, often referred to as lawfare, does threaten the desire to develop 
forces, legal oversight acts as a guide toward the legitimacy of military action. In 
fact, it is difficult to distinguish in the literature on lawfare a divide between civil 
legal oversight, and lawfare. The two are in fact distinctly different.  
Lawfare has emerged to describe the use of legal action as a weapon of war, 
using the West’s adherence to humanitarian principles to achieve an operational 
objective. But, beyond the subversive attempts of national enemies, 
commentators such as Mercantel (2013) and Croft & Tagenhat (2013) have come 
to describe broader examples of legal oversight of military action as lawfare. 
These commentators, aligned to Western forces, criticize legal oversight of 
military operations originating in numerous scenarios. Both UK and US legal 
writers criticize the actions of groups such as Public Interest Lawyers (PIL), who 
they say are motivated by money and political influence. However, this 
dissertation will argue that such oversight by civilian lawyers is a stable function 
of Western democracy and it should not immediately be identified as legal action 
with operational intent, just because it does not obviously align to a government’s 
interests.  
There are a number of other legal threats that could influence the training of 
indigenous forces: technological proliferation, a desire to see justice applied 
evenly internationally, as well as the determination by external groups seeking 
justice, such as the Mothers of Srebrenica. All increase the pressure of legal 
scrutiny on Western forces. As signatories to the Geneva Convention, UK forces 
have a legal responsibility to act in the protection of civilians who may be subject 
to abuse at the hands of indigenous forces, the plight of the civilian population is 
‘rooted in Article 1 of Geneva Conventions’ (ICRC, 2013). These trends and the 
determination of domestic legal charities mean that the legal challenge to 
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operations, which commit illegality, will continue to grow. The MOD must 
subsequently adjust its approach to lawfare and mitigate the threat of legal 
challenge to its operations if it is to train indigenous forces. 
Given that this legal threat exists, methods to mitigate the threat must be 
developed. The United Nations have come under scrutiny, despite the best of 
intentions, for the actions of some of their troops in Haiti, where they caused a 
cholera outbreak, despite the disease having been absent on the island for one 
hundred years previously; the Central African Republic, where UN troops were 
accused of Rape; as well as in Somalia and a number of less reported cases.31 
Necessarily, the UN have developed a policy of conditionality and produced a 
due diligence policy for working with indigenous forces of questionable 
character.32 So far, the UK Government has only developed vague policies to 
guide dealings with this threat. It should utilize the experience of the UN and 
adopt similarly comprehensive policies to create the maximum protection from 
prosecution of UK forces if complicit in IHL violations. With this protection, tactical 
level commanders should then be developed and empowered to properly develop 
indigenous force respect for IHL at the tactical level. This dissertation will now 
discuss the issues surrounding this aspiration. 
The rise and rise of litigation 
British forces have been increasingly held to account in British domestic and 
military courts and inquiries for their conduct on operations since 2003. As a 
result, British military operations have come under increasing litigious scrutiny.33 
This vulnerability has always existed under international law, but the MOD’s 
domestic legal vulnerability is a more contemporary development. Beforehand, 
legal oversight would have extended as far as courts martial within the military 
for violations of IHL, but now it includes civil suits against the MOD, and increased 
pressure on the MOD to prosecute its soldiers as well as increased interest 
amongst the International Criminal Court. A number of high profile cases have 
                                                                
31 A number of sources exists, and will be discussed in this section. For an introduction see: Reuters, 
http://rt.com/news/254205-french-soldiers-abuse-boys (Date Accessed 12 July 15), The Wall Street 
Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-n-stalled-probe-into-allegations-of-child-rape-by-french-troops-
says-prosecutor-1431024227 (Date Accessed: 12 July 15), and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-24457195 (Date Accessed: 12 July 15). 
32 See: UN Due Diligence Policy (2013) 
33 These cases will be discussed in this chapter, but include the Baha Moussa, Al Sweady, Marine A and 
Sgt Kevin Williams cases. 
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facilitated this development, and now mean that UK operations are strongly 
influenced by legal oversight which will now be discussed. 
Increased legal oversight has enhanced the risk of troops being held accountable 
for developing indigenous forces that abuse the skills that they are taught. Croft 
and Tagenhat have argued that the erosion of Crown Immunity for military action 
has caused this enhanced legal oversight on troops and the likelihood of UK MOD 
personnel being prosecuted for wrongful actions on operations. Where ‘Combat 
Immunity would once have acted as the blanket protection for decisions taken in 
the confusion of battle’ (2013: 28), this no longer applies. Subsequently, the 
breadth of legal oversight affecting military actions has broadened. This 
increased oversight has become known as Lawfare.  
Lawfare poses a threat to the training of indigenous forces, where UK culpability 
could exist, but is not yet fully exploited by legal challenge. The term sees 
established legal norms used in the West to affect military action. For insurgents 
or enemy states this is a subversive strategy, ‘using—or misusing—law as a 
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective’ 
(Dunlap, 2008: 146). The term, coined by Major Charles Dunlap in the United 
States, has earned vogue status amongst military legal commentators who 
highlight the strategic impact that Lawfare is having on Western interests. Blum 
claims ‘that U.S. power is being curbed in the name of humanitarian concern’ 
(2011: 166). Increasingly, such commentators are arguing for the need to 
legislate against the effectiveness of Lawfare.34 However, this could similarly 
impact concepts of objective civil oversight. This study argues that not all legal 
oversight is Lawfare. Some challenges can be classed as civil oversight of the 
military as espoused by Huntington. Examples of legal challenge impacting the 
UK MOD will now be explored. 
                                                                
34 Lawfare is explored briefly within this essay, but its extent is too broad for a thorough analysis. The 
reader should be aware however, that this study argues that legal oversight is driving the threat of culpability 
for the actions of indigenous forces. See: On a Differential Law of War Gabriella Blum, 166 Harvard 
International Law Journal / Vol. 52, NUMBER 1, WINTER 2011; for comment on the binding affect of 
humanitarian law on US policy, L. Croft and T. Tugenhat, 2013, The Fog of Law: An introduction to the 
legal erosion of British fighting power, Policy Exchange, London; for criticism of the effect of legal civil 
oversight on British operations in Afghanistan, and, Human Rights Boon or Time Bomb: The Alien Tort 
Statute and the Need for Congressional Action, Major William E. Marcantel, Jr.MILITARY LAW 
REVIEW VOLUME 217 • 2013; for calls to repeal the effect of Lawfare. 
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A number of cases from recent military operations highlight the threat of the UK 
MOD being prosecuted for actions on operations where culpability can be 
established and the increased legal scrutiny that the MOD is under to prosecute 
those within its ranks who commit wrongdoing. The death of Baha Mousa in Iraq 
in September 2003, the Battle of Danny Boy in Basra in 2004, which led to the 
Al-Sweady enquiry and the trial of Trooper Kevin Williams in 2005 characterise 
the erosion of the principle of Combat Immunity for British Forces, and the 
willingness of non governmental groups to challenge the MOD legally.35 But these 
cases can not all be defined as Lawfare under Dunlap’s definition. 
PIL activities: 
Much of the legal focus on British military activities has been generated by civilian 
and charitable legal organizations with a political and justice focus. Public Interest 
Lawyers (PIL), headed by Phil Shiner, are one such groups bringing focus onto 
the actions of British military forces overseas, as they did with the aforementioned 
Baha Mousa case. Groups such as PIL raise the spectre of legal challenge over 
the UK MOD by acting on behalf of the families of British military and overseas 
civilian victims of conflict. 
Public Interest Lawyers argue that they are an essential aspect of civil legal 
oversight of military action, acting for those that cannot fairly access justice. Head 
solicitor Phil Shiner is said to have ‘acted for the victims of injustices borne of 
many different circumstances.’ (PIL, 2014). However, this motivation is 
challenged by members of the media and the establishment. Whilst his firm 
claims an altruistic approach to justice for individuals in society, it is treated with 
derision by some. The Sun (2014) newspaper recently accused PIL of being 
driven by financial motivation, and receiving a huge payday as a result of the Al-
Sweady enquiry, in the region of £2.5 million (2014). This was an inquiry that 
achieved mixed success.36 
                                                                
35 The accusation was that Trooper Williams failed to act lawfully in a law enforcement situation by 
shooting a local civilian, CPS statement available here: http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/120_05/). 
He was experiencing the challenge of the ‘three block war’ (see Krulak C, ‘The Strategic Corporal: 
Leadership in the Three Block War’ [1999] Marines Magazine); soldiers have to comply with IHL, law 
enforcement and combat situations, with scant time/geography to separate these different scenarios. 
36 Al Sweady Inquiry occurred in response to the aftermath of The Battle of Danny Boy, where Iraqi men 
and women were claimed to have been murdered by British Troops in custody. The Inquiry found that 
detainees suffered ill-treatment by British troops (less than that experienced by Baha Mousa and the men 
detained with him, but still unlawful). The lawyers for the Iraqi Core Participants (including Public Interest 
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Yet, PIL claim accusations of ‘money grabbing’ are minded to undermine their 
efforts. They maintain that they act in the public interest and that their actions 
help to ensure the fundamental principles of civil oversight of government and 
military action as discussed at the very beginning of this study. Without such 
groups, they claim there would be little rebuke of illegality by the MOD or military 
personnel. Shiner (2014) issued a statement detailing personal net worth, that is, 
his wage (equivalent to a primary school head teacher) and details of his property, 
car and children’s education. The firm further claim to be on the side of the British 
soldier, specifically in relation to the Smith case saying that they are ‘proud to 
have represented and to continue to represent the UK Armed Forces and their 
families in a wide range of matters for over ten years’ (PIL, 2014).37 This study 
cannot explore further the motivations for the actions of legal firms acting on 
behalf of complainants in MOD-related cases, whether they are moral, financial 
or altruistic. However in line with Moskos’, Huntington’s and Janowitz’s thinking, 
objective observers must appreciate the benefit of such oversight in ensuring 
ethical and legal military actions. We will now examine how the threat of legal 
challenge has been effective at this. 
Why is the MOD concerned by lawfare? 
The effect of perceived Lawfare on British Army actions and reputation has been 
wide, and has affected the aspiration to train indigenous forces. The Guardian 
(2013) claims that the Baha Mousa case left a stain on the reputation of the British 
Army,38 achieving notoriety because of the determination of Daoud Mousa 
(Baha's father) and Phil Shiner to seek justice. The financial and reputational 
impact of such cases has influenced British engagement with indigenous forces. 
This influence manifests itself in the British government’s decision-making 
process with regards to new operations. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
                                                                
Lawyers) withdrew earlier allegations that some of the deceased had been killed in detention. See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150115114702/http:/www.alsweadyinquiry.org/.  
37 Private Jason Smith died of heatstroke in Iraq in 2003. Public Interest Lawyers argued on behalf of his 
family that the MOD had failed in its duty of care to prepare the soldier for operations in the heat of Iraq. 
The MOD apologised ‘unreservedly’ for his death. See: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/sep/23/jason-smith-inquest-iraq-heatstroke, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-
scotland-26328285. See also case of Pte Phillip Hewett, who died when his Snatch Land Rover was blown 
up in Iraq in 2008; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-26328285. All accessed 15 July 
2015. 
38 The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report provides extensive information on the case. The MoD has 
conceded shortcomings, including in training; that led to Baha Mousa’s death.  
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expresses concern relating to the skills that indigenous forces are taught, and the 
possible culpability of those who teach them: ‘the UK Government is anxious 
about the possibility of advice and training given in good faith being subsequently 
misused in a field setting, and of the British officer who provided the training 
becoming implicated’ (2014: 35).39 Although there have been no recent 
prosecutions under such an interpretation, legal suits concerning other British 
force military activity have impacted the British Government’s awareness of 
soldier culpability for the actions of indigenous forces that they train40. One 
interpretation envisages a situation where offering training to specific individuals, 
who then go on to commit violations of International Humanitarian Law or Human 
Rights legislation, in sight or in full knowledge of British commanders, makes 
them complicit in their actions under British domestic judicial interpretations, 
because they failed to act robustly enough to counter such occurrences41. This 
study maintains that legal oversight has created such concerns, by enhancing the 
consciousness amongst the government and MOD of the legality of military 
behaviour on operations. 
This concern over the actions of indigenous forces suggests a fear over the ability 
of tactical level events to now influence interpretations of strategic policy and the 
government’s ability to deploy training missions. In addition to the nearly 
£13million costs for the Baha Mousa inquiry itself, there is the cost of payouts. 
The BBC claimed that ‘In July 2008 the Ministry of Defence agreed to pay £2.83m 
to those who were mistreated in Basra’ (BBC, 2014). If the threat of legal 
prosecution of British forces is not condition enough, the large cost of the lawsuits 
and inquiries involving British forces make legally risky ventures less attractive. 
This is not a legal study of the legal culpability of British troops in this situation. 
Yet, this study’s research strongly suggests that the issue of culpability is an area 
that requires further study by a more experienced legal mind. We will now 
examine the debate surrounding Lawfare. 
                                                                
39 See also: Defence Select Committee, Report on The Legal Framework of Operations.  
40 The attack on the Sikh Golden Temple in the city of Amritsar in 1984 caused an international media 
storm, when it was revealed in 2014, 30 years after the event, that an SAS Officer had played a minor 
advisory role in the storming of the mosque which led to the loss of 3,000 lives. 
41 Such liability could exist under aiding and abetting laws within international or domestic courts, if 
training and/or materials were supplied in knowledge that they would be used in the commission of a crime. 
Additionally, the British Government’s own policy document Building Stability Overseas (2011) identifies 
this threat. 
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Problems with the Fog of Law 
The prospect of civil legal oversight of the military is daunting to the MOD, but it 
is a staple of the civil-military relations model espoused by Huntington. Legal 
adherence is a defining principle of an organization that obeys the laws of the 
state and civilian oversight ensures this adherence. Whilst Lawfare has elevated 
the actions of tactical commanders and those they train to a national level of 
prominence. The MOD should focus on methods to minimize its exposure to 
Lawfare, such as mitigating the effect of IHL or Human Rights violations, rather 
than attacking all forms of legal challenge as Lawfare. The recent Tugenhat & 
Croft (2013) publication, The Fog of Law,42 examines Lawfare. Written by two 
military lawyers, the article attacks the invasion of the battlefield by human rights 
lawyers and the replacement of traditional humanitarian law with the civilian focus 
of human rights law. The article contains significant bias by failing to properly 
acknowledge the motivations of groups that cause the frustrations discussed 
above, such as PIL, instead labelling all forms of legal challenge as Lawfare. 
Overbearing judicial oversight is frustrating, even dangerous in the article’s eyes. 
Still, the study lacks the objectivity that might lead to broader consensus amongst 
interested non-governmental parties. Tugenhat & Croft argue for the 
reinstatement of Crown Immunity for the MOD by focusing on three areas: the 
treatment of prisoners in Iraq, the employment of lawyers within the Ministry of 
Defence, and efforts to mitigate the risk of torture by Afghan forces. However, 
recent trends in prosecution would suggest that whilst these efforts affect the 
MOD, continued civil legal oversight of military operations should be expected. 
Therefore they should place their effort into mitigating the risk of IHL violations 
rather than the legal consequences of abuses. 
Afghan prisoners  
The example of Afghan prisoners used by Crofts and Tagenhat is useful to this 
study on two fronts. First, it highlights the risk of indigenous forces trained by the 
British Army abusing the skills that they are taught. Second, the example 
significantly undermines the anti lawfare lobby by arguing against the protection 
of Afghan prisoners in favour of notions of sovereignty. The very real risk of 
                                                                
42 At the time of writing, the ICRC is conducting a major report, Strengthening Legal Protection for victims 
of armed conflict. This publication is likely to shed further light on this debate. 
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torture in Afghanistan impeded the handover of Afghan prisoners from British 
military custody to Afghan indigenous forces during 2012-13, because of this 
perceived risk of abuses43. Croft & Tugenhat criticize that cessation of handovers, 
claiming that it created a violation of Afghan Sovereignty and a huge operational 
difficulty having to house the prisoners in Camp Bastion.44 However, this issue 
reinforces this study’s assertion of concern over the actions of British trained 
indigenous forces with the response appearing to be an effective measure in 
preventing the implication of British complicity in possible mistreatment of 
prisoners by Afghan forces until a diplomatic solution was reached guaranteeing 
the prisoner’s fair treatment.  
The argument that Afghan Sovereignty should be respected in favour of allowing 
human rights abuses to occur is a weak one. ‘Afghan sovereignty matters not one 
jot in this situation, as the obligation is jus cogens,45 and sovereignty can never 
be interpreted to include permission to torture someone’ (Interview 8). Using this 
logic, the Croft & Tugenhat article’s legitimacy, and many others who argue 
against such legal interventions is undermined. This example is useful for twofold. 
It highlights the concern surrounding the behaviour of indigenous forces that 
British tactical commanders encounter, but also highlights the larger media, legal 
and diplomatic tensions that such events cause, thus, energizing the requirement 
for British troops to train indigenous forces to behave appropriately.  
Increased civil oversight is a side effect of earlier mistakes made by the military 
in detainee handling in Iraq. Tugenhat and Croft fail to acknowledge that it was in 
large part the UK MOD’s actions that caused this scrutiny, Baha Moussa being a 
case in point. Though they argue that lessons have been learnt since these 
cases, this learning process only occurred because of the oversight of civil 
society, and organizations like PIL. The MOD should, therefore, expect such legal 
scrutiny in the future. U.S. commentators similarly argue against lawfare, 
Marcantel argues that the U.S. Government should legislate against ‘judicial 
activism, but also the threat of lawfare as understood as the use of the U.S. legal 
system and respect for the rule of law to “achieve an operational objective”’ (2013: 
                                                                
43 The cessation occurred after the alleged mistreatment of Serdar Mohammed by Afghan forces, creating 
concern over prisoner safety under Afghan security forces and British complicity in the treatment of those 
prisoners. 
44 The UK and U.S. Main Operating Base in Helmand Province Afghanistan. 
45Peremptory: leaving no opportunity for denial or refusal. 
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138), but it seems difficult to differentiate between genuine civil-military legal 
oversight and lawfare with an operational objective. There is a danger that all 
legal challenge is labelled ‘Lawfare’ whereas, in fact, legal challenge as part of 
civil-military oversight is distinctly different from Lawfare, where an insurgent or 
enemy seeks to exploit Western humanitarian laws. Legal military commentators 
must focus on developing responses to emerging and future problems that will 
counteract the threat to the MOD rather than focusing on the overhyped tactical 
impact of these rules, such as prolonged detention of insurgents in Camp Bastion. 
There also exist further threats of legal challenge, besides the concept of Lawfare 
that could cause financial cost and damage in political and domestic goodwill in 
future conflicts. 
Technology influence 
Development in technology increases the legal risk of accusations of culpability 
for indigenous force behaviour and removes the impetus on legal organizations 
to pursue court action. Additionally, Dunlap (2008) highlighted the use of modern 
media by insurgents to exploit civilian casualties in order to use U.S. forces’ 
adherence to law as a weapon against them. If unsavoury behaviour is recorded 
and publicized then the British legal system is left with little choice but to pursue 
the case without non-government pressure, as was the case with Marine A. Just 
as social media can rapidly influence public opinion, so too can the pervasion of 
media technology on the battlefield.  
The Case of ‘Marine A’, Sgt Alexander Blackman, exemplifies this emerging 
paradigm of technological influence. Thirty years a go, in the Falkland Island 
Campaign, and twenty years ago during the first Gulf War, helmet cameras with 
digital recording did not exist. Sgt Blackman became the first British soldier since 
the Second World War to be convicted of the murder of an enemy combatant.46 
In an interview with the BBC, former First Sea Lord Admiral West (2014) claimed 
that ‘if every soldier had a self cam during the Second World War, we would have 
had thousands and thousands of cases’. Although a subjective assertion, it does 
allude to the ability of media technology to influence legal proceedings, triggering 
unavoidable legal action where culpability can be established.  
                                                                
46 Sgt Blackman’s offence, the murder of an injured Afghan insurgent, came to light because a comrade’s 
video recording of the event, found on his personal laptop, was made available to military police.  
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Indeed, if the focus of this study was how to avoid prosecution for IHL complicity, 
rather than how to train indigenous forces not to commit IHL violations, then the 
banning of personal media devices on the battlefield would be a sensible step for 
the MOD to take, denying what might be termed an IHL ‘own goal’. Video of an 
IHL violation is difficult to defend against, whether the camera is carried by 
civilians, enemy combatants or soldiers. Whilst the MOD have been subject to 
the civil control emphasized by Professionalisation for many years, the 
development and proliferation of media technology has left the MOD dealing with 
a level of legal oversight that would previously have been impossible. Further 
pressure on the UK MOD originates from the political need to make international 
legal action appear fair and legitimate. 
Continued international focus 
The pattern of international war crimes trials has created the accusation of 
victimhood amongst poorer states, where accusations have emerged that they 
are being singled out for prosecution. Recent international legal cases have 
focused on less developed states, these include the trials of Charles Taylor of 
Liberia, Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, although the latter was tried 
in an Iraqi court. In an interview with the American International Legal Association 
(2014) David Crane Chief International prosecutor at the Sierra Leone War 
Crimes Trial warned of the possibility of a two tier system developing, where 
Western leaders and soldiers could escape justice by not being convicted for 
perceived crimes. Crane (2014) claimed that there should be justice for everyone 
and that no one is above the law. Whilst this may not substantiate a specific threat 
to Western powers with comprehensive domestic legal frameworks,47 it does 
imply that there is an awareness of the one-sided paradigm of international legal 
prosecutions, which will maintain pressure on Western military forces, if only to 
provide fairness to less developed states and avoid the accusation of 
international legal partiality. An aspiration for international legal parity should 
focus the MOD on the risk of legal prosecution.48 
                                                                
47 The ICC is established to compliment domestic legal frameworks that are too weak to handle overly 
complex cases such as genocide. 
48 In response to concern over UK MOD detainee handling in Iraq, the European Centre for Constitutional 
and Human Rights (ECCHR) and Public Interest Lawyers (PIL) submitted a request for UK activity to be 
examined by the ICC; ‘Communication to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court: 
The Responsibility of Officials of the United Kingdom for War Crimes Involving Systematic Detainee 
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Mothers of Srebrenica  
The massacre in Srebrenica, Bosnia, is an example of a Western power being 
held to account for its actions, but also how a group of peace keepers, the Dutch 
in this case, are pursued for culpability in failing to prevent the massacre of large 
numbers on men and boys. The case offers parallels for cases in which soldiers 
fail to intervene when confronted by humanitarian violations. Although the case 
centres on the activity of UN Peacekeepers who failed to intervene in the 
Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995. A collection of bereaved widows and 
mothers from the town, known as The Mothers of Srebrenica, allege that UN 
peacekeepers were negligent in their duty in failing to intervene in the massacre. 
Although not under a peacekeeping mandate and arguably unlikely to be working 
alongside troops likely to commit abuses on the scale of Srebrenica, the case 
highlights the will of wronged groups to bring legal proceedings against those that 
fail to intervene in humanitarian atrocities that they witness. 
At a recent American Society of International Law (ASIL) event, Bruce Rashkow, 
previously of the US Department of Justice and of the UN, remarked that in such 
cases ‘the Use of force under a UN security Council resolution is always a 
complex issue’ (2014). Dutch courts had previously ruled, however, that the case 
cannot be heard because the Dutch peacekeepers were acting under the banner 
of the UN, which holds immunity from prosecution. The inference subsequently 
being that troops not possessing the legal immunity of a UN mandate may be 
held responsible for such inaction in future. The legal responsibility to intervene 
in humanitarian abuses raises important issues for study, however, especially 
where those abuses are committed by personnel outside a soldier’s rank 
structure, namely indigenous forces. It highlights the need for governments to do 
all they can to stem witnessed abuses and highlights the ongoing legal pressure 
they are coming under. 
Conditionality 
To combat this pressure, and the legal threat of indigenous forces abusing the 
skills and misusing the equipment they are provided, a number of concepts have 
emerged. Conditionality is one that may help to counter the threat of legal action 
                                                                
Abuse in Iraq from 2003-2008’ available at: http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/united-kingdom.html (last 
accessed 23 June 2014). 
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to professionalizing indigenous forces. After operations by UN-sponsored troops 
in the Congo and Pakistani Troops in Haiti, the UN has adopted such a policy. 
Bruce Rashkow (2014) claimed that there have been widespread reports of 
sexual abuse by UN troops in the Congo in early 2000s. Conditionality has been 
used to counter such abuses. Advanced by UN secretary General Ban Ki Moon, 
conditionality dictates that UN units deploying on peacekeeping missions should 
properly consider those they offer assistance to. Human Rights Watch says that 
the policy ‘carefully screened Congolese military units aided with UN supplies, 
and officers with a track record of grave human rights abuses weeded out.’ (2012) 
This goes some way to mitigating indigenous force misbehaviour, as conditions 
to adhere to are placed on indigenous forces in exchange for continued UN 
support. 
The UN sponsoring peacekeeping missions in unstable states is a different format 
to that which the UK faces, as the UN holds immunity from prosecution for 
complicity in the acts that they may inadvertently aid. To draw parallels, however, 
is useful in this situation. Both seek to work with less developed military forces in 
volatile states. Many of the lessons learnt, even scandals embroiling the UN offer 
insight into how the UK MOD should approach training indigenous forces and 
some of the legal frustrations that may be encountered.49 
Solutions mitigation and the UN Due Diligence Policy. 
The UK should, therefore, be willing to adopt the policies of external agencies in 
its dealings with indigenous forces in order to provide greater freedom to 
professionalize indigenous forces. The thirteen-page UN Due Diligence Policy 
(DDP) document for the training of foreign armies outlines the conditions by which 
UN forces should engage with foreign security forces, and also by which this aid 
should be withdrawn if the force’s behaviour is deemed inappropriate. The policy 
is pragmatic on the matter of withdrawing support, acknowledging the dichotomy 
between withdrawing support if abuses occur, and similarly allowing the 
                                                                
49For broader academic commentary on IHL training for peacekeepers, see: Axmacher S, ‘Review of 
Scenario-Based Trainings for Military Peacekeepers on Prevention and Response to Conflict-Related 
Sexual Violence’ (Stop Rape Now: UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict 2013) 
http://www.stoprapenow.org/uploads/advocacyresources/1394227122.pdf (Last accessed 8 September 
2014) and Blocq DS, ‘The Fog of UN Peacekeeping: Ethical Issues Regarding the Use of Force to Protect 
Civilians in UN Operations’ (2006) 5 Journal of Military Ethics 201 
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continuance of development if the withdrawal of support may lead to an inability 
to further influence the forces under training at all.  
The UK’s early musings on conditionality have been overly vague and would 
benefit from emulating the UN DDP. Building Stability Overseas (2011) lays out 
these early efforts: ‘safeguards for potential human rights violations will be put 
into place, including seeking high level assurance that new capabilities will not be 
used or misused for the commission of human rights violations’ (2011: 30). 
However, such statements and policy stances remain vague. In relation to the 
planned training of 2,000 Libyan soldiers in the UK, it claimed they ‘will be vetted 
in advance for medical, physical and behavioural suitability’ (HMG, 2013). 
Unfortunately, this operation ended poorly, after a number of the soldiers were 
returned home charged with a number of sexual assaults on local civilians in 
Cambridgeshire.50 Still, a more detailed policy, properly enforced, is likely to add 
greater protection against legal challenge. The UN DDP will be discussed in a 
later chapter, specifically in relation to the value of the UK Government 
developing its own policy in order to mitigate against the risks of indigenous 
forces abusing the skills they are taught. 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
When considering issues of conditionality, the UK Government must further 
consider the issue of equipment, tightly tied to conditionality. A developing 
indigenous force will require military equipment. In the case of more developed 
nations such as Bahrain and Egypt, the extent of these sales have a great 
economic drive. The wealth of such countries allows them to purchase equipment 
of a high technological standard that makes such sales economically attractive to 
foreign states with domestic arms industries. Comparatively intervention in 
unstable states with limited financial resources may lead to the supply of more 
basic equipment. But, in both cases, the supplying government must be mindful 
of its responsibilities under international law. The sale or provision of weaponry 
or equipment to states is governed by the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) of April 2013, 
which upholds the principle that ‘States are to assess whether proposed transfers 
would contribute to or undermine peace and security, or be used to commit or 
                                                                
50 Andrew Lansley MP for Cambridge South wrote to Defence Secretary demanding an apology and 
explanation for a series of sexual assaults by Libyan soldiers, committed against local residents in 2014. 
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facilitate serious violations of IHL or international human rights law (IHRL)’…If 
there is an ‘overriding risk’ (Article 7.3) that these negative consequences would 
occur as a result of a transfer, a state must not license it’ (Saferworld, 2013:16). 
Policies, such as this, which the UK subscribes to, provide legal oversight further 
opportunity to challenge the outcomes of government policy. 
Conclusion: 
Legal action poses a very real threat to the UK’s aspiration to develop indigenous 
forces. Although there is no precedence of UK forces being tried for complicity in 
the development of indigenous forces who commit humanitarian violations, it is a 
concern that the UK Government has raised in Building Stability Overseas (2011) 
as a result of the growing trend in Lawfare. The pervasiveness of legal challenge 
has caused this vulnerability, with the recent Baha Mousa, Al Sweady and 
Trooper Williams cases, further exacerbated by developing media technology 
and a desire for even handed justice amongst international courts. 
However, a number of Western legal commentators, Croft and Tugenhat (2013) 
and Marcantel (2013) who are associated with military forces have defined this 
threat of legal action as exclusively Lawfare. There is little distinction made 
between Lawfare as an operational tool and legal action as a method of civil-
military oversight espoused by the Professionalisation debate. This nuance is 
important. Defining all legal action as Lawfare undermines the legitimate legal 
action taken against the MOD in relation to detainee mishandling and other IHL 
violations. 
Whether or not the motivation of groups like PIL is personal greed or political 
viewpoint, legal oversight remains. Failing to understand the motivations of legal 
groups to pursue appropriate behaviour by the military and to conduct personal 
attacks on leading individuals within human rights law firms is contrary to the 
concepts of Professionalisation and civil oversight promoted by Huntington. In 
light of some of the abuses committed by British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
it seems almost certain that legal oversight will remain a feature of future 
intervention and conflicts.  
Focus should, therefore, lay in reforming British military adherence to IHL and the 
ability of training and mentoring forces to impart respect for international law 
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amongst those indigenous forces that they train. The UN has created effective 
mechanisms in mitigating the risk of their complicity in light of past scandals. 
Whilst they maintain a legal immunity in international law, their development of 
conditionality for those they assist is an effective mitigation to the legal threats 
that they could face without immunity. Although such policies may fail, the legal 
ramifications of abuse, the cost to taxpayer in legal fees and costs, as well as the 
risk of prosecution of ‘complicit’ personnel should be minimized by adoption of 
similar policies by the UK Government. These policies are, however, focused on 
the higher strategic and operational policies of developing indigenous forces to 
adhere to international legal norms. This study will now examine more tactical 
and de facto methods of encouraging IHL adherence concurrent to indigenous 
force development. 
 
 75 
Chapter 3 - How effective is the British Army’s approach to the 
professionalisation of indigenous forces? 
The British Army must broaden its perspectives on training indigenous forces. By 
utilizing more varied sources and by properly integrating the experience of its 
soldiers in contemporary operations it will mitigate the risk of indigenous forces 
abusing the skills they are taught and improve its approach to Professionalisation. 
This Chapter analyses British MOD Doctrine on the training of indigenous forces, 
principally JDP 3-40, JDN 6/11, a Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre 
(DCDC) discussion paper on indigenous forces, as well as the UK Government’s 
policy paper Building Stability Overseas. Further utilizing interviews with a 
number of key informants to identify the practices at play at the tactical level of 
indigenous force development. Subsequently, this Chapter identifies a number of 
areas for improvement in the MOD’s considerations of Professionalisation. 
Analysis and contradictory interviews raise a number of issues with British 
doctrine that should be addressed if the British Army is to improve its approaches 
to developing indigenous forces. JDN 6/11, which focuses exclusively on 
indigenous force development and provides a useful basic explanation of training 
indigenous forces. Still, it is blinkered in its approach to forming partnerships with 
indigenous forces by focusing too much on British experiences of indigenous 
forces, without utilizing other available examples. It fails to seek external 
Organisational understanding. The available case studies for UK doctrine are 
broad, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. Using the RGR as an 
example of indigenous force development mistakes the very nature of indigenous 
force development. Although, the case study does once again reinforces the 
significance of resources within the Professionalisation debate. Errors within the 
doctrine’s language, which is almost derisory of less developed forces, could 
damage the process of developing indigenous forces. Finally, there is a lack of 
focus on the differing stages of conflict at which indigenous forces are developed. 
Whilst UK military doctrine is more strategically and operationally rather than 
tactically focused, the conduct of British soldiers in development roles and those 
they train can have clear strategic effects. They are a good example of ‘the 
strategic corporal’ effect-where tactical commanders will face complex rapidly 
evolving scenarios on the battlefield. The roles of tactical commanders must, 
therefore, be better comprehended by the higher levels of command. 
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Interviews identify paradigms that are at play at the ‘tactical’ level that are not fully 
acknowledged at higher levels or in doctrine. One significant identification 
concerned the stage of conflict at which engagement is pursued. Within the 
doctrine there is a black or white classification of conflict. Either training is 
conducted in or out of conflict. Whilst this may be the case at a macro level within 
a state, the reality at the micro ‘tactical’ level is much more nuanced than this 
would suggest. A state of conflict may exist within a country, but it may not directly 
impact indigenous forces or trainers specifically. In such a case the battle may be 
far away or near, but the effect of this difference is not recognized. 
This study maintains that operational and tactical encounters with IHL violations 
in conflict are not comprehensively understood. Occasions of decoupling were 
identified, where the tactical practice is different to that understood within the 
doctrine or acknowledged at the public level. This includes cases of indigenous 
force trainers being underprepared for their task as well as the observance of 
what this study has termed ‘pragmatic patience’, where advisors accept low level 
violations of professional norms achieving long term success. 
Approaches during peacetime are already well understood by the ICRC, NGOs 
and the British Government and pursued with the hope of mitigating violence if a 
conflict does erupt. Yet, indigenous force trainers must be better prepared for the 
diverse and fluctuating states of conflict that they may find themselves in when 
developing indigenous forces. To its credit, the doctrine identifies the difficulty of 
creating civil structures and indigenous forces whilst a conflict rages. 
Unfortunately that is precisely what the UK MOD has found itself doing in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The ICRC advocate the development of adherence to legal 
codes of war before the conflict has erupted, however, this is not always possible. 
Therefore, when preparing soldiers to develop indigenous forces, the UK MOD 
must pay greater attention to the nuanced states of conflict that exist within a 
conflict. This study identifies situations where a state of conflict exists within a 
country, but where indigenous forces may find themselves in contact or out of it.51 
Soldiers must be prepared to affect change within these multifaceted situations. 
                                                                
51 JDN 6/11 refers to ‘conflict’ in the country. However a group of soldiers may not be under immediate 
pressure from fighting. Subsequently, mentor/mentee relations are simpler. Interview 1 identified a military 
term ‘Contact’, where soldiers are directly involved in an armed firefight. 
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When a British soldier finds himself training forces within a state of conflict, this 
study maintains that there is a deficit for engaging in behaviour that is contrary to 
British interests, such as violations of IHL-as discussed in the previous Chapter-
which may undermine the UK’s position in years to come, both as a result of 
failing to mitigate the risk of legal complicity in its support for unsavoury partners 
as well as on moral grounds or the political imperative of ensuring such 
adherence amongst its partners. This study, therefore, seeks to suggest 
opportunities for the UK MOD to increase its development of indigenous force 
trainers and advisers ability to counter possible IHL violations. 
For the British Army to achieve this, there are a number of informal paradigms at 
play on the tactical level that should be better understood: soldiers’ safety, the 
role of peer pressure, a pragmatic patience approach to an indigenous force’s 
development and the personalities of indigenous force and UK commanders. 
Whilst some of these concepts are politically controversial, a better 
understanding of them would highly strengthen the UK’s approach in facilitating 
the Professionalisation of indigenous forces. 
Firstly, it is necessary to examine the advocated approaches to indigenous force 
development within British doctrine. 
How have the UK MOD decided to progress with indigenous force training? 
British attempts to define indigenous force development produce a capable 
doctrinal departure point for the subject. The pieces that will be discussed here 
are a response to the ever complicated states of conflict that British forces find 
themselves encountering, as well as increasingly fractious political situations 
described in Chapter One. Still, the doctrine lacks the detailed approach that such 
complicated situations require. This Chapter identifies three key areas where the 
British Army’s doctrine on stabilisation and developing indigenous forces 
warrants greater scrutiny: 1) the use of terminology within doctrine that identifies 
divides between indigenous forces and their trainers; 2) the use of inappropriate 
case study examples,52 3) finally, the intricacies of the stages of conflict where 
                                                                
52 The Royal Gurkha Rifles (RGR) example offers useful observations on inter-cultural relations, but as a 
model for developing indigenous forces in the short term, it is almost irrelevant, using a colonial model of 
leadership where UK born and educated Officers command Nepalese born and raised troops, has minimal 
application to professionalisation within a modern independent foreign state. Whereas, in an unstable state, 
the aspiration is to develop both the soldiers and leaders within that state. 
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Professionalisation may be conducted. The JDN makes reference to pre and 
during conflict approaches to training, but further understanding of these 
differences when working in unstable states is limited. Each of these points allow 
identification of where the approach to developing indigenous force adherence to 
IHL can be strengthened and will now be examined, in turn. 
JDN & DCDC discussion advice from general experiences 
Joint Doctrine Note 6/11 and the Doctrine Concepts Development Centre 
discussion paper on partnering indigenous forces provide specific attention to 
training indigenous forces as part of the military’s contribution to developing 
stability. JDN 6/11 utilizes a combination of the DCDC discussion paper as an 
initial reference point of historical analysis and of interviews with Army officers 
whose opinions warrant consideration given their experience. The JDN highlights 
several features pertinent to partnering indigenous forces that are of interest to 
this study. However, the document also makes significant oversights in its 
understanding of the modern partnering process that JDP 3 -40 does allude to, 
that is, the requirement on the part of British Army to ensure that indigenous 
forces behave appropriately. 
Both Stabilisation - The military contribution (2009) and Partnering indigenous 
forces (2011) successfully identify the benefits of developing indigenous forces, 
as previously discussed in this paper.53 Similarly, the papers identify past errors 
in the conduct of the Afghan campaign, citing the delayed development of the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) due to a focus on the Afghan Army. This likely links 
to the aforementioned prioritization of security in stability efforts with the UK Army 
focusing its efforts on the Afghan Army stemming from a cultural bias towards a 
military rather than police approach to SSR. However, the inability to identify the 
reason for this oversight reduces the ability of commanders to become aware of 
and remedy such failures in future. The Army can say what went wrong, but is 
reticent to openly admit why. This is a weakness in the MOD’s doctrine on 
partnering, there is no scope within this study to explore why British Army doctrine 
produces such limitations in knowledge. Yet, where those blackspots currently 
                                                                
53 Stabilisation pays particular attention to the indigenous forces’ ability to bolster force ratios in the counter 
insurgent’s favour, as well as the improved local profile of indigenous forces. 
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exist, how they manifest themselves and how British soldiers have adapted to 
deal with such vacuums will be examined. 
Partnering and partnership 
The manner in which messages are communicated to indigenous forces has 
huge significance. Terminology is the set of terms and language belonging to a 
specialized subject. There exists a lack of humility towards indigenous forces 
within the UK MOD doctrine which is bolstered by the use of unfortunate 
terminology. With its terminology, JDN 6/11 undermines the development of 
effective relationships between UK training forces and indigenous force 
commanders. The DCDC discussion paper states that support can take form of 
‘partnering’ or ‘partnership’. This asserts that indigenous forces do not qualify for 
full ‘partnership’ with the forces training them because of their inability to conduct 
complex operations independently. Partners must supply their own ‘internal 
security, governance and economy (and) should not be dependent on the 
partnership to deliver this’ (JDN 6/11, 2011: 12). The distinction between the two 
is that ‘partnership’ is only achieved by a host nation once they have undergone 
‘the development of the relationship (partnering)’ (DCDC, 2011: 7) and passed 
exacting tests in order to be worthy of ‘partnership (marriage)’ (DCDC, 2011: 7). 
The partnership is said to be a full strategic relationship ‘based on a sound legal 
arrangement, trust and mutual respect, where partners are otherwise 
independent bodies who agree to co-operate’ (JDN 6/11, 2011: 11). 
Using the above logic, the UK is in partnership with the United States, but 
partnering with Afghan forces. This may be the criteria for fulfilling strategic 
partnership, but it is unhelpful to associate it with an operational approach reliant 
on day-to-day relationships54. The wording used within the note could be 
significant. General Frank Kitson argues that ‘A good indication of the way in 
which the US Army looks at the problem can be got from an examination of the 
terminology which they now use’ (1972: 52). In the UK’s case, British doctrine’s 
terminology relegates the partner nation below the one developing indigenous 
force capability. 
                                                                
54 Humility and shared experienced are later espoused as crucial in developing indigenous forces, and will 
be discussed. This example may undermine subsequently undermine this concpept  
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By receiving support, indigenous forces become subordinate according to this 
doctrine’s terminology. Yet, if they have consented to receive support in the first 
instance, they cannot be relegated below the provider purely on what appears to 
be financial and development need. Indeed, Eliav Lieblich (2011) argues that by 
consenting to an intervention in which a foreign state assists the local government 
to deal with an internal conflict, their relationships cannot be anything less than a 
strategic partnership, because a forcible intervention without the support of the 
host government is a violation of the international norms of sovereignty. 
Therefore, the distinctions between a force being developed being subordinate 
to another is firstly legally inaccurate, but also politically counter-productive. It is 
possible that this creates an attitude of superiority among British forces and 
subservience of the host indigenous forces, thus, undermining the relationship 
between the more developed and less developed forces in the partnership. 
DCDC contradicts this slip in their own terminology by citing one tactical 
commander who claims that, ‘It is important to have a sense of humility when 
dealing with indigenous forces’ (JDN 6/11, 2011: 12). It is significant that this 
recognition is made by a tactical commander given that many commanders on 
the ground realize this, but operational and strategic teaching is defiantly more 
doctrinally pure55. Marking partnering and partnership as mutually exclusive is an 
unhelpful interpretation. As the paper goes on to say, ‘it is the spirit of partnership 
that is required to achieve success jointly encapsulated by the slogan 
“succeeding together”’ (DCDC, 2011: 43). Humility is supported as a significant 
personality trait in those attempting to encourage IHL amongst indigenous forces, 
but the doctrinal approach undermines that. It is quite possible that this strategic 
differentiation between partnering and partnership permeates down to the tactical 
level with serious consequences. This issue will, therefore, be explored via 
several interviews in this study. However, it is interesting to note that such 
differentiations are not highlighted when discussing methods employed within the 
RGR case study. 
The Royal Gurkha Rifles 
In contrast to the terminology used in the doctrine, the primary case study, 
involving the RGR, advocates an egalitarian approach to developing indigenous 
                                                                
55 Doctrinal purity is a military colloquialism, akin to playing it ‘by the book’ 
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forces. This is somewhat different to the doctrinally pure explanation of strategic 
partnerships. The strengths and weaknesses of the case provide notable points 
for the development of indigenous forces. There exists a polarity of cultures 
between British Officers commanding the Nepalese soldiers and the Nepalese 
soldiers themselves, which is useful. The two way exchange of culture and 
knowledge sharing, advocated in the case study is a positive advance on the 
divisive terminology; and the success of the Gurkhas makes it easy to point to 
the Regiment as a beacon for non-Western professionalized forces. However, 
this case study is misapplied because the RGR are not an indigenous force. They 
are an already professionalized force with a historic legacy of success. The use 
of the example demonstrates positive and negative aspects of the British Army’s 
doctrinal approach to indigenous force development. These will be discussed 
now. 
Specific strengths of the RGR example within the context of indigenous 
forces development 
The RGR case study does provide a number of effective observations that 
strengthen the British Army doctrine’s effectiveness. The polarity of cultures that 
exists between the United Kingdom and Nepal, with British Officers commanding 
Nepalese soldiers facilitated DCDC’s selection of the RGR as a case study. The 
case highlights useful guidance for the engagement of British Officers with 
soldiers who originate from a different culture. The two-way exchange of 
education is perhaps one of these, the applicability to this study being that whilst 
advisers develop military skills in the indigenous forces, the indigenous forces 
develop the knowledge of the adviser of their language and local culture. This 
model espouses the sharing of knowledge on an equal footing. Strengths specific 
to the Gurkha Regiment model are translated into five lessons.56 These are said 
to be applicable to the partnering of all indigenous forces. Concepts of humility, 
mutual respect and the importance of relationships are especially emphasized. 
These attributes are important to the study’s analysis and will be examined in 
                                                                
56 They are: support for British Officers from their command; the Officer induction programme: a period 
immersed in South Asian culture; the Mentoring and nurturing of British Officers through the appointment 
of a Gurkha soldier as a radio operator or orderly who the Officer can then discuss Regimental matters with, 
speak Nepali with and develop an information network; the presence of an internal Gurkha induction cadre 
and finally; the development of language skills by the British Officer. (JDN 6/11, 2011: 126) 
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further detail in interviews. Particular attention will be given to the concept of 
developing and nurturing relationships. However, there remains the problem that 
the RGR are already professionalized as a force. Furthermore, they are trained 
and predominantly garrisoned within the UK. 
Specific weaknesses of the RGR example 
The case study is misapplied. Although the analysis of the RGR offers tactical 
advice to those developing indigenous forces, the regiment is singled out as a 
model indigenous force. The DCDC paper highlights attributes of the Gurkha 
Regiment model by using it as the example of successful partnering. Yet, they 
are not indigenous forces at all, except that the regiment is manned by soldiers 
from outside the UK. Many of the suggested methods used within the RGR 
encouraging partnership have taken nearly two centuries to develop.57 This is far 
removed from the wholesale training of indigenous forces and SSR in unstable 
states, which is a relatively rushed process. 
Why DCDC selected the RGR case study 
Given the flaws in the case study, identified here, it raises the question as to why 
it was chosen in the first place. One reason could be due to the association 
between the Head of Land and Research at DCDC, Brig Ian Ridgen and the 
Gurkhas. He himself is a Gurkha Officer. If this is the motivation behind the 
selection of the RGR as a case study, it is blinkered. Jackson (2015) argues that 
there is a lack of effective research on SSR. Although this is some excuse for not 
utilizing academic research on the topic, there still exist better examples within 
the military that could be utilized in preference to the RGR example, such as the 
US embed teams in Iraq. Chapter 3 of JDN 6/11 utilizes only a brief case study 
of these teams in Iraq between 2005 and 2007, which is a more relevant and 
recent example of indigenous force development in an unstable state. The 
doctrine note opts to delve into the Gurkhas as an example of partnering in 
modern COIN and stabilisation environments. The use of British Officers of the 
RGR to produce this case study may provide further limited objectivity in their 
assessment of the strengths of the RGR model for indigenous force training due 
                                                                
57Early constituents of the Regiment in the British Army were first founded in 1815. 
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to their loyalty to the Regiment. These factors undermine the case study’s 
legitimacy and must be considered before accepting it as a viable model. 
The success of the RGR within the British army; both the length of their existence 
and their success on operations, gives their example weight. The case study’s 
contribution to our understanding of indigenous force development cannot be 
completely discounted because of limited objectivity. Reconciling the advantages 
and disadvantages of this case study helps to draw additional lessons for 
partnering indigenous forces. Weaknesses in the model, such as the 
incompatibility of the RGR’s 200 hundred year partnership with the United 
Kingdom compared with an embryonic indigenous force highlights the 
awkwardness of the case. Still, it can also be viewed as positive: the proven 
success of the Gurkhas and the time it has taken to develop the process of 
assimilating new arrivals into British military culture, the fostering of regimental 
pride and ethos are proof of its validity. Similarly, highlighting the presence of 
financial incentives to Gurkhas has an important application to the examination 
of indigenous force development. These factors are largely within the control of 
the indigenous force’s government. Additionally the absolute necessity of mutual 
cultural respect between adviser or British officer and indigenous soldier or 
Ghurkha is key to this example. 
There are likely better alternative examples of indigenous force development than 
the example of the RGR, which would aid more Professionalisation. This is the 
case for several reasons. The historic and traditional legacy of the Gurkhas is 
long and established,58 whilst indigenous forces are a new creation due to the 
very nature of SSR. Consequently, the Gurkhas can be highly selective of 
personnel, which an army in an unstable state may not have the luxury of being. 
As a longstanding member of the British armed forces, Gurkhas receive financial 
incentives to reach a high level of professionalism. The same incentives are 
usually not available to indigenous forces trained in unstable states. Finally, the 
Gurkhas are selected and trained within a secure environment; their training is 
not conducted within a state of conflict as JDN 6/11 advocates or in an unstable 
state, but safely within the UK, without pressures on the duration and conditions 
                                                                
58 Gurkha selection criteria is highly exacting and their selection produces a low success rate, around 1% 
of applicants are successful at entering the Regiment. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
news/the-big-question-who-are-the-gurkhas-and-what-is-their-contribution-to-military-history-
1676354.html Last accessed: 13 July 2015. 
 84 
of training, unlike most indigenous force training missions. The unstable 
environment which indigenous force development often occurs in is therefore 
likely to impact their development in a manner that would not affect the Gurkhas. 
Two of these three points have great significance to this study, and warrant 
further investigation, both the case of pay and resources that the Gurkhas 
receive, as well as the state of conflict experienced by a state where indigenous 
forces are developed, and how those two factors affect indigenous force training. 
Unfortunately, the 166 year history of the RGR cannot be replicated. However, it 
does provide an end point that British and indigenous forces might wish to strive 
for. 
Issues that they do not overcome…that indigenous forces do 
The Gurkha case study and its ability to encourage adherence to IHL draws three 
observations in relation to: 1) resources; 2) relationships; and 3) perspectives. 
The issue of resources deserves greater attention. The financing of indigenous 
forces is an issue of considerable relevance to ensuring their appropriate 
behaviour. Gurkhas are paid in line with British troops so do not encounter this 
issue. By falling within British training and discipline, the act of IHL training is 
second nature. Unlike the challenge of encouraging indigenous forces to conduct 
themselves in a new manner this may require skills of co-option, convincing and 
manipulation, not often needed in a well-disciplined unit such as the RGR. 
However, it does reinforce the importance of strong relationships between trainer 
and trainee in the absence of traditional discipline. The Gurkha case study may 
be indicative of the UK MOD not looking outwardly. It may prove beneficial, 
therefore, to examine alternative examples of indigenous force training that not 
only prove relevant to encouraging IHL adherence, but also grasp the basic 
problems that mentors encounter with indigenous forces that the Gurkhas do not, 
such as ill-discipline, misallocation of resources and negligible selection criteria 
in addition to the need for the rapid application of skills and quickly established 
relationships. One example of this may be the work of NGO officers to encourage 
adherence to IHL amongst indigenous forces. 
In and out of conflict-upstream prevention 
The stage of conflict in which indigenous force development is conducted is a 
neglected theme in JDN 6/11. The stabilisation doctrine acknowledges the 
military’s role in supporting states that are ‘entering, enduring or emerging from 
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conflict’ (JDP 3-40: 2010: xi). By investing in state structures and capabilities 
before a conflict, the UK government hope to build ‘strong, legitimate institutions 
and robust societies in fragile countries that are capable of managing tensions 
and shocks so there is a lower likelihood of instability and conflict’ (BSO, 2011: 
20). A pre-conflict intervention, by developing a state’s ability to provide its own 
stability, is claimed by the British Government to be far more cost-effective than 
to ‘invest in conflict prevention and de-escalation’ (BSO, 2011: 6). This approach 
is similarly echoed by organizations such as the ICRC and Amnesty International, 
both of which are concerned with the development of adherence to IHL. The 
ICRC claim that the dissemination of IHL training ‘before the outbreak of an 
internal armed conflict is essential’ and even has the benefit of making the 
outbreak of conflict less likely by fostering ‘a spirit of humanitarianism that will 
serve to mitigate the tensions within a society’(ICRC, 2003: 25). 
Thompson’s emphasis in COIN is on political solutions and the necessity of 
security within a threatened state, reinforcing Lt. Col. P. Vann’s maxim ‘Without 
security, nothing else will last’. Stabilisation-The Military Contribution (2009) is 
similar. Both approaches emphasize the significance of security and training local 
indigenous forces to achieve this, in line with Thompson’s five principles of COIN. 
This development has been the result of thirty years of evolution in the execution 
of military intervention. To this study, the convergence of COIN, training 
indigenous forces and political primacy, emphasizes the need for the 
Professionalisation of forces within conflict. 
Despite the significance afforded to pre-conflict development, the JDN 6/11 only 
affords one paragraph to the issue of developing indigenous forces ‘in conflict’, 
itself highlighting the difficulty of this; ‘Troops already in combat will often be tired, 
dispirited and in need of a rest, but the fight must continue.’ (2010: 3-22). This 
either represents a remarkable optimism that British forces will not have to 
develop indigenous forces during conflict or a naiveté nativity about the difference 
between the two situations. It lacks the detail to provide sufficient guidance to a 
commander about how they should approach each situation, as each is rather 
different. Therefore, this study will address this deficit, and examine the role that 
the stage of conflict plays in developing indigenous force adherence to IHL, and 
how approaches have emerged to manage the nuances of different situations. 
What these three key points actually allude to is a broader set of considerations 
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that are identified in the interviews. The significance of terminology alludes to the 
significance of interpersonal relations in developing indigenous force behaviour, 
the way that desired outcomes are communicated and the ability of the advisor 
to form connections with the indigenous force is desperately important. Criticism 
of the RGR case study is more indicative of the British Army’s sometimes 
perceived lack of desire to look externally. The case study itself actually identifies 
a number of key themes essential to indigenous force development that should 
not be discounted. Yet, a case gleaned from such internal experiences leads this 
study to advocate the examination of broader sources. Finally, the stage of 
conflict helps the recognition that advisors must be prepared for more diverse 
situations than is already the case. The Professionalisation of indigenous forces 
is not a fixed transition, but a varied path with a more fixed end state. The route 
to success should not be as mandated as the doctrine suggests. These concepts 
will now be explored in greater detail. 
Has an informal understanding of indigenous force development emerged 
in the British Army that is not mirrored in doctrine? 
Developing indigenous forces and concepts of professionalism is much more 
difficult once a state of conflict has taken hold. The ICRC find they have greater 
success sharing their norms before a conflict ensues: ‘This process is more easily 
carried out during peacetime or when armed conflict has not reached high levels 
of intensity’ (Integration, 2007: 20). Similarly, at the heart of stabilisation doctrine 
is the belief that conflict should be deterred before it takes hold, and that pre-
conflict development of indigenous forces aids this. However, this is not always 
possible, and development of indigenous forces may either take place in two 
situations identified by UK MOD and NGO doctrine: pre-conflict and during 
conflict conditions. Pre-conflict methods of development are very much ‘high end 
Security Sector Reform’ (Interview 3) before a conflict erupts. Pre-conflict 
development sees the judiciary and civil-military oversight arranged.59 This high 
end SSR is well understood and described in UK MOD and Government 
literature. 
                                                                
59 This arrangement utilises methods advocated by the ICRC, such as norm diffusion, cultural development, 
and IHL integration, where IHL norms are emphasised throughout the development of the armed force. 
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Developing indigenous forces once conflict has erupted is markedly much more 
difficult than pre-conflict development and is less understood. This is in the case 
of both the UK military and IHL-focused organizations such as the ICRC. British 
doctrine argues the benefit of this training, but emphasizes the importance of 
distance from combat conditions during ‘in conflict’ training. JDN 6/11 argues that 
by withdrawing combat engaged indigenous forces from the frontline to develop 
them, the force can be enhanced. Developing IHL adherence as an aspect of 
professionalism is one aspect of this. Nevertheless, this method removes 
valuable troops from what may be a traditional combat or counter insurgency 
environment where they are needed. As well as reducing a force’s number of 
troops in use, the troops may not be as receptive to the training as hoped, ‘troops 
already in combat will often be tired, dispirited and in need of a rest’ (JDN 6/11, 
2011: 84), so this preferred method of in conflict development itself can be 
difficult. 
When the withdrawal of troops cannot occur, MOD doctrine advocates the 
deployment of embedded adviser and mentor teams to develop indigenous 
forces. JDN 6/11 refers to both of these situations as ‘in contact’ (2011: 84), it 
makes no distinction between training on the frontline by embeds versus 
removing indigenous forces from fighting for training. This study’s interviews 
suggest that they are very separate scenarios requiring distinct consideration. 
This is because a state of conflict may exist in the country, but indigenous forces 
may rarely encounter their enemy, the contrast in instability within Afghanistan is 
one example of this, where the insurgency in 2009 was far more violent in certain 
regions compared to others: for example, Kandahar and Helmand Provinces in 
contrast to Bamyan Province to the north. The distinction between the two 
scenarios is relevant to those training indigenous forces, because they are very 
different scenarios, requiring nuanced skills. Situations incorporating patrols in 
permissive regions, training in established training military camps or informal talks 
in forward military bases will be termed ‘out of contact’, but ‘in conflict’; as such a 
state remains in the country. However, situations during or in the immediate 
aftermath of battle, will be referred to as ‘in contact’. This concept and 
differentiation is one that this study makes, but not drawn in British military 
doctrine. The distinction is important, because they require very different 
approaches and preparations by soldiers. We will now explore the frustrations of 
this dichotomy, by focusing on in contact development. 
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In contact doctrine 
A number of humanitarian agencies have a great understanding of in contact 
tactical level paradigms of IHL development. This study’s interviews also 
confirmed that this is also understood privately in British Army training. Still, the 
difficulty of this frontline engagement is not reflected in British Army doctrine on 
indigenous forces. But where the doctrine might be relevant, those items are 
toned down compared to the experiences encountered in this study’s interviews, 
thus, reducing the impact of data collected and disseminated by British Military 
sources for scrutiny. This lack of public acknowledgement of the difficulty of in 
conflict development seems to be the result of a number of conflicting priorities 
on British Forces, including the British Army’s internal battles with maintaining 
professional standards in adverse conflict situations. 
Conflicting priorities -difficulties in ensuring IHL protection even for UK 
The British Army has a far more established tradition of IHL adherence than the 
militaries of many unstable states, but they have struggled with their own 
protection of IHL in the face of competing priorities in conflict. The ICRC 
recognizes this difficulty. Despite the best will to promote IHL, ‘when armed actors 
are engaged in major combat operations, other priorities will inevitably replace 
these long-term concerns.’ (ICRC, Integration, 2007: 20). 
An example of such conflicting priorities was presented to the Al-Sweady enquiry 
(2014) which cited the evidence of Captain Bowen, of the Royal Military Police 
who was present at the Battle of Danny Boy. When attempting to investigate the 
deaths of 20 Iraqi men- said to be rioters and insurgents by the deployed British 
infantry battalion, Captain Bowen was told by the Commanding Officer that he 
was too busy ensuring the safety of his men to aid her enquiries (Al Saweady 
inquiry, 2014).60 The Commanding Officer’s statement suggests how two 
considerations are at play in contact; the difficulty of upholding IHL norms, in this 
case investigating alleged wrongdoing, versus focusing on ensuring the safety of 
his own soldiers. 
                                                                
60 Capt Bowen, http://www.alsweadyinquiry.org/ 2014. It is significant to note that the Al-Saweady inquiry 
was later dismissed due to a lack of evidence. The prosecuting legal teams coming under criticism for the 
weakness of the charges.  
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Given that British forces, despite their legacy of IHL adherence, face this 
dilemma, the prioritization of IHL amongst indigenous forces will be equally if not 
more difficult wherever a legacies of IHL adherence or professionalism do not 
exist. This example highlights the very specific nature of in contact situations with 
the presence of the threat to life or near fighting influencing the soldier’s attitude 
to violence and was a concern echoed by the military interview subjects of this 
study. 
The difficulties at the tactical level: 
The previous example highlights the difficulty British troops face in adhering to 
professional standards, namely IHL norms within In contact situations. Such 
situations are not routinely and openly critiqued, Interviewee 3 thought, because 
of the embarrassment and sensitivity of such events, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2 in relation to the risks of indigenous forces abusing their skills. 
Unfortunately, events such as the Battle of Danny Boy, where the failure to 
investigate what was eventually ruled to be a situation where British forces acted 
within professional norms, are overshadowed by the experience of some of the 
former serving soldier interview participants. Interviewee 1 gave an example of 
an in contact experience from the British involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict 
that highlights the extraordinary difficulties that those developing indigenous 
forces face: 
A 12 man British patrol witnessed the capture and subsequent 
summary execution by beating of a captured RUF (Revolutionary 
United Front) soldier. The patrol was deterred from intervening by the 
large numbers of SLA (Sierra Leone Army) soldiers in the hype of post 
battle retribution. 
The intimation from Interview 1 was that the patrol wished to intervene, but were 
unable to because of the numbers faced and perceived drug and battle crazed 
behaviour of the soldiers. This marks a set of stark considerations for an adviser 
or mentor seeking to develop the behaviour of an indigenous force, that in all 
likelihood they may encounter this type of situation. Military actors likely have to 
face the immediate aftermath of battle more than actors not embedded with 
indigenous units during frontline fighting. This difference poses risks to these 
teams that are not faced in high end SSR out of contact situations. Pre-planned 
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concepts of norm diffusion and integration are far removed from such frontline 
situations. It implies greater physical risk to the adviser, the added complication 
of emotional factors during battle, such as rage, and the decision making process 
as to how or even whether to intervene when faced with a clear violation of IHL. 
A distinguished former military officer suggests that far greater attention is 
needed at the tactical level for developing indigenous forces than is currently 
available. Greater preparation and acknowledgement within British doctrine is 
required for such difficult circumstances, which are likely to be encountered by 
British soldiers working with indigenous forces In contact. This study’s 
interviewees supported this view, one of whom claimed that even if you do 
persuade indigenous forces to follow norms of international law ‘You won’t take 
a West African soldier and convince him overnight to provide food, shelter and 
water for a detainee, especially when they have little themselves’ (Interview 1). 
This comment reinforces the earlier observation of the role resources play in 
indigenous force respect for IHL and one of the many priorities which a tactical 
commander must balance when seeking to encourage respect for IHL. 
Additionally, the ability to engender commitment to IHL is, therefore, a required 
skill amongst indigenous force developers. 
De facto solutions 
The research of this study would suggest that British Army teams attached to 
indigenous forces have faced similar In contact dilemmas of varying severity as 
recently as the Afghan and Iraq campaigns. The difficulty of the situation is quite 
evident, so it may be of value to ask how tactical commanders currently 
understand and deal with such situations and what de facto method and 
understanding have emerged that are not propagated in British Doctrine. 
Pragmatic patience 
The concept of pragmatism has emerged in relation to the behaviour of 
unprofessional indigenous forces. In 2014, Barack Obama used his West Point 
address to warn of the dangers of failed and failing states. Significantly for this 
study, he claimed that Western forces must be pragmatic in their engagement 
with unstable states and conflict regions. Whilst the West may not agree with all 
of the actions of those we aid, sometimes the alternative is worse. Freedman 
(2006) noted that in the U.S. Military, the term ‘transformation’ had come to be 
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seen as a process to be adhered to rather than something focused on an end 
state. This would imply a lack of flexibility for such doctrine. This study has 
resultantly produced a term that describes this balance, that is Pragmatic 
Patience runs counter to set processes of developing, focusing on the end state, 
and accepting variation from the proposed model of development.61 
Such a policy is not officially in place with the UK Government, but seems to be 
at play informally amongst the armed forces focused on long term gain. 
Operational or tactical commanders do not agree with or condone such violations, 
but they realize that if long term development is to be achieved, continued 
engagement and a belief is needed; that indigenous force adherence to 
international law will improve over time if they receive training from professional 
soldiers. The soldier’s moral freedom is summed up adeptly, ‘You can step out 
(of advising) if it is too bad, but if you stay it will improve’ (Interview 1). 
Working with indigenous forces that have a haphazard approach to IHL 
adherence may be beneficial in the long run, even if they act outside Western 
professional standards. Interviewee 1 notes that acts such as the one cited must 
be placed in the context of the conflict: 
When the RUF are conducting an insurgency that involves the 
systematic mutilation, the chopping off of the arms of civilians by 
rebels attempting to prevent them from voting; it becomes quite 
difficult to ensure their prisoners are treated with the accord that we 
would expect. 
This statement alludes to a degree of what we might describe as pragmatism on 
the part of the military man. The possibility that a violation of IHL can firstly be 
condoned as relatively minor in the context of a brutal conflict, but also that 
condoning the behaviour allows the soldier to justify remaining unmoved in the 
face of grave danger. ‘The approach of British Officers is invariably pragmatic. 
We will accept a certain amount of abuse or behaviour we disagree with for a 
greater advance in the long run’ (Interview 1). Whilst a clear violation of IHL is 
                                                                
61A practical understanding that a certain degree of violations are accepted, in exchange for the long term 
development of respect for IHL. ICRC (2013) also recognise the role of pragmatism in their approach to 
humanitarian abuses. That they should advocate for unfavourable actors to develop their norms over time. 
What these allowances entail is unfortunately blurry, but it has a similar tone to the UN’s DDP and what is 
seemingly practiced tactically by UK troops. 
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acknowledged, it is overlooked in the immediate scenario because of perceived 
danger of intervening, and that in the long-term, development with deter such 
acts. 
Two considerations emerge from the concept of Pragmatic Patience in relation to 
ensuring IHL at the tactical level. Firstly, it alludes to a process recognized within 
Organisational culture at play within the UK armed forces regarding IHL 
adherence amongst indigenous forces, known as Organisational hypocrisy or 
decoupling.62 This means that there is a gap between the formal policies of the 
UK MOD and practices at the tactical level. 
Secondly, the UK government must bring into line the senior policy understanding 
of tactical practices concerning indigenous forces to mitigate political and legal 
risk to them. The UN has issued the UN Due Diligence Policy in order to address 
such difficulties. The policy sees a certain level of violation of IHL not sanctioned, 
but tolerated by UN operations in order to allow continued long-term 
development. Such a policy would likely mitigate instances of decoupling, by 
bringing the unofficial norms into accepted institutional practice, which will be 
discussed shortly. Whilst such a policy is absent in UK forces, it is necessary to 
examine what shape the decoupling is taking by examining how UK soldiers 
intervene in situations where decoupling from norms of professionalism are 
taking place. 
What is needed?  
The interviews suggest a number of areas where individuals with experience of 
developing indigenous forces understand the process, which are not similarly 
reflected in British Doctrine. Issues such as personality, character clash, peer 
pressure, selecting the right people and the significance of resources are all 
mentioned. So, it is necessary to discover what informal responses and 
understanding have emerged. 
Interviewee 1, who has extensive experience of this subject from a number of 
military deployments synthesized the problem faced by a British Army adviser 
well: ‘If they (indigenous forces) have captured a soldier and want to ‘deal’ with 
                                                                
62 See also: Avant (1984), Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars and 
Legro (1996), Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step, American Political 
Science Review 
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him, they may not respond well to the suggestion that you treat him in accordance 
with the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights), especially if he has just killed 
their comrades or mutilated women and children in a nearby village’ (Interview 
1). The suggestion is that the adviser must have prepared or be able to think 
instantly and affect the situation in the heat of an In contact moment, 
communicating norms, all whilst maintaining personal safety as well as standing 
amongst those indigenous forces so that he can influence them again in the 
future. This suggests a level of training far beyond what is currently afforded to 
advisers or advocated in doctrine, but more importantly, a calibre of adviser that 
can cope with flammable situations with a calm head and intelligence. 
The role of personality 
Despite the severity of such situations, one interview emphasizes the importance 
of an adviser’s or mentor’s interpersonal relations and personality. He suggested 
British advisors were poorly prepared to deal with such situations with their 
approaches sometimes bordering on arrogant: ‘there is a tendency to think we 
have the answers because we possess a liberal Western education, this stems 
from a subconsciously ‘colonial ethos’, rather than forming a plan and marching 
over, which is a colonial approach to doing things’ (Interview 6). This was a 
perspective, which echoes the delivery of UK doctrine, citing both the Gurkha and 
East India Company colonial examples, which relegated the indigenous forces to 
junior parts. 
Conversely the importance of a two way exchange, advocated by the Gurkha 
model, but not the doctrine’s terminology gains relevance. One interviewee felt 
he achieved greater influence over those he worked with by investing in 
interpersonal relationships: ‘I developed relationships that I had because I went 
to listen’ (interview 5). By spending the majority of the time listening and not 
directing, the interviewee received more positive reactions from those he was 
advising when he did suggest courses of action. 
The importance of personality is reinforced elsewhere. A belief that the UK has 
not currently got its official policy right when approaching those who deal with 
indigenous forces and foreign cultures still exists. Whilst speaking to MSSG 
(Mission Support and Stabilisation Group), who are charged with the Army’s 
contribution to stabilisation, it was suggested that ‘we do not get the top quality 
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‘Strategic Corporal’,63 rather the second and third tier guys’ (Interview 5). This is 
not necessarily the group charged with advising indigenous forces on the 
frontline. However, the interviewee felt it alluded to the standing that has been 
placed upon the softer functions of stabilisation within the UK MOD as opposed 
to traditional combat roles. Interviewee 2 endorses this concept, revealing how 
some groups within the military embrace dealing with foreign cultures and the 
less combat focused functions, whilst others do not. 
Assigning significance to advising/dealing with foreign cultures, not 
combat 
Key to developing indigenous forces is the ability of advisers to understand and 
deal with foreign cultures, not just traditional combat functions. There appears to 
be a mixed acceptance of this. In Afghanistan, some units ‘really bought into the 
concept of partnering, whereas other regiments didn't necessarily' (Interview 2). 
This, the interviewee believed, was because the 'MS (Military Secretariat, 
reporting) and Honours & Awards System encouraged some commanders to 
chase more kinetic or ‘braver’ courses of, action in a counter insurgency 
environment'. Similarly regiments specifically tasked with advising indigenous 
forces can ‘become too focused on their own infantry planning cycles’ (Interview 
6), and maintain an allegiance to their regiments and the traditional combat 
military functions, rather than to the softer relationship-focused endeavours. The 
interpretation of Interviewee 2 is quite cynical, but it does seem clear that there 
has been an inability to fully embrace the approaches of a different culture, due 
to either organizational differences or the personal motivations of individuals. 
Interviewee 2 concedes that one reason for this is because such roles have 
previously been the remit of UK Special Forces, such as in the Dhofar campaign. 
So the remainder of the Army is catching up with the demands of such roles. It is 
clear, however, that the UK MOD has allocated many of its best soldiers, such as 
those from the Special Air Service (SAS), to developing indigenous forces. Still, 
as it has increased as a paradigm across military approaches to stabilisation, the 
remainder of the Army must keep track with the development of indigenous forces 
as a crucial modern military function deserving high quality recruits. 
                                                                
63 See: C. Krulak, Three Block War: low level commanders must comprehend complex situations on the 
modern battlefield. 
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What is the right personality- for commanders? 
This is a role that required a more specific type of officer than the Army generalist. 
Making this transition, where normal soldiers, not special forces are used to 
develop indigenous forces must take into account that 'the best military 
commander is not necessarily the best mentor’ (Interview 2). Those selecting 
advisors or mentors must recognize that ‘some senior NCOs and officers are 
brilliant soldiers, but unable to see the perspective of others….a way of doing 
things outside the normal British method of operating is alien to them’ (Interview 
2). An ability to operate in a more flexible state than the linear method of 
conventional military function is, therefore, important for those charged with 
developing indigenous forces. 
A more junior officer emphasized the specifics of this softer skills set saying, ‘You 
need patience, understanding and listening’ skills (Interview 6). Whilst an adviser 
undoubtedly will need to be self-confident to deal with the different culture in 
question, the humility to understand their perspective must be possessed to 
support such confidence. It would seem that the role of the personality of the 
adviser or mentor contributes to both his effectiveness in moulding the behaviour 
of those indigenous forces under him, but also in ensuring his own personal 
safety. 
Safety 
The ICRC has developed protection guidelines for their humanitarian workers 
relevant to this very subject. However, the UK MOD’s guidance is vaguer. An 
advisor attempting to correct indigenous force behaviour could ‘produce 
situations where an adviser has faced a ‘Mexican standoff’ situation, even a green 
on blue attack,64 because they were unable to diffuse a situation or approached 
it in the wrong manner’ (Interviewee 2), thus, supporting the supposition about 
the danger of attempting to correct behaviour at odds with British norms. The 
ICRC supports this perspective that ‘there is always a risk of an aggressive 
response (overt or otherwise) by the abusers.’ (Professional Standards for 
                                                                
64 A feature of the Afghan campaign where members of the Afghan Security Forces turned on the Western 
allies. The motivations for these attacks have been varied, but are said to include; insurgent collusion, 
insurgent infiltration, injured pride and lost tempers. The last two motivations are of primary relevance to 
this study. 
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Protection Work, 2013: 107). Therefore, some those training indigenous forces 
must be wary of intervening in situations that could put them at risk. 
Peer pressure 
Conversely, humility and understanding the foreign culture do not mean that all 
of their behaviours should be adopted or accepted. They are enviable qualities 
amongst advisers or mentors, but commanders must similarly be aware of the 
risk to commanders who are too open to the norms of other groups, whilst 
neglecting their own IHL norms. For this reason, those assigned to indigenous 
forces need to be self-confident: ‘Good, strong, heavyweight commanders aware 
of his actions and responsibilities are needed. He does not need to be an 
intellectual heavyweight, but professional and confident’ (Interview 1). Such 
characteristics should ensure the integrity of tactical commanders in specific 
dealings with indigenous forces. 
If an advisor working closely with indigenous forces does not possess the 
requisite commitment to IHL, the tight bonds they form with the groups they work 
with could mean ‘they could adopt some indigenous force traits in an effort to fit 
in’ (interview 1). Such behaviour might be viewed traditionally as peer pressure, 
whilst it may not imply that British forces would commit IHL violations themselves, 
it may suggest how they could further normalize such behaviour to a deeper level 
than that justified through a pragmatic patience model or by the UN DDP. One 
interviewee cites the case of the Baha Mousa death, previously mentioned in this 
study saying, ‘I suspect it was quite short steps to rule breaking. If you asked 
them now, what were they thinking at the time, they probably wouldn’t be able to 
answer, or be able to explain their actions’ (Interview 1). Interviewee 1’s belief 
that ‘peer pressure gradually builds up and up’ (Interview 1) to a point where 
normal behaviour is forgotten by normally rational actors could see advisors turn 
away from their usual norms. This concept is recognized by the ICRC (2013), 
which is robust on the threat of their own actors causing harm; one of their 
consistent principles being that their workers should ‘cause no harm’ 
(Professional Standards for Protection, 2013: 22). 
This is too large a topic for examination here, but there is clearly a spectrum of 
intervention that an adviser witnessing IHL violations may encounter. On one 
hand they may condone the violations as a result of peer pressure or a cultural 
acceptance amongst those they advise, on the other, they may rebuke violations 
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so excessively that they put themselves in danger. In selecting advisers who 
cannot understand the perspective of someone from a foreign culture or 
communicate the value of acting in accordance with IHL, you may be placing the 
adviser or others in unnecessary danger. Similarly they must remain self-
confident and professional enough to retain their traditional commitment to IHL. 
Character clashes 
The importance of personality is not just the responsibility of UK forces, ‘getting 
the wrong person works on both sides, a stubborn counterpart is equally difficult 
for the situation as a stubborn mentor’ (Interview 2). So when considering the 
appointment of a mentor, it is important to try and match personalities so that if a 
moment does arrive where one has to influence the other, personality clashes 
have already been considered. Again, the concept of defusing possible character 
clashes seems necessary on the tactical level, not one that can be explored 
extensively here. Still, it is a concept that should at least be mentioned in doctrine. 
Approach a possible IHL violations 
The need to appoint high quality individuals to positions where they may have to 
deal with difficult scenarios such as the example from Sierra Leone has been 
discussed. Examining how they might promote adherence once the kind of 
situation described erupts suggests the way a more communicative and original 
thinking character may be better suited for such tasks than the traditional combat 
focused soldier. One concept suggested in the course of this study is the need to 
appeal to the motivation of the indigenous forces worked with: ‘manipulating the 
situation to make them feel vindicated is important’ (Interview 1). So, for the 
adviser to be able to meet the desire for retribution in hostile situations, to 
influence the indigenous force on the one hand, but ensure IHL compliance on 
the other is a balancing act that depends on ‘how you sell it to them’ (Interviewee 
2). Therefore, advisers must seek out the motivation of their charges. ‘Suggesting 
that detaining him for interrogation and intelligence by units not in post battle 
frenzy may be more effective’ (Interviewee 1). 
Concepts of selling ideas may be alien to many of the combat soldiers described 
by interviewee 2 above, who are used to people doing as they are told, but this 
again reinforces the need to appoint advisers with the type of personality that can 
adapt to such situations, rather than the more typical disciplinarian military officer 
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or soldier. Such negotiation relates to the earlier discussion in this Chapter that 
should be understood by advisers in order to communicate. However, the 
maintenance of safety must taper any such intervention, similarly the concept of 
the adviser’s standing amongst those indigenous forces worked with is also 
relevant. 
Whether or not to step in: 
One question that these observations provoke is at what point should an adviser 
step in to protect IHL, or whether or not to at all. This debate has been stirred by 
the legal cases discussed earlier in this study. There exists the fear of complicity 
in such situations. The pragmatist soldier might argue ‘could the 12 man patrol 
cited above really step in to stop the beating they saw when faced with hundreds 
of SLA soldiers; it would be incredibly dangerous’ (interview 1). In Interview 7 it 
is claimed that under IHL norms the soldiers have a responsibility to protect such 
charters, even at risk to themselves. However, even for the ICRC (2013) their 
humanitarian workers’ personal safety is paramount, thus, claiming that no one 
should put themselves in danger where they are unwilling to. A problem with this 
comparison is that this organization is not training the indigenous forces in the 
first place, so their possible complicity in IHL violations is minimal. Interviewee 7 
advocated the possible creation of a scale of complicity that would allow the 
tactical commander to uphold the spirit of IHL, whilst protecting the lives of his 
own men and himself. However, one interviewee asserted rather cynically in such 
situations 'you are damned if you do, damned if you don't’ (Interview 1). This is 
again, a topic beyond the remit of this study, but worthy of further scrutiny. 
What long term solutions are available to the British Army 
Whilst the legal argument of whether or not an adviser or mentor should step into 
flammable situations should be discussed elsewhere, this writer feels a 
discussion on how best to intervene in such situations and possible steps to 
improve the British Army’s approach to such events, informed by personal 
experiences of the interviewees, is warranted. 
A second addition to the development of IHL adherence by mentors or advisors 
is the use of two existing, but underused models within the British Army, those of 
coaching and mediation. 
Other areas for study: 
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There is a lack of understanding of the tactical considerations of UK commanders 
in indigenous force focused doctrine. Six areas that could benefit from further 
study have been explored in this study. Whether or not there is an unofficial 
condoning of IHL abuses at the tactical level, not a moral approval, but 
recognition in line with NGO and UN literature that it takes time to develop IHL 
norms in indigenous forces, advisers and mentors must be both pragmatic and 
patient about this trend. The role of personality is currently underestimated in UK 
doctrine. Military commanders are treated as a bloc containing similar traits that 
vary minimally. This is in fact not the case, the UK military should pay greater 
attention to the types of people selected to conduct advisor tasks. Additionally, 
tactical commanders must be warned of the role of personality clash between the 
UK and the indigenous force commander. A development in the UK military’s 
understanding of their soldier’s personality types and those they seek to develop 
would therefore prove a viable course of academic study. 
The second stream that deserves greater academic and internal military scrutiny 
is more heavily tied to the legal debate. As the UK has seen with recent IHL and 
HRL cases, it has still not perfected the preparation of its own soldiers. 
Additionally, such abuses show that there is a danger of UK soldiers being drawn 
into violations to seek acceptance by peers. This could similarly be reciprocated 
with indigenous forces being developed, so the UK MOD should seek to 
understand their knowledge of such behaviour in much the same way that the 
ICRC do by issuing their ‘cause no harm’ directive. Finally, we have already 
acknowledged that IHL practices could be better understood by those teaching 
them, both for delivering training, but also for the point at which a tactical 
commander may or may not be complicit in a violation by failing to intervene. 
Military forces are distinct from humanitarian organizations because they seek to 
develop indigenous forces, by the fact that they delivered the training that goes 
on to aid the conduct of an IHL violation are they complicit, despite personal 
safety fears that stop intervention? 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, whilst current British Doctrine goes some way to offer useful 
guidance for advisors approaching training missions, such as the importance of 
developing strong relationships, humility and some practical considerations. The 
doctrine is undermined by a number of factors, not least that there exist a number 
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of informal methods and understanding of indigenous force development at the 
tactical level that are not recognized officially. 
The examination of recent historical examples within JDN 6/11 requires broader 
consideration by those writing it. The use of the RGR as the primary example of 
partnering indigenous forces is a poor choice. The analysis of the doctrine 
identifies several areas where the RGR model is not applicable to indigenous 
forces, specifically the advantage that the RGR possess in guaranteeing good 
pay and resources to its soldiers, a peaceful state of conflict to allow training and 
the length of time it has taken to establish the RGR at the level they are now at. 
Examination of more recent and relevant examples in greater depth should 
instead be pursued, such as the Iraqi police training team example from 2007 
utilized in the UK’s Stabilisation Doctrine. 
This dissertation has also found significance in the attachment of terminology to 
states of training. Whilst on the one hand, the doctrine emphasizes humility and 
equality in the cause of developing indigenous forces; it also mandates a 
doctrinally pure assignment of states of partnership on the indigenous forces 
being developed. The distinction between partnering and partnership is unwise, 
bordering on hubris. Kitson’s observation on the importance of terminology 
reinforces this view. This concept requires further examination. Do troops 
conducting training retain humility in their approach to developing indigenous 
forces, or do they find the delineation of clear boundaries advocated in the 
doctrine offering greater utility. 
The tactical considerations of commanders developing indigenous forces is one 
of the strongest endorsements of the ‘strategic corporal’ trend. Ground 
commanders are tasked with developing the IHL considerations in the forces they 
develop, yet they must simultaneously balance their personal safety and that of 
their men with the possible strategic repercussions of IHL violations by those they 
advise. This danger might take the form of post battle haze, or inculcate a more 
delayed Green on Blue reaction, as witnessed on so many occasions in the 
Afghanistan campaign. This equation is currently poorly understood in UK 
doctrine. 
These states of conflict highlight the necessity of developing understanding of the 
state of conflict that indigenous force development is occurring within. At present, 
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approaches to In contact methods of development are underrepresented in 
British Doctrine, but they are situations that carry the greatest risk. 
To prepare for such situations and counteract possible altercations, British 
military doctrine must pay more attention to the risk of character clashes and the 
significance of selecting the correct personality types to engage with indigenous 
forces. A blanket endorsement of all military commanders who have reached 
certain seniority exists across roles. There is an assumption that the perfect 
combat soldier will also be the perfect advisor, because he teaches combat. This 
assumption, when developing indigenous forces In contact, is unwise. Advisor 
safety and advocating IHL norms amongst indigenous forces suffers from 
advisors’ personality and character traits not being taken into account when they 
are selected for such roles. 
Pragmatic judgment is at play on the ground that does not condone, but does 
tolerate low level IHL violations by indigenous forces. This is in line with trends 
developed by the UN Due Diligence Policy and the ICRC at the strategic level. 
By selecting the correct people for the task, soldiers can better interpret such 
scenarios by being afforded training that prepares them to influence and cajole 
those they develop. Through coaching and mediating difficult situations, rather 
than directing the end state, more satisfactory IHL outcomes will be gained.
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Recommendations  
The UK MOD must exploit its internal experience and that of external bodies that 
could aid the professionalisation of indigenous forces. There are pools of 
underutilised experience within the UK MOD and civilian Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). In order to develop a more comprehensive approach, the 
UK MOD should assimilate the knowledge of NGOs to further enhance the 
development of adherence to IHL professionalism amongst indigenous forces.  
The European Union define the comprehensive approach as ‘the strategically 
coherent use of EU tools and instruments…. at its disposal – spanning the 
diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid fields.’ (European Union, 2013). The current interplay between 
the MOD and external groups does not achieve this. This is the result of 
government disorganisation, organisational bias between both organisations and 
the desire to retain neutrality by some NGOs. NGOs and the ICRC have 
extensive experience of developing indigenous force adherence to IHL, reflected 
in their doctrine and practical experience. The UK MOD should exploit the 
practices of NGOs to be more comprehensive in its approach to COIN, 
Stabilisation and IHL adherence. 
The tactical level has more ability to impact the success of Professionalisation 
than ever before. In recent years, the ICRC and NGOs understanding of this 
subject have evolved away from an emphasis on high level engagement to more 
grassroots development of IHL norms. There remains some disparity amongst 
the shared understanding of these themes by both military and NGO 
practitioners. Adherence is better understood to require patience and be the 
result of cultural norms, not just military discipline, affected over time and by 
integrating IHL training into all forms of training.  
UN Concerns 
Returning to the slightly more strategic efforts to encourage professionalism 
within indigenous forces, the British Government should adopt a due diligence 
policy. The UN have similar concerns to those raised in Chapter 2 that indigenous 
forces may abuse the skills that they are taught. However, the UN has developed 
a policy to ensure continued engagement, whilst mitigating the risk of abuses. 
The UN Due Diligence Policy for working with foreign security forces stresses 
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that support must be consistent with international law. Support is not permissible 
where ‘real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of 
international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant 
authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures’ (2013: 2). 
It is significant that both the UK Government and the United Nations acknowledge 
the risks associated with training forces in unstable states, but also its necessity. 
However, the UN’s adoption of a Due Diligence Policy is a positive move to 
placate these concerns that the UK government would be wise to copy. The UN 
(2013) publicly acknowledges that the withdrawal of efforts in the presence of 
clear violations might diminish the development of forces, thus undermining 
stabilisation efforts. They affirm that engagement with people practicing methods 
unpalatable to Western society can cause better outcomes than non-
engagement. This process must be tempered with patience, government 
acceptance is required that it takes time to develop these norms, whilst 
simultaneously affording forces the opportunity to convince indigenous forces of 
the advantages of proper behaviour 
What is the problem? 
The aspiration to be comprehensive in UK approaches to stabilisation has 
emerged, but remains ineffective. The UK MOD understands the comprehensive 
approach to be ‘Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes 
that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes’ (JDP 3/40, 
2009: 51). Whilst Building Stability Overseas (2011) is an early government 
attempt to promote greater collaboration between government departments, the 
contributions to BSO are undeveloped. The literature is comprehensive in its use 
of input from Government departments: DfiD, FCO and MOD; but limited beyond 
that, both BSO and MOD doctrine lack emphasis on the organisations outside 
government. In fact, Interview 3 endorsed this view and went further by claiming 
that there was a lack of coordination between government departments 
themselves. It could be that it is the competing nature of stabilisation interests 
and disorganisation holding back comprehensive approaches within government 
itself, not a specific wilful organisational bias from either government or all NGOs. 
The Comprehensive approach makes clear the need for a broad array of inputs. 
The UK Government’s approach and more specifically the MOD’s doctrine would 
be enhanced by greater input of NGO expertise.  
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Why ICRC and alternative sources of expertise should be considered 
This study asserts that NGOs and humanitarian organisations have a part to play 
in contributing to the UK’s approach to developing IHL adherence during 
indigenous force development. An extensive group of NGOs associated with the 
protection of IHL exists; two of these organisations have profound insight into 
indigenous forces, the ICRC and Amnesty International. The extent of ICRC 
literature and Amnesty’s campaigning activities on engaging armed groups and 
governments on IHL underscores their experience. Whilst the military specialise 
in what Huntington termed the ‘management of violence’, humanitarian 
organizations focus on the limitation and cessation of its effects. The ICRC are 
charged with ‘the understanding and dissemination of knowledge of international 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 
2006: xxxii), extrapolating areas of their expertise beneficial to British operations 
with indigenous forces is worthwhile.  
Why they are currently not used 
The existing lack of interplay between the UK MOD and NGOs is not purely the 
result of the military’s inclination to look inwards. The ICRC overlooks military 
actors with relevant experience of IHL issues too. International seminars on 
encouraging compliance with IHL conducted by the ICRC in 2003, exemplify this 
paradox. The seminars utilised parliamentarians, government experts and NGO 
representatives, a broad array of interested parties to develop approaches and 
their knowledge of improving compliance to IHL, but avoided military 
practitioners. This invites a huge deficit in the experience represented at such 
seminars because of the aspiration to retain conflict neutrality.  
Neutrality 
The ICRC pride themselves on neutrality, Hoffman and Schneckener claim that 
‘their flexible but principled approaches are one of their strengths’ (2006: 10). This 
provides greater access to groups involved in conflict. But this neutrality creates 
a handicap, in the form of less open engagement with established military forces. 
Amnesty International does not have this problem. ‘Amnesty differ from the ICRC 
that they are not wholly objective. They advocate on behalf of the civilians trapped 
in conflict’ (Interview 3). The ICRC loses valid perspectives on the development 
of IHL adherence and limits their doctrine in the same way as UK MOD Doctrine. 
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Although for Amnesty their campaigning on issues of British violation of IHL such 
as the Marine A or the Baha Moussa case would impel them to remain detached 
from the UK MOD, they in fact argue that it is like engaging with any government 
department, ‘the FCO, DfiD, MOD, Department for Education, NHS; we can’t 
have an aversion to the military, they are an actor in human rights issues’ 
(Interview 3). Conversely, for the ICRC to hold a conference on adherence to the 
laws governing armed conflict without input from those that take part in conflict 
could even undermine the efforts of such literature to generate more actionable 
solutions to problems within this dissertation. 
There has, in recent years been a growing will within the UK MOD to utilise 
external academic expertise for the development of counterinsurgency strategy, 
such as think tanks like RUSI and Chatham House, and the rise of Institutions 
such as Oxford’s Changing Character of Warfare Department (CCW) and 
Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute (SSI). However, to gain more thorough 
experiences from broader sources, the UK MOD should attempt to further open 
input to its doctrine to broader sources such as the aforementioned NGOs. 
Bottom up development & patience 
The UK must embrace a more bottom up approach to developing IHL adherence. 
At the start of the last decade, much of the debate focused on the top down 
elements of encouraging IHL. The publication, Improving Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law (2003) makes several recommendations to aid 
governments and international organisations.65 Whilst these are all concepts that 
the UK MOD and Government should consider, these approaches are focused at 
the higher levels of engagement, and provide less applicability for tactical 
commanders developing indigenous forces. The nature of this guidance and the 
article’s use of practitioners at the top of implementation infer a paradigm of top 
down encouragement of adherence at the time. This study finds that ‘Bottom Up’ 
methods of IHL encouragement are more effective.  
The exercise of higher power has a limit to its impact in many of the situations 
that the ICRC find themselves in today. Whilst the diplomatic functions 
emphasised in the literature a decade ago are important in supporting tactical 
                                                                
65 Dissemination and education of IHL, discreet negotiations to encourage respect for IHL, diplomatic 
pressure, utilize existing IHL mechanisms, withdraw aid or assistance until IHL is addressed and the 
consideration coercive measures, such as diplomatic sanctions. 
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commanders. Bottom up development has taken on added focus. Hoffman and 
Schneckener argue that ‘experience has shown that it is more productive to begin 
dialogue with more practical matters rather than delving into abstract issues of 
international norms’ (2011: 10). Further to this, there must be an element of 
consensus building with those receiving advice, sometimes patience is required; 
‘do not offer take-it-or-leave-it programs but gradual processes through which the 
armed actors become acquainted with international norms step by step.’ (2011: 
10). This emulates a major finding of Chapter 3, that the importance of patience 
must be emphasised to tactical commanders. These perspectives encourage a 
greater recognition of the need to develop tactical commanders if IHL norms are 
to improve. 
Greater cultural approach 
The understanding of culture must be reinforced amongst indigenous force 
mentors. Some academics have argued in line with the military society debate, 
that it is the culture of the nation or military that must be addressed to develop 
adherence to IHL, ‘The general opinion is that violations of international 
humanitarian law are not due to the inadequacy of its rules, but rather to a lack 
of willingness to respect them’ (Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, 2006: xxxiii). To 
change this, Hoffman and Schneckener (2011) advocate the importance of 
developing a mind-set that renounces IHL violations, using ‘norm diffusion’; 
making adherence to international laws, normal throughout societies. Similarly 
Sassoli (2010) emphasises the importance of social attitudes towards IHL. Both 
of these examples highlight the importance of perception in the conduct of internal 
conflict. Sassolli claims that for prospective perpetrators of IHL violations, 
‘rejection by their own social environment has a greater stigmatizing effect than 
reprobation by the enemy, third states or a distant ‘international’ community’ 
(2010: 10). Such viewpoints are not advanced in the earlier methods of 
encouraging adherence.  
Integration 
In conjunction with greater emphasis of cultural approaches, Integration has 
emerged as a popular approach in ICRC literature. Although the ICRC (2007) 
describe it as a top down approach, they also emphasise that ‘all levels of the 
chain of command are to be involved, from the strategic down to the tactical’ 
(Integration, 2007: 21). Integration is the issuing of standing orders for the 
 107 
adoption of practical IHL training encompassing multiple training activities, this 
still requires the buy in of the junior ranks conducting the training, But by 
advocating a greater practical rather than theoretical approach to training, the 
ICRC claim that ‘this approach enables participants to retain nearly 90% of the 
content, weeks later’ (Integration, 2007: 29). Conversely, more traditional 
classroom methods of teaching law of armed conflict are abandoned in favour of 
role playing scenarios. This represents one further way in which training 
indigenous forces in IHL can be strengthened. 
Coaching and mediation 
Integration of norms into training marries well with the concept of coaching, 
a concept understood within the British Army already, but underutilised to 
develop indigenous forces. The ASLS (Army Staff Leadership School) in 
Pirbright advocate coaching methods that reason and encourage thinking in 
the development of members of the British Army. The concept of coaching 
differs from training, in that the correction to behaviour is encouraged by the 
coach, but the solution is gleaned from the subject. As opposed to training 
which is the direction of a specific course of action. Coaching allows a more 
patient approach to indigenous forces, as advocated throughout this study, 
but also attempts to correct behaviour in a less confrontational manner.  
Coaching is cited as a form of assistance given by advisers or mentors in 
JDN 6/11, but no formal coaching training is mandated before deployment. 
The utility of this approach was corroborated by the reflections in Interview 
2, who claimed that 'rules are often counterproductive as they are imposed 
by outsiders, and resented', whereas he felt that 'the suggestion of courses 
of action were often warmly accepted (by indigenous forces)', this is exactly 
in line with coaching principles, solutions reached through the indigenous 
soldier’s reasoning. Interviewee 5 had not previously known about the 
existence of this form of training within the British Army, but was highly 
receptive to its implementation amongst those dealing with indigenous 
forces. Currently coaching is focused on those assigned to UK training 
establishments. Interview 10 had previously been employed in an Army 
establishment that utilised coaching as a method. He noted that being able 
to employ the technique as an advisor to Afghan forces not only allowed him 
to impart training detail to indigenous forces effectively, but by not dictating 
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methods and actions it cemented personal relationships with commanders 
mentioned in Chapter 3. 
A similar form of engagement is mediation theory, detailed in The Harvard 
Guide to Negotiated Theory. There is a limited development of such concepts 
amongst young Officers at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, but not 
offered to those deploying as mentors to indigenous forces. The theory 
focuses on the Position- what someone says, and the Interests- what they 
want and need, and attempts to meet both parties’ interests to produce 
positive outcomes. If equipping Advisors to mitigate the behaviour of 
indigenous forces, they must be armed with such techniques. 
The right people 
The importance of selecting the right personnel for such environments has 
already been discussed. These advisers or mentors may benefit from further 
development in line with the United States understanding of Civil-military 
Teaming, as advocated in Interview 5, which demands individuals capable of 1) 
adapting across cultures 2) building relationships 3) collaborating with others. 
Currently, cultural specialists in the UK military get a form of social anthropology 
training, but indigenous force advisors do not get such extensive training. Before 
deployment, ‘the Brigade Advisor Group conducted fragmented training before 
deployment that contained some half-hearted scenarios focused on interaction 
with Afghans, but mostly focused on delivering a combat, not advisor unit to 
Afghanistan’ (Interview 6), furthermore, Interviewee 6 was not aware of specific 
training to be a mentor. Such characteristics would directly aid the outlook of 
soldiers described in Interview 2, and should therefore receive additional 
attention when selection and training of advisers is conducted.  
Pressure through resources 
Resources exist as one method of influencing indigenous forces. In the situation 
described in Chapter 3, the aftermath of the event in Sierra Leone, the 
interviewee ‘exerted influence with the threat of withdrawal of bullets, food, 
money’ (Interview 1), which highlights an awareness that even in fragmented 
military organisation the leadership can be expected to impose some form of 
influence over their troops to guarantee the maintained supply of support. This 
argument was supported by the observations of Interview 3 as well, who claimed 
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that operational commanders were not always completely sincere in their support 
for IHL norms in Syria, but ‘there exists a box ticking exercise for transfer of 
equipment by governments, adherence to international law is one of these boxes’ 
(Interview 3), so referring tactical violations and threatening the withdrawal of 
equipment or support often did have the desired corrective effect. For the tactical 
commander who cannot step in ‘it is perhaps best to report it up the chain and 
exert pressure through the threat of the withdrawal of support’ (Interview 1). But 
for cases where intervention or communication to halt violations at the tactical 
level may be conducted, influencing behaviour with the control of resources is an 
effective tool. 
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Study Conclusion 
This study has conducted a broad exploration of SSR and indigenous force 
development, specifically the risks that indigenous forces may abuse the skills 
that they are taught and how these risks may be mitigated by the UK MOD.  
SSR literature is overwhelmingly focused on the understanding of contemporary 
conflict with theoretical input from older counterinsurgency conflicts. However, 
SSR theory is relatively lacking, driven by the infancy of the concept. This study 
subsequently utilised early civil-military relations theory in detail. The works of 
Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz examine the relationship between the 
state and society. Their theories are so important here because they allude to the 
standards to which military forces are held accountable. These standards are 
rarely discussed in SSR literature, which covers the more practical 
implementation of indigenous force development. 
Within British military doctrine, the understanding of SSR and concepts of civil-
military relations theory are disconnected, this undermines efforts to develop 
indigenous force adherence to international law. Civil-military relations theorists 
Kamrava (2000) and Feaver (1996) highlight the risk in developing the 
management of violence amongst the indigenous forces in less developed states 
where pre-existing traditions of civil-military control do not exist. Because 
traditions of control do not exist to the same extent as in Western states, 
indigenous forces have greater freedom to act outside the norms of international 
law, unchecked by their own government or society. Because of this risk, the UK 
MOD must better understand the connection between civil-military relations and 
SSR; a link which is very strong but is infrequently acknowledged in doctrine. 
Chapter One examined the progression of intervention over the past thirty years 
up to a point where indigenous force development and SSR are now staple 
aspects of British military intervention. There has been a decline in state on state 
conflicts, but a rise in internal conflict leading to greater instability and pressure 
on the UK’s security interests. This drives the UK to establish greater stability 
abroad through the development of indigenous forces. 
Indigenous force development has the potential to play an enormous role in future 
UK foreign policy. These forces offer the UK Government the ability to intervene 
by influencing unstable states threatening UK interests, whilst also mitigating the 
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dangers of wholesale UK military intervention. Intervention in the 1990s 
increasingly attempted to utilise foreign financial aid to allow states to develop at 
their own speed. However, it was difficult to ensure buy in to such aid from the 
host state and to enact the required development without the presence of security 
that comes with professional military and police forces. As a result, the 
development of indigenous forces is seen by Western states as an effective 
method of providing stability quickly. 
Indigenous forces offer local legitimacy, the ability to engage with the local 
population with local linguistic and cultural understanding that a Western 
interventionist would struggle to match. Furthermore, the development of 
legitimate indigenous forces is significantly cheaper and palpably more tolerable 
than a large intervention by an outside state. However, the process comes with 
risks. The conflict traps and instability that demand development of stability in 
foreign states simultaneously increases the risk of them abusing the skills they 
are taught, as highlighted by Feaver and Kamrava in the literature review. 
Properly understanding this associated risk is essential to the success of the 
professionalisation of indigenous forces. 
The risk of indigenous forces was examined in three parts in chapter two. What 
the likelihood of indigenous forces abusing the skills that they are taught is and 
why this risk exists; how this risk manifests itself to present danger to the UK 
government with tactical and strategic implications; and finally the legal 
ramifications of indigenous forces abusing the skills that they are taught. 
The possibility that indigenous forces will abuse the skills that they are taught is 
driven by socioeconomic, institutional and resource factors within an unstable 
state. The study found that there was a high likelihood of such abuse occurring 
given the factors that cause violence and the presence of these factors in many 
of the states that require engagement. There is often deprivation and corruption 
and a weakness of civil-military structures that have facilitated the instability that 
warrants Western intervention. These factors are further enhanced by the legacy 
of conflict with many adults having been plagued by the effects of war, as well as 
the use of drugs and child soldiers amongst indigenous forces. 
Efforts to create stability within the state are undermined if indigenous forces 
abuse the skills that they are taught. Counterinsurgency scholars have argued 
that direct methods of military control and oppressive behaviour can be effective 
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in controlling unstable states or for a counterinsurgent facing insurgency, such as 
methods used in Nazi Germany or post-revolutionary China. However such 
methods are doomed to fail in the long-term, as populations grow weary of such 
control. Furthermore, the UK military must consider what General Carter has 
termed ‘Engaging Domestically’: that UK domestic sentiment will not tolerate 
methods at odds with the modern British moral code, nor quite often will soldiers. 
Furthermore, the proliferation of media technology has meant that abuses do not 
remain hidden for long. Therefore, to maintain continued domestic support for 
interventionist training missions and to maintain the support of the local 
population, indigenous forces must utilise methods that do not politically 
undermine a Western government or push people to oppose the indigenous force 
being trained. 
Legal considerations further add to these strategic and tactical considerations. 
The exposure of abuses by Western trained indigenous forces has enormous 
legal significance today. Recent legal cases brought about by the Iraq and Afghan 
conflicts have undermined the UK MOD in British courts. There exists a similar 
risk that the UK training indigenous forces who abuse the skills they are taught 
leaves them vulnerable for prosecution as complicit in the conduct of abuses and 
could even implicate those soldiers or officers that train the indigenous force. This 
risk has been noted in UK Parliamentary papers as undermining the aspiration to 
develop indigenous forces, such as in Nigeria. Similarly, there were a number of 
examples of events in Afghanistan where British forces were forced to alter their 
decisions regarding local prisoners because of the influence of legal groups from 
the West. This influence is referred to as Lawfare. 
Legal cases criticising government military intervention are frequently referred to 
as examples of Lawfare. But as this study discusses, this is quite often not the 
case; legal challenge to British military actions cannot be viewed as solely 
subversive, they can also represent effective examples of civil-military control 
within the United Kingdom. The ability for the UK government to mitigate the risk 
of indigenous forces abusing the skills that they are taught is, therefore, essential.  
Chapter Three found that UK doctrine is currently ineffective in its aid to preparing 
UK troops to develop indigenous forces. The study’s examination of UK doctrine 
found that it lacked breadth in its research, specifically utilizing a case study of 
the Royal Gurkha Rifles (RGR) that is almost irrelevant to the cause of developing 
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modern indigenous forces. The RGR are a foreign recruited, but British 
commanded force, they are well paid and have a long history of British service. 
Conversely this is not so with indigenous forces.  
Similar error exists with the doctrine’s use of terminology, which is often derisory 
to undeveloped forces, relegating them to junior partners. All the while the 
positive aspects of the RGR case study advocate the importance of a two way 
relationship between advisor and soldier. This doctrine subsequently exists as 
fundamentally contradictory. 
The conflicting messages within the doctrine led this study to investigate whether 
or not there are informal paradigms occurring at the tactical level that are not 
acknowledged in the doctrine. By utilising interviews with retired British Army 
soldiers and officers and other practitioners, this study found that there are 
instances of decoupling occurring within indigenous force training missions. 
British soldiers understand situations at play at the tactical level that are not 
reiterated either in doctrine or British policy. These factors include the exercise of 
Pragmatic Patience where soldiers accept certain violations from British moral 
norms within the context of the society within which they are deployed. This 
patience is driven by the desire to stay and develop indigenous forces, knowing 
that removing the mission will not lead the long term improvement in stability or 
their behaviour. Secondly, there is the very real issue of safety. There is a large 
risk that by attempting to intervene in situations that are at odds with international 
law, British troops place themselves at risk. Therefore, understanding the existing 
norms for engagement with indigenous forces at the tactical level is a subject 
worthy of study. 
Further study 
The progress of this study highlighted several features which, if given further 
examination, would be of significant interest to the subject. Greater examination 
of the risk of abuse during indigenous force development would aid the 
understanding of governments preparing to conduct SSR. Preliminary work on 
this has been done by those studying the causes of violence. However, a greater 
understanding of how the causes of this risk emerge during SSR would allow a 
more directed mitigation of this risk. 
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Should the risk of indigenous force abuse of power materialise, legal study into 
the culpability of British forces in training indigenous forces who go on to abuse 
the skills they are taught would aid British government preparedness for such 
cases. This is beyond the remit of this study, but would prove particularly 
interesting to legal minds. One consideration that has been suggested is a sliding 
scale of culpability; a way to mitigate the risk by defining appropriate actions for 
ground commanders. The military legal debate from within Government would be 
wise to focus on creating legal protection by mitigating the risk of indigenous 
forces abusing the skills they are taught. The UN policy of conditionality is one 
example of this. 
Finally, greater examination of the current preparation for British forces who will 
train indigenous forces is required. The current understanding of the factors 
affecting indigenous forces and how to mitigate the risk of them abusing the skills 
they are taught is limited. This study identifies a number of areas where British 
forces may better uphold concepts of professionalism, IHL and traditions of civil-
military relations, which will be discussed in concluding recommendations.  
Recommendations 
In conjunction with conducting further examination of issues identified in this 
study, this dissertation makes five key recommendations which would improve 
UK encouragement of adherence to international law by indigenous forces during 
SSR. The key themes are recapped here. 
Recommendation One: There are pools of knowledge, experience and 
understanding that the UK MOD does not currently exploit which limits the UK’s 
approach to the development of indigenous forces. Advocating IHL adherence 
has evolved significantly in the last decade, therefore the UK MOD must monitor 
this debate, and utilise increased engagement with NGOs to remain better 
informed. One example of this is that the ICRC has evolved in the manner they 
advocate for proper behaviour on the battlefield. Whilst top down influence on 
governments is effective, as noted in Interview One of this study, the ICRC now 
increasingly advocate bottom up influence and grassroots engagement to foster 
an attitude throughout society that rejects abject violence; a concept similar to 
that argued by Janowitz. So this must be seen as a developing debate that needs 
monitoring.  
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Recommendation Two: However, this process is not immediate; changing 
cultures and norms takes time. Time is a significant concept that requires more 
thorough understanding in the UK MOD’s doctrine on developing indigenous 
forces. This study identified the concept of Pragmatic Patience where British 
soldiers are accepting and experiencing violations in international law, but with 
the belief that in the longterm their continued presence will improve the behaviour 
of the indigenous force. Both the MOD and ICRC recognise the importance of the 
time it takes to change cultural norms and the patience needed to accompany 
that, but this should be better represented in the preparation of soldiers and 
doctrine. 
Recommendation Three: The UK MOD should liaise and adopt the techniques 
and understanding of non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations 
such as Amnesty and the ICRC. These include incubating practices of bottom up 
development, IHL Integration into training and utilising greater cultural 
understanding amongst advisers. With broader input into the doctrine and 
practices of intervention the MOD can mitigate some of the challenge from civil-
military oversight that originates with NGOs focused on the protection of 
international law; this would foster not only shared understanding, but also trust. 
Recommendation Four: Although external sources of knowledge and 
experience can be invaluable, there are available techniques and experiences 
already at use within the British military and Government which would aid 
indigenous force development, specifically getting someone from a foreign 
culture to act in a way that might differ from his traditional norms. Mediation and 
coaching, which are well regarded in other fields of military training, could provide 
an effective development to prepare soldiers for the difficult and dangerous 
situations that may confront them. It should therefore be included as a greater 
part in preparing indigenous force trainers to develop forces. 
Recommendation Five: Finally, a recommendation which would help to place 
the UK in a stronger legal position, by better examining the risks faced before 
indigenous force training missions are conducted. The UN has adopted a Due 
Diligence Policy which accepts certain risk of indigenous forces misbehaving but 
gives clearer guidance on what the response to that should be, compared to the 
current adhoc UK approach. Adoption of a policy by the UK government would 
 116 
remove the presence of decoupling amongst military forces by bringing the 
current UK policy into line with tactical paradigms. 
In conclusion, this study finds that there exists a considerable amount of 
competence in the UK MOD’s development of indigenous forces and a longterm 
desire to improve the behaviour of indigenous forces attempting to secure their 
own states. However, the UK can improve encouragement of adherence to 
international law during Security Sector Reform by adopting the methods 
recommended here and by marrying formal and informal understanding of 
developing indigenous forces. Otherwise, future engagement and training 
missions will remain at risk.
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